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Abstract 
 
Pesticides are used in agriculture to protect crops from pests and diseases, with indiscriminate 
pesticide use having several adverse effects on the environment. In an era of an increasing 
public awareness on pesticides’ environmental spillovers, the EU is trying to update its 
pesticide policy by using economic incentives, aiming at reducing pesticide use and 
environmental spillovers. This dissertation focuses on assessing how pesticide use and its 
related environmental spillovers are affecting farmers’ production environment under a 
dynamic production setting, thus assisting policy makers in designing optimal pesticide policy 
tools.  
 
This dissertation met this research aim through an extensive study of relevant literature and the 
implementation of empirical research. The former included the identification of the contours of 
an optimal pesticide policy scheme, exploring the information needed for the introduction of 
such a policy framework in order to identify knowledge gaps to be addressed to support the 
design of optimal pesticide policies. The empirical research included an empirical evaluation of 
the impacts of pesticide use and environmental spillovers in agricultural production, empirical 
assessment of the impacts of pesticide tax and levy schemes on pesticide use and the 
environment, non-parametric efficiency analysis of arable farms taking into account pesticide 
dynamics, biodiversity and production uncertainty, and risk-adjusted efficiency analysis of 
arable farms considering explicitly the risk-increasing or-decreasing nature of pesticides and 
other inputs.  
 
This research produced a number of key findings: the development of environmental standards, 
where differentiated tax rates can be based on, needs further attention due to inadequate 
information on pesticides’ environmental spillovers; the indirect impacts of pesticides on 
biodiversity have a significant impact on farmer’s production environment; pesticides are on 
average overused in Dutch arable farming; pesticide taxes as a single instrument can be 
characterized as ineffective since they yield small decreases in pesticide use and environmental 
spillovers; Dutch arable farmers have noticeable output and pesticide environmental 
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inefficiency scores; and when adjusting outputs and inputs to account for the impact of 
variability in production conditions, estimates of inefficiency decreased dramatically. 
 
The main conclusions drawn from this research were that an optimal pesticide policy should 
involve incentives to achieve environmental and health standards; future pesticide policies 
should try to decrease pesticide use and conserve organisms beneficial for the farm; and that 
our understanding of efficiency levels can be distorted when using models that ignore the 
dynamics of production and the effects of variability in production conditions.  
 
Keywords: Pesticides, biodiversity, dynamics, environmental spillovers, arable farming, 
economic incentives, production uncertainty, Netherlands. 
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1.1 Background 
 
During the last decades, there is a considerable increase in the global level of food production. 
This growth that was brought about mainly by technological innovations has its impact on the 
environment. Agricultural intensification has resulted in environmental degradation but, on the 
other hand, the development of pollution abatement technologies promises to ease these 
environmental problems. Sustainable agricultural production is of primary importance in 
sustaining human needs and protecting the natural habitat. 
  
Plant protection products constitute one of the most important agricultural inputs in developed 
countries. Being a damage- and risk-reducing input, these products are widely used in 
agricultural production (EC, 2006). Their stochastic nature (productivity and climatic 
conditions, pest arrival) is related to uncertainty on the timing and the way of applying them. 
There is a large range of positive outcomes from the use of pesticides. Pesticides can help in 
securing and improving crop yields and quality of the obtained products resulting in increased 
farm and agribusiness revenues. Other benefits of pesticide use is the improved shelf life of the 
produce, reduced drudgery of weeding that frees labor for other tasks, reduced fuel use for 
weeding, and invasive species control (Cooper and Dobson, 2007). On the other hand, pesticide 
application is related to various externalities that call for an immediate rational use of these 
chemical substances. 
 
Starting with the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 which highlighted the 
risks of pesticide use, continuous use of chemical inputs such as pesticides produces significant 
negative externalities that have been broadly documented in the scientific literature (Pimentel 
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et. al., 1992; Pimentel and Greiner, 1997). Pesticides can be dangerous for human health when 
the degree of exposure exceeds the safety levels. This exposure can be direct, such as the 
exposure of farm workers applying pesticides to various crops and indirect by consumers 
consuming agricultural products containing chemical traces or even bystanders near application 
areas. Additionally, the excessive and uncontrolled use of pesticides can pose serious and 
irreversible environmental risks and costs. Fauna and flora have been adversely affected while 
the decline of the number of beneficial pest predators has led to the proliferation of different 
pests and diseases (Pimentel and Greiner, 1997). Certain pesticides applied to crops eventually 
end up in ground and surface water. In surface water like streams and lakes, pesticides can 
contribute to fishery losses in several ways (Pimentel et al., 1992). High chemical 
concentrations can kill fish directly or indirectly by killing the insects that serve as fish food 
source. Moreover, the extensive use of pesticides has often resulted in the development of 
pesticide resistant weeds and pests (Powles et al., 1997; Jutsum et al., 1998). This can trigger 
increased pesticide applications to reduce pest damage and avoid crop loss. Pimentel et al. 
(1992) mention many adverse consequences from the overuse of pesticides such as animal 
poisoning, contaminated products, destruction of beneficial natural predators and parasites, bee 
poisoning and reduced pollination, crop and biodiversity losses.  
 
Many international and national policies are aiming to reduce pesticide use as consumers are 
becoming more aware of pesticide externalities and demand pesticide free agricultural products 
and cleaner and safer natural habitat. Important efforts towards regulating pollution have been 
made in industrialized countries in the form of increasingly stringent environmental regulations. 
Regulations on the marketing of plant protection products, maximum residue levels and the 
thematic strategy on the sustainable use of pesticides compose the puzzle of the European 
pesticide policy. European Union is aiming at implementing coherent pesticide regulations 
Chapter 1 
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incorporating economic incentives (i.e. tax and levy schemes) in an effort to reduce pesticide 
use and indirect effects, thus protecting public health and the environment. Research at the 
farm-level may provide important information to policy makers seeking to introduce optimal 
pesticide policies. 
 
1.2 Farm-level empirical research and pesticide policy 
 
Farm-level approaches are important in primary policy analysis as the design and 
implementation of an efficient pesticide policy (based on economic incentives) requires 
information on pesticide use, and the indirect effects of pesticides (Hoevenagel et al., 1999; 
Oskam et al., 1997). Findings coming from farm-level approaches can assist policy makers in 
introducing optimal economic incentive-based pesticide policies by revealing important 
information on pesticide demand elasticity, evidence on overuse or underuse of pesticides, 
impact of pesticides’ indirect effects on output realization, and efficiency of the use of 
pesticides.  
 
Evidence on pesticide demand elasticity provides insights on a potential pesticide tax rate, 
while information on pesticide overuse or underuse reveal the products to be targeted for 
reductions. Investigating the production impact of pesticides’ environmental spillovers shows 
the role farmland biodiversity plays on output realization, thus providing useful information for 
preservation strategies. Information on the extent to which farmers use pesticides efficiently 
and contribute to spillovers can reveal if there is a potential for reducing pesticide use and their 
spillovers. 
 
General Introduction 
 
12 
 
Despite the importance of a farm-level approach on primary policy analysis, little empirical 
research has been done on jointly investigating the impact of pesticide use and environmental 
spillovers on production. Lack of detailed farm-level data on pesticides environmental 
spillovers may be considered a reason for the lack of empirical evidence. 
  
1.3 Study objective and research questions 
 
The objective of this study is to provide a theoretical and empirical evaluation of the impact of 
pesticide use, and environmental spillovers in output realization under a dynamic production 
environment, thus assisting policy makers in introducing optimal pesticide policies. To achieve 
this goal five research questions are addressed: 
1. What is the contour of an optimal pesticide policy scheme and what are the knowledge 
gaps to be addressed to support the design of optimal pesticide policies?  
2. Are pesticides’ impacts on biodiversity affecting agricultural output? 
3. Are pesticide tax and levy schemes effective in reducing pesticide use and 
environmental spillovers in Dutch arable farming? 
4. What is Dutch farmers’ technical and pesticides’ environmental inefficiency when 
considering pesticide dynamic effects on biodiversity  and production uncertainty? 
5. What is Dutch farmers’ technical and allocative inefficiency when accounting for 
undesirable outputs and the risk-increasing or decreasing nature of agricultural inputs?  
 
1.4 Research approach and data 
 
Different approaches were used to answer the five research questions. For question one, a 
literature review took place to identify the optimal pesticide policy. This was followed by an 
Chapter 1 
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identification of the elements needed to apply such a policy framework, i.e., the production 
structure (i.e., production function, pesticide demand elasticities), attitudes toward risk and 
uncertainty related to pesticides application, the value of pesticides to consumers (e.g., the 
willingness to pay (WTP) for lower pesticide use), and the effects of pesticide use on 
biodiversity in relation to existing pesticide policies. Reviewing the literature on the pre-
mentioned elements enabled the identification of knowledge gaps that need to be addressed to 
introduce an optimal pesticide policy scheme. 
 
Question two aims at an empirical assessment of the impact of pesticides’ environmental 
spillovers on farmers’ production environment. For this purpose, a dynamic model of optimal 
pesticide use was employed incorporating two pesticide categories that differ in terms of 
toxicity, and pesticides’ environmental spillovers in different specifications of the production 
function. Furthermore, shadow prices of the different inputs were computed to assess whether 
an input is overused or not, thus providing important information to policy makers aiming at 
designing subsidies and taxes for different inputs. 
 
Question three, addresses the impact of tax and levy schemes on pesticide use and 
environmental spillovers. In other words, the aim of this research question is to investigate 
whether economic incentives can alter pesticide decisions at the farm level such that 
environmental spillovers of pesticides are reduced. A dynamic model of optimal pesticide use is 
developed and estimated econometrically. Following the econometric estimation, a dynamic 
optimization model is developed that is used to assess the impacts of several scenarios of tax 
and levy schemes, and quotas on pesticide use and environmental spillovers. 
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Question four aims at investigating the performance of Dutch arable farms when taking into 
account pesticide dynamics and production uncertainty (i.e., the variation in production arising 
from climatic events and other random forces). A dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
model is applied to outputs, inputs, and undesirables of Dutch arable farms. The Simar and 
Wilson (2007) double-bootstrap procedure is employed to explain technical inefficiency using 
socioeconomic and environmental variables, thus providing empirical representations of the 
impact of stochastic elements and the state of nature on production. The results of the double-
bootstrap procedure are used to adjust firms’ outputs and inputs to account for the impact of 
variability in production conditions. 
 
Question five, aims at investigating the performance of Dutch arable farms taking explicitly 
into account the risk behaviour of producers. A non-parametric risk-adjusted inefficiency model 
is used utilizing undesirable outputs and accounting explicitly for the effect of production 
means on output variability. Output, risk-mitigating inputs and, undesirable outputs inefficiency 
are computed. Moreover, shadow values of the risk-mitigating inputs are calculated, providing 
the extent to which these inputs are over- or under-used. 
 
The study uses panel data of Dutch cash crop farms over the period 2002-2007 from the 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI). The available data are composed by the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) database and detailed data on pesticide use at the farm 
level. The dataset includes also biodiversity indicators and climatic variables at the farm level. 
Biodiversity indicators were obtained from the Dutch Centre for Agriculture and Environment 
(CLM). For each pesticide that Dutch arable farmers use, there is an environmental indicator 
which shows the impact on different farmland biodiversity categories (i.e., water and soil 
Chapter 1 
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organisms, biological controllers). Meteorological data include precipitation and temperature 
and were obtained from the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI, 2011). 
 
1.5 Outline 
 
This work is composed of seven chapters including the general introductory chapter. Each 
chapter concentrates on one of the research questions outlined in section 1.3. This section 
presents the highlights of each chapter. Chapter 2 presents the contour of an optimal pesticide 
policy scheme and the knowledge gaps that need to be addressed to introduce such a policy 
framework. Chapter 3 presents a dynamic model of optimal pesticide use and provides 
estimates of the impact of pesticides and environmental spillovers on output realization. 
Additionally, shadow values of pesticides and other inputs are computed, providing important 
information to policy makers seeking to develop tax and levy schemes. 
 
Chapter 4 uses a simulation model to test the impact of different tax and levy schemes on 
pesticide use and environmental spillovers. Pesticide taxes, subsidies, and quotas are used to 
examine their impact on farmers’ attitudes, providing valuable information to policy makers 
aiming at introducing economic incentive-based pesticide policies. Chapter 5 presents a DEA 
model accounting for pesticide dynamics and production uncertainty to measure the 
performance of Dutch arable farms. Socioeconomic and environmental variables are used to 
explain farmers’ performance, thus providing empirical evidence for the design of pesticide 
policy measures. The results highlight the extent to which efficiency measures are distorted 
when ignoring pesticide dynamics and production uncertainty. 
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Chapter 6 presents a risk-adjusted DEA model to measure the performance of Dutch arable 
farms. This chapter shows a way to incorporate undesirable outputs and risk-mitigating inputs 
in DEA modelling frameworks and take explicitly into account the risk-increasing or –
decreasing effect of production inputs on output realization, thus focusing on the risk behaviour 
on the part of the producer.  Finally, Chapter 7 highlights and synthesizes the main findings of 
the study and discusses the major policy implications, and suggestions for future research. 
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Abstract 
An European Union (EU) wide pesticide tax scheme is among the future plans of EU policy 
makers. This study presents an optimal pesticide policy framework and examines the 
information needs for applying such a framework at the EU level. Damage control specification 
studies, empirical results from pesticide demand elasticity, issues on pesticide risk valuation 
and uncertainty, and knowledge on pesticides’ indirect effects in relation to current pesticide 
policies are analysed. Knowledge gaps based on reviewing these information are identified and 
an illustration of the direction future pesticide policies should take is provided. 
Keywords: pesticides, pesticide policy, tax schemes, EU. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
There has been a considerable increase in the global production of agricultural goods and 
services in recent decades. Plant protection products have played a major role in driving this 
growth, as have other technological innovations. However, growth in global agricultural 
production has a concomitant impact on the environment.  
 
Plant protection products are active substances that enable farmers to control different pests or 
weeds, and thus constitute one of the most important inputs in agricultural production 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006). There is a large range of positive outcomes 
from the use of different pesticides related to agricultural productivity, but the potential 
benefits are particularly important in developing countries, where crop losses contribute to 
hunger and malnutrition (Anon, 2004). Additionally, improving crop yields and the quality of 
production results in increased farm and agribusiness profits. With weeds being the major 
yield-reducing factor for many crops, herbicides are the most widely used type of pesticides. 
Cooper and Dobson (2007) refer to a number of benefits from pesticide use, among which are 
the improved shelf life of produce, the reduced drudgery of weeding, which frees labor for 
other tasks, reduced fuel use for weeding, invasive species control, increased livestock yields 
and quality, and garden plants protection.  
 
Starting with the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) which highlighted the 
risks of pesticide use, there has been steady progress in documenting the negative spillovers 
arising from the continuous use of chemical inputs (Pimentel et. al., 1992; Pimentel and 
Greiner, 1997). Pesticides are not restricted to use in agriculture: they are used for landscaping, 
on sporting fields, road and railway side weed control, and public building maintenance. These 
substances can be dangerous for human health when the degree of exposure exceeds the safety 
levels. Exposure can be direct, for example when farm workers apply pesticides to various 
crops, and indirect, such as when consumers ingest agricultural products containing chemical 
traces, or even when bystanders happen to be nearby application areas. Food and Agriculture 
Organization (2008) evidence suggests that tens of thousands of farmers are exposed to 
pesticides each year. The largest number of poisonings and deaths is recorded in developing 
countries, where farmers often do not use appropriate protective equipment.  
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Additionally, the excessive and uncontrolled use of pesticides can pose serious and irreversible 
environmental risks and costs. The decline in the number of beneficial pest predators has led to 
the proliferation of various pests and diseases with adverse impacts on fauna and flora 
(Pimentel and Greiner, 1997). Certain pesticides applied to crops eventually end up in the 
ground and surface water. In surface water environments such as streams and lakes, pesticides 
can contribute to fishery losses in various ways (Pimentel et al., 1992). Moreover, the extensive 
use of pesticides has often resulted in the development of pesticide resistant weeds and pests. 
This can trigger increased pesticide application to reduce the respective damage, resulting in 
high economic costs that farmers must shoulder. Further, Pimentel et al. (1992) address the 
adverse environmental consequences from the overuse of pesticides such as animal poisoning, 
contaminated products, destruction of beneficial natural predators and parasites, bee poisoning 
and reduced pollination and crop and biodiversity losses. 
 
Currently, the EU aims to upgrade existing pesticide regulations, which includes the 
introduction of an EU-wide regulatory framework on pesticides grounded upon economic 
incentives. The foundation of future EU policy schemes aims at the sustainable use of 
pesticides in European agriculture. This effort involves reducing the risks and impacts of 
pesticide use on human health and the environment, while still being consistent with crop 
protection. The design of optimal pesticide policies requires insight into the relationships 
between production decisions on crop yields and their quality, the environmental and health 
spillover impacts of pesticide use, and how policies and regulations influence production 
decision-making. A key policy consideration is balancing the incentives for economic growth 
against the adverse impact on the environment, which is broadly defined to include the 
management of land, water and air, as well as the overall stability and biodiversity of the 
ecological system. 
 
 
The objective of this paper is to present the contour of an optimal pesticide policy scheme and 
explore the potential for introducing such a scheme at the EU level. More specifically, this 
paper reviews the information needed for the introduction of such a policy framework to 
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identify knowledge gaps to be addressed to support the design of optimal pesticide policies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an optimal 
pesticide policy framework. This is followed by a review of the existing literature on pesticides 
indicating the extent to which the current literature provides information needed for the 
implementation of optimal pesticide policies. The final section discusses knowledge gaps based 
on the literature review.  
 
2.2 An optimal pesticide policy framework 
 
Under the Pigouvian tradition the optimal pesticide policy grounded on economic incentives 
should include taxes (or subsidies) to control pesticide externalities, where the tax (or subsidy) 
reflects the marginal net damage (benefit) of pesticides’ use. The problem in such a policy 
framework is that obtaining an accurate estimate of the monetary value of pesticide damage (or 
benefit) is not an easy task, mainly due to prohibitive information requirements. Alternatively, 
Baumol and Oates (1988) proposed the establishment of a set of standards or targets for 
environmental quality followed by the design of a regulatory system that could employ unit 
taxes (or subsidies) to achieve these standards. The authors add that although this will not 
result in an optimal allocation of resources (such as pesticides) it represents the most cost 
effective way in attaining the specified standards. A pesticide policy framework that combines 
market-based instruments with standards for acceptable environmental and health quality will 
enable policy makers to base the charge rates or prices on the acceptability standards rather 
than on the unknown value of marginal net damages. In this way taxes can reflect the potential 
environmental and health damage from each pesticide (Pretty et al., 2001; Hoevenagel et al., 
1999; Oskam et al., 1997). 
  
The design and application of a pesticide policy framework grounded on market-based 
instruments and environmental and/or health standards, requires rigorous information on 
different dimensions and aspects of pesticide use. The elements needed to apply such a policy 
framework may be summarized by information on a) the production structure (i.e., production 
function, pesticide demand elasticities), b) attitudes toward risk and uncertainty related to 
pesticides application, c) the value of pesticides to consumers (e.g., the willingness to pay 
(WTP) for lower pesticide use), and d) the indirect effects of pesticide use. Information on the 
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production structure of pesticide use include trends in pesticide use (overuse or underuse), and 
the direction and extent farmers’ behavior will change following the introduction of a pesticide 
tax. In particular, will a pesticide price increase lead to significantly decreased pesticide use? 
Information on the riskiness of pesticides in relation to output realization may enhance the 
effectiveness of pesticide policy tools while evidence on the consumers’ WTP for reducing 
pesticide adverse effects can reveal if there is a demand for more environmental friendly 
products providing an incentive for farmers to switch to more environmental friendly forms of 
production (e.g., organic or IPM). Finally, detailed data on pesticides’ indirect effects can assist 
policy makers in setting proper environmental and health standards that can increase the 
effectiveness of the different economic instruments. 
 
It is important to notice that optimal pesticide use may be achieved not only through the use of 
market-based instruments, such as taxes and subsidies, but also of alternative instruments. For 
instance, command-and-control regulations may be among the means to achieve a policy goal. 
Unlike market-based instruments encouraging firms’ behavior through market signals, 
command-and-control regulations set uniform standards for firms. An example of a command-
and-control measure in relation to pesticide policy is bans on the use of specific pesticides. 
Stavins (2003) argues that despite the proven success of market-based instruments in reducing 
environmental pollution at a low cost, they did not come close to replacing command-and-
control measures. Given that market-based instruments are difficult to change on short notice, 
command-and-control measures (e.g., bans on pesticides) can provide flexibility to policy 
makers. As research on pesticide externalities advances, pesticide bans may always have a 
place in pesticide policy frameworks.1 Baumol and Oates (1988) add that a mixed system of 
regulations, composed of both fiscal and non-fiscal measures, constitutes an optimal regulatory 
strategy to reduce firms’ externalities. Another alternative or complement to public or market 
intervention instrument can be agricultural production in certified farms (organic or IPM) or 
self-regulation. Farmers can form groups with common production rules (e.g., IPM), facing the 
opportunity to gain from their collective capacity to establish a reputation for their products. In 
this way farmers can experience higher revenues and society can be benefited from reduced 
pesticide externalities. The formation of producer organizations can be promoted by 
governments by providing financial facilities (e.g., lower firm taxation).  
                                                 
1 Many active ingredients have been recently banned based on their adverse effect on human health. 
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2.3 Production structure 
2.3.1 Production function 
 
The concept of damage abatement input, first introduced by Hall and Norgaard (1973) and 
Talpaz and Borosh (1974), suggests that pesticides have an indirect effect on output in future 
years arising from pesticide resistance rather than a direct yield-increasing effect. Lichtenberg 
and Zilberman (1986) were the first to specify production functions that are consistent with the 
concept of damage abatement input. Apart from pesticides, damage control inputs could 
include windbreaks, buffer zones and antibiotics. The Lichtenberg and Zilberman (LZ) (1986) 
damage control framework enables economists to observe that the Cobb-Douglas formulations 
used in this study resulted in an upward bias in the optimal pesticide use estimations, while 
recent evidence suggests an overuse (Babcock et al., 1992; Guan et al., 2006). Additionally, the 
damage control specification accounts for changes in pesticide productivity and enables the 
prediction of producers’ behavior. Pest resistance initially triggers farmers to apply more 
pesticides until alternative damage control measures become more cost effective. The LZ 
damage control specification was applied by Babcock et al. (1992), Carrasco-Tauber and 
Moffit (1992), Chambers and Lichtenberg (1994), Oude Lansink and Carpentier (2001), Oude 
Lansink and Silva (2004). Guan et al. (2006) and Lin et al. (1993). Table 1 reviews these 
studies using a set of common criteria: a) setting, b) modeling framework, c) data and 
application, and d) results and policy implications. The results are mixed with some studies that 
indicate the over-utilization of pesticides, and others that indicate its under-utilization. 
 
Although the LZ specification has been applied successfully and constitutes a considerable 
innovation, some authors have expressed concerns. Oude Lansink and Carpentier (2001) have 
shown that in a quadratic production function, the lack of differentiation between damage 
abatement inputs and productive inputs does not lead to overestimation of the marginal 
product, as Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) argued. Additionally, Oude Lansink and 
Carpentier (2001)  allow for interaction between damage abatement and other production 
inputs, where the LZ specification precludes these interactions. Oude Lansink and Silva (2004) 
challenge the assumption of a non-decreasing damage control function and assumptions 
imposed on parameters in the damage control model, and propose a nonparametric 
specification. 
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Although the LZ specification constitutes a useful and widely acceptable tool in the economics 
of pesticide use, the various critiques and mixed results developed by some authors perpetuate 
the debate regarding this specification. The majority of findings show that pesticides are under-
utilized, which is contrary to the conventional view. Some interesting insights emerge from 
studies implementing the LZ specification predicting the over-utilization of pesticides. The 
choice of specification for the damage abatement function significantly impacts pesticide 
productivity estimates. Studies permitting specifications allowing a decreasing marginal 
product of pesticides are more likely to predict pesticide overuse. Furthermore, the examined 
product/crop can influence the final result regarding the overuse or underuse of pesticides. 
Babcock et al. (1992) applied the LZ specification on apple production data in North Carolina 
and found that pesticides are overused. However, apple production requires a considerable 
amount of preventive pesticide application in order to obtain high quality output. Therefore, 
this preventive application can justify the over-utilization of pesticides.  
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2.3.2 Pesticide Demand Elasticity 
 
The design of regulatory frameworks for levies on pesticides requires estimates of pesticide 
demand elasticities. If pesticide demand is inelastic, a new tax or levy will not affect pesticide 
use significantly, but it will generate revenues that can be distributed to the agricultural sector. 
Table 2 presents a review of the pesticide demand elasticity estimates of European countries, as 
well as the United States. A general conclusion based on this table is that the price elasticity of 
pesticide demand is quite low (in most cases), indicating that pesticide use is indifferent to 
pesticide price increases. Inelastic demand can indicate a lack of knowledge among farmers 
regarding alternative production practices, a strong intention toward risk-aversion, or can be 
due to behavioral factors like professional pride derived from weed-free fields. Inelastic 
pesticide demand is also reported by Hoevenagel et al. (1999) in their study of an EU wide 
scheme for levies on pesticides. Therefore, a tax on pesticides can create considerable revenues 
but it will have a small impact on reducing pesticides’ externalities. Another important point is 
that the more specific the pesticide (e.g., aggregating over all fungicides, insecticides), the 
higher the elasticity of demand. This suggests that there are few substitutes to these specific 
products, with the result being that the producers face difficulties in adjusting their agricultural 
practices. The difficulty of finding lower-risk alternatives or applying alternative crop 
protection practices is also mentioned by Wilson and Tisdel (2001). 
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2.4 Risk and uncertainty in relation to pesticide use 
 
Pest arrival is an uncertain event, and pesticide productivity varies, leading to uncertainty in 
operator profit. This uncertainty can lead to the overuse of pesticides relative to the private or 
social optimum. Norgaard (1976) notes that the major motivation for pesticide application is the 
provision of some “insurance” against damage. Feder (1979) shows that an increase of the 
degree of uncertainty due to pest damage will cause an increase in the volume of pesticide use. 
As uncertainty in the pest-pesticide system leads to higher and more frequent use of pesticides, 
there is also uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of pesticides. Many times, farmers lack full 
knowledge of the relation between pesticides and pest mortality (Feder, 1979). The 
effectiveness of pesticides can be influenced by fluctuations in temperature, as well as wind and 
humidity conditions. Therefore, the pest population can vary with changes in climatic 
conditions, though these changes can also alter the effect of pesticides, as every chemical 
product has different durability.  
 
A production function should process enough flexibility that the impact on the deterministic 
component of production is different from that on the stochastic component. The Just and Pope 
(1978) approach to modeling production processes in the face of production risk has been a 
popular addition to the literature, and is widely used in applied analyses related to pesticide use. 
The variation in production is influenced by the input levels; some inputs may be variation-
increasing, while others are variation-decreasing, where risk is defined as the variance of 
output. Saha et al., (1994) and Griffiths and Anderson (1982) also support the conventional 
view that pesticides are risk-reducing inputs.  
 
On the other hand, Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1994) show that a limited knowledge of the 
production process, captured by assuming that pest damage is independent of other factors 
affecting output, leads to the conventional view that pesticides are risk-reducing inputs. 
Pesticides may increase risk when pest populations are positively correlated with growth 
conditions. When pest populations are high and growth conditions are favorable, pesticides will 
be risk-increasing as they increase the variability of harvests (increase output under good 
growth conditions). Gotsch and Regev’s (1996) study of Swiss wheat producers shows that 
fungicides have a risk-increasing effect on farm revenues when rain levels are low. Similar 
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results are reported by Saha et al., (1997) when the production process takes into account the 
interaction between pesticides and fertilizers, and by Pannell (1995) where herbicides have a 
risk-increasing effect on wheat farmers in Kansas. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) have 
shown that pesticides may be risk-increasing inputs and that farmers who purchase federal 
government crop insurance use more chemicals ceteris paribus. This view on pesticides is 
contradicted by Smith and Goodwin (1996).  
 
Saha et al. (1997) report the importance of considering the stochastic nature of both the damage 
control and the production function in order to avoid overestimating the marginal productivity 
of damage control inputs. With pesticide productivity affected by the level of the developed 
resistance, the more resistant the pest population, the higher the use of the damage control 
agents (pesticides) until resistance is sufficiently pervasive and alternative damage control 
measures are more cost effective. 
 
Uncertainty related to pesticide externalities has become an important health and environmental 
regulatory issue. The absence of full knowledge on pesticide’s side effects can lead to 
irreversible environmental and health damage if policy-makers postpone pesticide management 
measures to wait for further scientific knowledge. The precautionary principle, first defined in 
the 1992 Rio Declaration, addresses this issue by maintaining that uncertainty regarding the 
environmental or health effects of pesticide use should not act as an obstacle to the timely 
introduction of pesticide policies. 
 
The following hypothetical example illustrates how the precautionary principle applies to 
pesticide application in agriculture. Considering the  two time period setting, the imposition of a 
tax or levy scheme to internalize pesticide externalities, thereby leading to socially optimal 
pesticide use, is not a costless procedure, and its entire regulatory cost creates uncertainty 
regarding the optimal time of application. In the current period there is uncertainty about the 
future state of the world. The externalities of pesticides have not been documented fully, nor 
have the external costs been quantified precisely. Therefore, a policy-maker cannot be sure 
whether a pesticide tax should be introduced now or later, after further information has been 
obtained. Imposing a pesticide tax in the current period can be more costly, as there are no 
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precise indicators of the external costs of pesticides. This lack of knowledge may induce a 
policy-maker to delay intervention and wait to identify the exact external costs of pesticides, 
where the prices of the different commodities reflect the external costs of pesticide use by 
imposing a suitable tax in the second period. Therefore, delaying reduces the economic risk of 
imposing a tax scheme. Nevertheless, acting in the future period can be devastating in terms of 
biodiversity loss, as there are often difficulties in enhancing biodiversity levels after long 
periods of intensive agrochemical use (Berendse et al., 1992). 
 
2.5 Pesticide risk valuation 
 
During the last two decades, many attempts have been made to value pesticide risks. The meta-
analysis of Florax et al. (2005) and Travisi et al. (2006) provide an overview of the literature on 
pesticide risk valuation. These analyses find that the literature is diverse, providing WTP 
estimates not only for various human health risks, but also for environmental risks. However, 
the majority of studies estimate WTP for the negative externalities on human health., finding 
great variation in the WTP estimates, as some studies find higher WTP for human safety than 
environmental quality (Foster and Mourato, 2000), while others show higher WTP for 
environmental quality than for food safety and human health (Balcombe et al., 2007). This 
mixed evidence is attributed to the use of different valuation techniques, and to differences 
among the available biomedical and ecotoxicological data. Foster and Mourato (2000) provide 
a conjoint analysis of pesticide risks by estimating the marginal value of risk reduction for 
human health and bird biodiversity. Additionally, Schou et al. (2006) and Travisi and Nijkamp 
(2008) used a choice experiment approach to estimate the economic value of reduced risks from 
pesticide use. The latter approach was also used by Chalak et al. (2008), who found high WTP 
for reduced pesticide use for both environmental quality and consumer health. Moreover, this 
study indicates the presence of heterogeneous preferences for pesticide reduction in relation to 
environmental quality and food safety. 
 
2.6 Indirect effects of pesticides 
 
Data on pesticides’ indirect effects can enable the development of environmental and health 
standards, thus favoring the introduction of regulatory schemes that will use economic 
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incentives to attain these standards. Research on pesticide spillovers on human health seems to 
be more advanced considering the banning of many active ingredients on human health 
grounds. Sexton et al. (2007) underline the need and difficulty in incorporating and translating 
pesticide externalities into policy. They also confirm the low level of knowledge on pesticides’ 
environmental effects compared to human health effects. The use of environmental and health 
standards in EU states’ pesticide policies can be depicted in Table 3 which reviews the pesticide 
policies of different EU countries. Only a few European countries (i.e., Sweden, Norway, 
France, and Belgium) use environmental and/or health standards to base their pesticide policy 
tools. Sweden was one of the first countries to introduce a simple tax scheme based on an 
environmental levy, while Norway uses a tax system where the taxation level is banded by 
health and environmental properties. In France there are taxes on seven categories of pesticides 
as non-point sources of pollution, which reflects the differing environmental load of each plant 
protection product. Belgium has recently introduced a pesticide tax on five active substances 
which is based on health and environmental risk criteria (OECD, 2008). According to OECD 
(2008) the use of plant protection products has declined in the abovementioned countries, but it 
is difficult to separate the impact of taxation on pesticide use from the other factors influencing 
farmers’ use decisions. Moreover, in Norway, the high reductions in pesticide risks should be 
treated with caution due to the stockpiling of pesticides prior to expected increases of pesticide 
taxation (OECD, 2008).  
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2.7 Discussion 
 
The review of the information needed for the introduction of an optimal pesticide policy 
framework has revealed several knowledge gaps, thus providing useful insights to policy 
makers. The evidence from studies using the LZ specification is mixed. Overuse or underuse of 
pesticides may depend on the specification itself but also on the application to different crops. 
More research needs to be done across EU countries for different crops in order to obtain a 
clear view of pesticide use trends. Overuse of pesticides implies that policy efforts should focus 
on decreasing applied quantities while underuse shows that the policy target should not be to 
reduce pesticide application volume but to stimulate substitution of hazardous products with 
low toxicity alternatives.  
 
Pesticide productivity varies among others with changes in climatic conditions indicating that 
taxes on pesticides should be country or region specific. A considerable number of pesticide 
risk studies opposes the conventional view of pesticides being risk reducing. If pesticides are 
risk increasing then a pesticide tax (leading to reduced pesticide use), will render agricultural 
production less risky. Greater dissemination of such scientific findings may increase the 
effectiveness of pesticide tax and levy schemes. With pesticide demand being in general 
inelastic, only large pesticide price changes can alter farmers’ practices. Considering that high 
pesticide tax rates may be politically problematic, pesticide taxation might not be considered an 
effective policy instrument. However, taking into account producers’ heterogeneity, economic 
incentives may still have a role in pesticide policies by encouraging efficiency improvements in 
pesticide applications or movement to less pesticide intensive forms of cropping (e.g., IPM).  
 
The review of WTP studies has shown that consumers are in general willing to pay to reduce 
human health and environmental risks from the application of pesticides. This fact favors 
farmers’ switch to IPM or organic agriculture. In this way reductions in pesticide use could be 
achieved with gains in farm income through conversion to less pesticide-intensive cropping 
systems. Advice, training and extension in reduced pesticide use practices can encourage 
farmers’ conversion to less pesticide-intensive farming. Subsidizing production on certified 
farms (e.g., IPM or organic) or promoting self-regulation for pesticide free products may further 
stimulate farmers to alter their crop protection practices. 
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As pesticides are not homogeneous goods, pesticide taxation needs classification according to 
toxic contents (Nam et al., 2007); i.e. higher taxes to be imposed on pesticides that are more 
harmful to the environment and human health. However, there is no accepted methodology for 
hazard ranking possibly due to the extensive gaps in knowledge of the environmental impacts 
of pesticide use. Oskam et al. (1997) strongly encourage the European Commission to adopt a 
uniform or if possible a differentiated value tax within the EU. Effective pesticide policies 
should differentiate pesticides according to their health and environmental externalities as 
current EU pesticide policy (COM, 2006) highlights the importance of reducing risks to both 
human health and the environment.  
 
More than a decade ago, Hoevenagel et al., (1999) noted the difficulties in discriminating 
pesticides according to their environmental externalities. Since then, no action has been taken 
by the EU in stimulating an EU-wide or country specific data collection of pesticide  impacts. 
Zilberman and Millock (1997) argue that the construction of an effective pesticide tax scheme 
requires rigorous data collection on pesticide use at the farm level. As pesticide application 
levels and their externalities are very diverse across different regions and under different 
climatic conditions (Wossink and Feitshans, 2000), country-specific research is of the utmost 
importance. Pesticide classification through the development of environmental impact-based 
indicators for each country or region would be important in improving the effectiveness of 
pesticide policies. The levy systems based on environmental standards used in some countries 
encompass interesting lessons for an EU wide regulatory framework on ways to charge, collect, 
differentiate and reimburse the levy. The limited use of the environmental or health standards in 
national pesticide policies and the small reductions in pesticide use in the countries that use 
these standards may be attributed to the multidimensionality and lack of data of pesticides’ 
indirect effects. This has led policy makers to be unable to introduce optimal economic 
incentive-based policies that will not only aim to finance national action plans but will also 
affect farmers’ behavior. Falconer (2002) argues that an effective environmental banding could 
be based on groups of pesticides with similar hazard scores instead of developing 
environmental indicators (based on environmental impacts) for each pesticide. A starting point 
for such a classification could be the development of hazard scores from pesticides’ labeling 
which includes precautions for environmental and human health safety and its mandatory in all 
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EU member states. Pesticide clusters with higher hazard scores could be prioritized for 
reductions. 
 
The optimal regulatory strategy does not have to be composed by single policy tools but can 
involve a mixture of measures and actions such as tax schemes, direct controls, farm 
certification and self-regulation. In this way the different measures may compensate the 
deficiencies of each other. Pesticide policies can be coordinated by the EU with taxes or direct 
controls being country or region specific as pesticides’ use and externalities vary regionally due 
to differences in agronomic characteristics (Schou, 1996). Action taken at EU level implies 
strong competitive effects between national regulatory systems (Knill and Lenschow, 2005). 
Integrating economic incentives (defined at the EU level) in existing national regulatory 
structures may induce strong political pressures on national policy makers to reform these 
structures. Knill and Lenschow (2005) state that the use of economic instruments at the EU 
level has been relatively week in comparison to national level, pointing to the required member 
states’ unanimity needed in tax-related decisions as a limiting factor. However, the authors add 
that such problems may be bypassed by enhanced cooperation among groups of member states.   
 
2.8 Concluding Comments 
 
In an era where existing EU pesticide policies are streamlined and new policies are planned, 
this study tries to shed light on the optimal pesticide policy framework and examine the 
elements needed for applying such a framework. An optimal pesticide policy should involve 
economic incentives based on standards for environmental and health quality. As the 
introduction of market-based policy instruments is among the future plans of EU policy makers, 
this study offers some important insights. Inelastic pesticide demand suggests that tax rates 
should be high while the development of health and environmental standards, where 
differentiated tax rates can be based on, needs further attention due to inadequate information 
on pesticide externalities. Evidence from pesticide use trends (overuse or underuse) among 
different crops and countries and its relation to risk is mixed, implying that further investigation 
is needed possibly at state level. The great variety of pesticide risks suggests that more primary 
research is needed. Pesticides affect human beings and other organisms differently and have 
various environmental effects across countries due to differences in climatic conditions and 
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species richness. Country-specific research on the effects of existing active ingredients on the 
environment and a comparison with their effects on human health may enable researchers to 
introduce differentiated fiscal measures, and trigger the chemical industry to develop effective 
alternatives. As agrochemical innovation is in general complex, costly and time consuming, the 
development of economic incentive-based policies grounded in the reality of agriculture can 
foster crop pest agents innovation.  
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Abstract 
Pesticides are used in agriculture to protect crops from pests and diseases, with indiscriminate 
pesticide use having several adverse effects on the environment and human health. An 
important question is whether the environmental spillovers of pesticides are also affecting the 
farmers’ production environment. A model that explicitly incorporates the symmetric and 
asymmetric effect of pesticides’ environmental spillovers on crop production is used. The 
application focuses on panel data set from Dutch cash crop producers and the pesticide 
contribution to biodiversity is found to impact farm output significantly.  
Keywords: pesticides, dynamics, biodiversity, The Netherlands. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Pesticides constitute one of the most important inputs in developed countries’ arable farming as 
they are the most common way of controlling pests. There is a large range of positive outcomes 
from the use of different pesticides related to agricultural productivity. Pesticides can secure 
farm income by preventing crop losses to insects and other pests, improve shelf life of the 
produce, reduce drudgery of weeding that frees labor for other tasks, and reduce fuel use for 
weeding. 
 
But their use raises a number of environmental and health concerns. Indiscriminate pesticide 
use can lead to off-target contamination due to spray drift with negative effects for biodiversity, 
bystanders, soil and water courses. Organic compounds of pesticides that are resistant to 
environmental degradation can contribute to soil contamination and accumulate in human and 
animal tissue (Ritter et al., 1995). Pesticides can be dangerous to workers, consumers and 
bystanders. Farm workers lacking the appropriate protective equipment can present irritations, 
poisonings and even death. Pesticides have been shown to have devastating effects on water 
organisms (Fairchild & Eidt, 1993), birds (Boatman et al. 2004), non-target beetles (Lee et al., 
2001) and bees (Brittain et al., 2009). Agricultural output can be negatively impacted from the 
above mentioned pesticidespillover effects. Farm operator’s health problems can decrease the 
efficiency of labor while a decreasing biodiversity deprives the farm from beneficial 
organisms’ productive and damage-abating functions. Pollinators like wild bees can increase 
plant seed set and output quality (Roldan Serrano and Guerra-Sanz, 2006; Morandin and 
Winston, 2006) while beetles and birds can control pest populations.  
 
An important question is whether farmers are rational using pesticides taking into account the 
potential future spillover effects. Myopic decision makers ignore the future effects of their 
decisions (Alix and Zilberman, 2003). Pesticides’ environmental spillovers concern common 
property resources, including biodiversity populations, for which decision makers perceive that 
their production decisions might not affect the stock of these resources under myopic behavior 
(Regev et al., 1976; Pemsl et al., 2008). Lack of information on pest and predator populations’ 
growth and the absence of a market price for the environmental effects of pesticides may drive 
farmers to ignore them in their production process (Feder and Regev, 1975). Harper and 
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Zilberman (1989) developed a model to compare output and pesticide use under myopic and 
optimal behaviour reporting that ignorance on pesticides’ dynamic effects on pests, may lead to 
the pesticide treadmill followed by increased pesticide applications and profit loss. In the same 
line of reasoning Feder and Regev (1975) argue that myopic pesticide use decisions increase 
rather than decrease pest damage due to the increased impairment of pest predators. 
 
Hall and Norgaard (1973) and Talpaz and Borosh (1974) introduce the concept of damage-
abatement input, which suggests that pesticides have an indirect effect on output in future years 
arising from pesticide resistance in addition to a direct yield-increasing effect in the current 
period. Apart from pesticides, damage-abatement inputs include natural predators, and cultural 
practices such as rotation and planting diversionary crops. Regev et al. (1983) developed a 
more comprehensive bio-economic model to determine optimal pesticide use using detailed 
entomological information. Their results show that pesticide use does not only decrease pest 
populations but also increases pesticide resistance, pointing to the importance of such state 
variables in policy decision making.  Drawing inspiration from these bio-economic models as 
well as on early analysis of self-insurance through expenditure in loss-reducing agents initiated 
by Ehrlich and Becker (1972), Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) developed an output damage-
abatement specification for estimating pesticide productivity, with an extensive range of 
empirical applications undertaken (Babcock et al., 1992; Carrasco-Tauber and Moffit, 1992; 
Lin et al., 1993; Chambers and Lichtenberg, 1994; Oude Lansink and Carpentier, 2001; Oude 
Lansink and Silva, 2004, and Guan et al., 2005). However, none of these studies explicitly 
account for the impact of pesticides’ environmental spillovers on output realization. The 
objective of this paper is to model whether pesticides’ environmental spillovers are also 
impacting agricultural output. For this purpose, a model is employed that accounts for both the 
symmetric and asymmetric effect of the environmental spillovers of pesticides on output, since 
pesticides’ environmental spillovers can reduce crop pollination and soil nutritional 
characteristics (through impact on pollinators and soil organisms respectively), increase crop 
damage by reducing the number of natural predators, and impact negatively the efficiency of 
labour (health impact on farm operator). As public awareness in Europe is growing regarding 
the indirect effects of pesticides on human health and the environment, the European Union 
(EU) is planning to revise its pesticide policy by introducing tax and levy schemes that 
internalize pesticides’ indirect effects and lead to socially optimal pesticide use. The integration 
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of indirect effects of pesticides in farmer’s production technology can assist policy makers in 
designing appropriate pesticide tax policies.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model of 
optimal pesticide use. Section 3 introduces the model specification followed by the estimation 
method and data description. Results are analyzed in Section 4, policy implications are 
discussed in Section 5 and conclusions presented in Section 6. 
 
3.2 Model of optimal pesticide use 
 
We assume that agricultural production is modeled by production function f and damage 
abatement function m with the following separable structure: 
 
),(*)),((
tttt jtkjp
PIZmqPIxfy ?     (1) 
 
where a single output is produced, y, using multiple variable inputs (xp), fixed inputs (qk) and 
damage-abatement inputs (Z, pesticides). Pesticides are separated into two categories, 
Z=g(Zl,Zh), where subscripts "l" and "h" indicate low toxicity (LT) and high toxicity (HT) 
pesticides respectively. The asymmetric specification in (1) implies that the actual output is 
scaled by the damage abatement; i.e., abatement is actual output/potential output [or y/f(•)].  
This is an assumption maintained in the literature frequently following Lichtenberg and 
Zilberman (1986). Separability is characterized by the independence of the marginal rates of 
substitution between pairs of inputs from changes in another input (Saha et al., 1997). More 
specifically the specification in (1) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between all  
pairs of inputs in xp and qk is independent of Z implying the output elasticities of xp and qk  are 
independent of Z in the damage abatement function, m. The Pesticide Impacts (PI) reflect 
impacts on biodiversity and are a function of pesticide use as they are yearly observations of 
the impacts of the used pesticide products: 
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where the beginning of the year PIj is a function of pesticides used in the preceding year. With 
last year’s pesticide use impacting production of the current year, the importance of PI on the 
farm decision environment follows from the potential for biodiversity to control pest 
populations, increase production through crop pollination, and improve soil nutritional 
characteristics. As the PI variables denote pesticide impacts on farmland biodiversity, we 
expect the impact of pest resistance to be reflected in the evolution of these variables. Increased 
volume of pesticide applications increase PI values which can be associated with increased 
resistance levels among biodiversity populations. The specification in (2) implies that the state 
variable PIj evolves according to ܲܫ௝೟ − ܲܫ௝೟షభ = ݃௝൫ܼ௛೟షభ, ܼ௛೟షభ൯ − ݃௝൫ܼ௛೟షమ, ܼ௛೟షమ൯ −
ܲܫ௝೟షభwhich indicates a 100% depreciation rate.1 As a result, the current period choices of 
pesticides (Zl, Zh) can be fully characterized as a two period optimization problem. The 
producer’s problem is to maximize profits over two time periods subject to the production 
technology reflecting the damage abatement and the equation of motion linking last year’s 
pesticide use to this year’s PI. 
 
3.2.1 Model specification 
 
The empirical application of model (1) requires the specification of functional forms for the 
production function f(·) and the damage-abatement function m(·). The Cobb-Douglas 
specification is used here and has a long history in the literature for ease of estimation in 
production studies, in general, and for pesticide impact assessment, in particular (Saha et al., 
1997; Carpentier and Weaver, 1997; Carrasco-Tauber and Moffit, 1992).  
 
Following Guan et al. (2005) we use the following damage-abatement specification: 
 
                                                 
1 This assumption might be somewhat strong, but is imposed just by the construction of PI variables where a state 
of nature impact is absent. 
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This specification restricts the value of abatement within a sensible region and allows for both 
positive and negative marginal product of pesticides. It addresses the damage abatement from 
the use of pesticides, and their environmental spillovers, and allows for interactions among 
these inputs. 
 
We can conceptualize the decision problem as follows: Producers are trying to maximize their 
profit by choosing the optimal quantity of variable inputs (xp) and pesticides (Zl, Zh),  
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and (2).  
The subscript i indexes each farm , N is the number of farms and ρ reflects the discount factor. 
 
The solution to this optimization problem leads to the optimal x1 and x2: 
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and the optimal pesticide use (e.g for Zl 2): 
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Expression (8) implies that the discounted flow of marginal profit arising from current period 
pesticide use, equals the current cost of applying another unit of pesticide. The rationale of the 
behavioural model in equation (5) is that each production period starts off with a specific 
biodiversity status which has been shaped from previous period’s pesticide decisions. Then 
producers decide on the optimal use of pesticides taking into account the impact in the current 
period and all future periods. 
 
3.2.2 Empirical estimation 
 
The system to be estimated must reflect the pesticide choices with the intertemporal linkages, 
found in (8), the profit maximizing variable input choices, reflected in (6) and (7), and the 
technology, in (5). With no closed form solution available for optimal pesticide use, these 
decisions are approximated by reduced form estimation. As a result, three equations are 
                                                 
2 The optimal pesticide use for Zh is derived by replacing (γ1+γ3Ζh) with (γ2+γ3Ζl). 
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estimated simultaneously using 3SLS3, where y, x1, x2, Zl and Zh are treated as endogenous 
variables. The assumption of profit maximization suggests the direct estimation of the 
production relationship in (5) is compromised by the productive variable inputs, x, being 
correlated with the disturbance term. The instrumental variables that were used in the 
estimation to avoid the simultaneous equation bias are the fixed variables (q1, q2, q3), the output 
and input price indexes, and the quadratic terms of these variables. The instrumental variable 
specification has been tested using a Hausman test indicating that the 3SLS provides consistent 
parameter estimates. 
 
The parameters to be estimated are α, β, γ, c and ξ. Variable inputs are denoted as x, with x1 for 
fertilizers and x2 for other inputs. The arguments qk are fixed inputs, with k=1 for labour, 2 for 
capital and 3 for land. PI are the impacts of pesticides on various biodiversity categories, with j 
= "w" for water organisms, "s" for soil organisms, and "b" for biological controllers. The farm-
specific dummies are denoted by ci and e is a disturbance term that includes factors that are not 
accounted for in the model such as stochastic events (e.g. weather) and measurement errors.   
 
The computation of the output elasticities of pesticides’ use reflects the impact of pesticide 
applications on the current period output and next period’s output through the PI components 
of the damage abatement function. Therefore, the overall elasticity for example of LT 
pesticides is composed of the direct elasticity: 
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and the future elasticity: 
 
                                                 
3 The 3SLS estimation takes place after taking the logarithms of equations (5), (6), and (7) and including random 
disturbance terms to count for the effects of variables that cannot be taken explicitly into account in the model. 
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Expression (10) indicates that the effect of present pesticide use is transmitted to future 
production through next year’s PI. 4 
 
3.3 Data  
 
The available data are composed by the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) database 
and detailed data on pesticide use at the farm level from the Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (LEI) for arable farms in the Netherlands. Panel data are available over the period 
2002-2007 from 130 farms (514 observations). The panel is unbalanced and on average farms 
stay in the sample for four to five years.  
 
Variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Table 1. One output and 8 inputs 
are specified. The output consists of root crops (potatoes, sugar beets, carrots and onions), 
cereals (wheat, barley, triticale, corn, oats and rye) and other crops (green beans and peas and 
grasseed). Output is measured as total revenue from all products, deflated to 2005 values using 
an index of prices from Eurostat. The inputs were classified as productive inputs and damage-
abating inputs. Productive inputs have a direct impact on agricultural output while damage-
abating inputs impact output indirectly through the reduction of crop damage. The productive 
inputs are separated into fixed ones which include land, capital and labour, and variable ones 
which consist of fertilizers and other specific crop inputs. Land was measured in hectares, 
capital includes the replacement value of machinery, buildings and installations, deflated to 
2005 using a Tornqvist index based on the respective price indices, and labour is measured in 
annual work units (AWU5). Fertilizers were measured as expenditures deflated to 2005 using 
the fertilizer price index. The "other inputs" variable includes expenditures on energy, seeds 
and other specific crop costs, deflated to 2005 using a Torngvist index for the disaggregated 
"other inputs" components. The damage-abating inputs include pesticides. Pesticides were 
                                                 
4 For the pesticide impact function g, a quadratic function was used (i.e., PI variables were regressed on the levels, 
squared terms and cross-product of pesticide inputs). 
5 One AWU is equivalent to one person working full-time on the holding (EC, 2001).  
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measured as expenditures deflated to 2005 using pesticide price index and divided into LT and 
HT products based on their environmental impact scores. Finally, the price of pesticides Zl, Zh 
are assumed to be the same. 6 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics  
 
Variable Symbol  
Number of 
observations Dimension Mean S.D. 
Output Y 514 1000 Euros 210.77 180.7 
Output price P 514 price index 1.12 0.08 
Fertilizers x1 514 1000 Euros 11.59 8.85 
Other inputs x2 514 1000 Euros 58.98 49.06 
Labour q1 514 
Annual work 
units (AWU) 1.6 0.82 
Capital q2 514 1000 Euros 335.04 365 
Land q3 514 Hectares (ha) 88.51 55.75 
Low toxicity pesticides Ζl 514 1000 Euros 18.55 13.5 
High toxicity pesticides Zh 514 1000 Euros 9.34 7.7 
Pesticides’ interaction term Zlh 514 1000 Euros 219.18 430.5 
Impact of pesticides on 
water organisms PIw 514 Impact points 5.38 7.53 
Impact of pesticides on soil 
organisms PIs 514 Impact points 7.1 10.57 
Impact of pesticides on bio-
controllers PIb 514 
Kg*10 of active 
ingredient 2.96 3.08 
 
 
3.3.1 Data on Pesticide Impacts (PI) 
 
The available data are obtained from the Dutch Centre for Agriculture and Environment 
(CLM). For each pesticide that Dutch arable farmers use, there is an environmental indicator 
which shows the impact on aquatic, surface water organisms (PIw), terrestrial life (PIs), and 
biological controllers (PIb). The effects of pesticides on water organisms and soil organisms are 
                                                 
6 Price indexes for LT and HT pesticides are not available and instead we use the price index of all pesticides from 
EUROSTAT to deflate HT and LT pesticides. The implicit assumption made here is that relative price changes in 
LT pesticides are the same as relative price changes in HT pesticides.  
Agricultural Production and Pesticide Effects on Biodiversity 
 
56 
 
expressed in environmental impact points. The impact points for water organisms (i.e., aquatic 
insects) depend on pesticide toxicity and the amount of spray drift to watercourses. The amount 
reaching a watercourse depends on the application technique. For arable farming the 
percentage spray drift is 1%.The impact points for soil organisms (i.e., soil insects), are 
computed based on the organic matter content, pesticide characteristics (degradation rate and 
mobility in soil) and pesticide toxicity. The organic matter content in conjunction with the 
pesticide characteristics determine the amount of pesticides that over the course of time 
remains in the soil. There are five classes of organic matter content with the case study farms 
belonging to the 3-6% category. Originally, the environmental impact points (for both PIw and 
PIs) are expressed for an application of 1 kg/ha (standard application). To calculate the 
application specific PIw and PIs, the environmental impact points under a standard application 
are multiplied by the actual applied quantity per hectare (CLM, 2010). The final farm-specific 
PIw and PIs are computed by summing up the impact points of the individual pesticide 
applications. 
 
The environmental impact points increase when pesticides have a greater impact on the 
environment. For soil organisms a score of 100 impact points is in line with the acceptable 
level (AL) set by the Dutch board for the authorization of pesticides (CTB) which reflects the 
concentration which implicates minor risk for the environment. Since 1995, the AL for aquatic 
organisms is 10 impact points per application (CLM, 2010). 
.  
The risk for biological controllers (PIb) (e.g. ladybugs, predatory mites, hymenopteran 
parasitoids) is indicated in the data ordinally with a symbol.7 This symbol reflects the 
suitability for integrated cropping systems and is a combination of all pesticide effects (direct 
effects, such as mortality or non-hatching of eggs and pupae, have been taken into account as 
well as indirect effects, such as reduced fertility, repellency, persistence etc.) for individual 
beneficial organisms. The division of pesticides into LT and HT products is based on their PIs. 
HT product is characterized by a pesticide where at least one of its PIs exceeds the acceptable 
                                                 
7 There are four symbols for bio-controllers: symbol ‘A’ indicates that the pesticide is useful for integrated 
cropping systems (i.e, no side effects on bio-controllers); symbol ‘B’ slightly useful (i.e., minor side effects); 
symbol ‘C’ not useful (i.e., large side effects); and symbol ‘?’ not well known impact (CLM, 2010). The PIb 
variable is a continuous variable that represents the sum of the kilograms of active ingredient of the most 
hazardous for beneficial organisms applications (“C”). In this way PIb variable captures the intensity of the most 
hazardous for bio-controllers applications. 
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levels 8 set by CTB or belongs to the most hazardous 9 category. On the other hand, LT product 
is a pesticide that all its PIs are below the acceptable levels or belong to the least harmful 
categories.  
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Pesticide use and environmental spillovers 
 
Data analysis has shown that Dutch cash crop farmers used in total 337 different pesticides. 
The average pesticide applications and products used per year were 27 and 21, respectively 
(Figure 1). The sudden increase of pesticide applications in 2003 can be attributed to a 10.4 % 
increase of fungicides, in comparison to the previous year, that was caused by relatively high 
temperatures and humidity.  
 
 
Figure 1. Average pesticide applications and products per year used by the Dutch cash crop 
farms (2002-2007). 
 
The majority of pesticide applications are in potatoes followed by sugar beet, wheat, onions 
and barley (Figure 2). Concerning the division of pesticides into LT and HT products, 104 
                                                 
8 Acceptable levels exist only for PIw and PIs. 
9 For PIb the most hazardous category is considered the “C”. 
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pesticides (31%) 10 were characterized as HT (Table 2). From the HT ones, the majority are 
herbicides and fungicides. It is worth noting that the majority of the used insecticides belong to 
the HT category while in almost all other types of pesticides the LT products have the highest 
share. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average pesticide applications (% of number) per year for different cash crops in the 
Netherlands (2002-2007). 
 
Regarding the PI of the pesticide used there are a number of products whose impact on bio-
controllers (PIb) is not well known is denoted as category "?". This category constitutes around 
25% of the used plant protection products and indicates that the specific pesticide can be either 
harmful or harmless for beneficial organisms. The effects of pesticides on beneficial organisms 
are mainly monitored on indoor crops where Integrated Pest Management (IPM) can be easily 
applied by the use of natural enemies to reduce harmful insects’ populations. It is important to 
notice here that our data concern arable crops where different pesticide products are applied in 
comparison to indoor crops. IPM is hardly applied in arable farming, hence the 25% of 
chemicals used there without information on beneficial organisms’ impacts (Moerman, 2009). 
                                                 
10 Around 87% of the HT pesticides had extreme environmental impact scores (or belonged to the most hazardous 
category) for more than one PI. 
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Furthermore, research on pesticide impacts on beneficial organisms has mostly focused on 
insecticides 11 while Dutch arable farmers use mostly herbicides and fungicides.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of used pesticides. 
 
Category    Total Percentage Low toxicity  High toxicity 
    (#) of Total products (#) products (#) 
 
Herbicides   148 43.92  99  49  
Fungicides   107 31.76  83  24  
Insecticides/Acaricides 32 9.49  9  23  
Growth regulators  23 6.83  22  1  
Additives (mineral oil) 8 2.37  8  0 
Ground Disinfectant  6 1.78  4  2 
Unclassified   6 1.78  4  2 
Sulfur (Zwavel)  3 0.89  3  0 
Rodenticides   2 0.59  1  1 
Detergents   2 0.59  0  2 
 
Total    337 100  233  104  
 
 
3.4.2 Production technology of Dutch cash crop farms 
 
The estimation results of the 3SLS model are presented in Table 3.12 Farm fixed effects 
estimates are not presented due to space limitations. The coefficient estimates α1-β3 are 
interpreted directly as elasticities. Most of the productive inputs  have a significant impact on 
production at the 1 or 5% significance level. The significant coefficients of fertilizers (a1) and 
other inputs (a2) indicate that variable inputs do play an important role in crop production.  
 
                                                 
11 The focus on insecticides stems from the fact that as this kind of chemicals target harmful for the crop insects, it 
is probable that they can impact negatively similar organisms like natural enemies and pollinators. 
12 A Cobb-Douglas versus a translog specification was tested and the restrictions of the Cobb Douglas were not 
rejected (p=0.258). 
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Table 3. Estimated coefficients of 3SLS system of equations 
 
Parameter Symbol Estimate p-value 
Productive inputs    
Fertilizer α1 0.053*** 0.000 
Other inputs α2 0.223*** 0.000 
Fertilizer-PIw α1w 0.0001 0.771 
Fertilizer-PIs α1s -0.0003*** 0.000 
Fertilizer-PIb α1b -0.001** 0.011 
Labour β1 0.188** 0.026 
Capital β2 -0.093 0.341 
Land β3 0.517*** 0.000 
Damage abatement inputs    
Low toxicity pesticides γ1 -0.014** 0.016 
High toxicity pesticides γ2 -0.021 0.190 
Pesticides’ interaction term γ3 0.001 0.180 
Pesticide impact on water organisms ξw 0.027** 0.021 
Pesticide impact on soil organisms ξs 0.0004 0.968 
Pesticide impact on bio-controllers ξb 0.061*** 0.000 
 
Note: Fertilizer-PIw to Fertilizer-PIb denote pesticide impact on fertilizer use through pressure on water organisms, 
soil organisms, and biological controllers respectively; (**), and (***), indicate that the estimate is significantly 
different from zero at the 5 and 1 % significance level, respectively.  
 
The elasticity of other inputs is higher than the one reported by Guan et al. (2005) implying the 
increasing significance of other inputs in agricultural productivity.13 The land elasticity is 
greater than the productive inputs, implying that land is a scarce input that constrains the cash 
crop sector. Guan et al. (2005) come to a similar conclusion but they report a higher land 
elasticity.14 The elasticity of capital is negative but insignificant which shows that the sample 
farms are overcapitalized in the short run. The elasticities a1w to a1b denote the symmetric effect 
                                                 
13 e.g. improved seed varieties may increase agricultural productivity in comparison to a decade ago. 
14 The lower estimate of our study is due to an increase of the mean acreage in comparison to the period studied by 
Guan et al. (2005). 
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of the PI variables on crop production through fertilizers.15 Increased pesticide pressure on soil 
organisms and biological controllers seems to have a negative effect on crop yields, possibly 
through a decrease in soil nutritional characteristics and pollination, respectively. 
 
Concerning the damage abatement inputs, a Wald test of the joint significance of parameters γi 
and ξi for i= 1, 2, 3, and j = 1, 2, 3 finds that the null hypothesis is rejected ( p=0.000). This  
indicates the existence of crop losses due to non-optimal production conditions (e.g., pest 
infestations), thus highlighting the importance of damage abatement inputs in avoiding yield 
reductions. Farm specific dummies absorb elements that are not modeled directly in this study. 
These elements can include education, farming experience, and farm soil type. Indeed, around 
91% of the farm-specific dummies are significant at the 5% significance level. The mean farm 
effect is 4.3 (with standard deviation 3.7) and shows how much will the production shift up by 
the elements that are taken indirectly into account.  
 
The coefficients in the damage abatement function (γ1-ξb) of Table 316, individually are not 
directly interpretable in terms of meaningful relations, elasticity responses are reported in Table 
4 which provide further information on the output response to each input and on the economies 
of scale in the Dutch cash crop sector. Pesticides have a direct impact on production and a 
future impact. The direct impact of both types of pesticides is positive with HT products having 
slightly lower impact on production than LT products while their production impact is 
insignificant. This opposes the conventional view that highly toxic products might be more 
effective in preventing crop damage. The future impact of both types of pesticides is negative 
(implying that use of pesticides in the current period impacts negatively next year’s output 
through the PI) but insignificant. Concerning the elasticities of PI, we can see that they all have 
a negative impact on output. This finding indicates that water and soil organisms and biological 
controllers can have a beneficial impact on output by reducing crop damage through the control 
of pest populations, enhancing soil nutritional characteristics and contributing to increased crop 
pollination. If farmers increase the pressure on the biodiversity categories (by using pesticides 
                                                 
15 A model specification where pesticide impacts on biodiversity affect both fertilizers and other inputs has been 
tested, with the impact of pesticides’ indirect effects on other inputs being insignificant. 
16 Prior to estimating the 3SLS model, pesticide and PI variables were examined for multicollinearity. The 
multicollinearity test has shown that no correlation exceeded ǀ0.5ǀ. This was expected as the different PI variables 
are calculated based on the observed pesticide use measured in Kg/ha while the Z variables reflect pesticide 
expenses measured in Euros. 
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that increase PIw, PIs and PIb) they will realize some output losses. Another explanation for the 
negative impact of PI on output realization can be that increased pressure on farmland 
biodiversity (i.e., higher PI) can increase the level of resistance among pest populations and 
induce some crop damage. It is important to notice that most PI elasticities are significant at the 
10 % significance level, indicating the important role of pesticides’ environmental spillovers on 
output realization. The input elasticities sum to 0.91 indicating decreasing returns to scale 
which is consistent with the results reported by Oude Lansink (1997). Guan et al. (2005), in 
their study on conventional and organic arable farms in the Netherlands, report an elasticity of 
0.98 adding that these farms may operate beyond the optimal scale. 
 
The value of the marginal product which is the shadow price of the different inputs can be used 
to assess whether an input is overused or not. Therefore, the value of the marginal product 
(VMP) can be used in the design of subsidies or taxes for individual inputs. Table 4 presents 
the VMP estimates which are computed at the sample means, at average output price index 
1.12.17 The shadow price of labour is 27.06 while a statistical test suggests that it is not 
significantly different from labour price. Capital investment is realizing a net loss showing that 
Dutch arable farms are over-capitalized. This finding is consistent with results from Guan et al. 
(2005) and Guan and Oude Lansink (2003). The VMP of land is 1.47 and is not significantly 
different from the average rent of land. Therefore, from the productive inputs only capital is 
used intensively in Dutch arable farms. 
 
The VMP of LT and HT pesticides are 0.25 and 0.23, respectively. A comparison of these 
shadow values with pesticide prices shows that both LT and HT18 pesticides are overused. 
Oude Lansink and Carpentier (2001) report a shadow price of 3.219 in their study of Dutch 
arable farms over the period 1989-1992. The large difference may result from the failure in the 
latter study to take into account the heterogeneity across farms. Even higher estimates are 
reported by Oude Lansink and Silva (2004) in a non-parametric study of pesticides use in the 
                                                 
17 By construction, the estimation using (6) and (7) guarantees that the average VMP of fertilizers and other 
productive inputs match up with the input price (i.e., the first-order conditions of profit maximization are imposed 
on the estimation, which means that the VMP of fertilizers and other productive inputs equals the input price). 
18 Using the point estimate of the elasticity of HT pesticides, the VMP is much less than the input price. 
Considering that this elasticity is not significantly different from zero, implies that HT pesticides are surely 
overused. 
19 Weighted over 3 types of pesticides (herbicides, fungicides and other pesticides) and 4 different model 
specifications.  
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Netherlands over the same period, but the authors add that this may be a result of outliers. Both 
Oude Lansink and Carpentier (2001) and Oude Lansink and Silva (2004) conclude that almost 
all pesticides are underutilized, on average, which is a result that is not in line with our finding. 
Carrasco-Tauber and Moffit (1992) and Chambers and Lichtenberg (1994) also find that 
pesticides are underutilized in U.S. agriculture. In our study, the average VMP of LT and HT 
pesticides is 0.24, which is lower than the average pesticide price, suggesting that farmers 
could increase their profitability by decreasing the use of pesticides.  
 
Table 4. Production elasticities and values of marginal products (VMP in EUR 1,000)  
 
Elasticities  p-value VMP Input price (IP) 
   Direct Future Overall     
 
Fertilizer  0.052     -   0.052  0.000  1.127  0.98 
Other inputs  0.223       -   0.223  0.000  0.856  0.99 
Labour   0.188     -   0.188  0.042  27.06  22.19a 
Capital   -0.093     - -0.093  0.427  -0.065  0.09b 
Land   0.516     -   0.516  0.006  1.471  1.60c 
LT pesticides  0.020 -0.0003  0.020  0.024  0.254  1.02 
HT pesticides  0.010 -0.001d  0.009  0.197  0.227  1.02 
PIw   -0.014     - -0.014  0.048  -0.626     - 
PIs   -0.001     - -0.001  0.984  -0.019     - 
PIb   -0.019     - -0.019  0.013  -1.548     - 
 
a Labour price is calculated as the average hourly wage of entrepreneurs in 2002-2007 (CBS, 2010) 
b Capital price is calculated as 10 % of average capital price index. 
c Land price is computed as the average farmland rent per ha for 2002-2007 (CBS, 2010). 
d P-values for the future elasticities of low (LT) and high toxicity (HT) pesticides were computed using 
bootstrapping techniques. The elasticities of HT and LT pesticides were found to be insignificant (i.e., p=0.364 
and p=0.209, respectively). 
 
Guan et al. (2005) report a VMP of 1.25 and conclude that pesticides were optimally used at 
the farm level, but they add that this might lead to an overuse if the indirect effects of 
pesticides are taken into account. This hypothesis is verified by the current study where the 
inclusion of pesticides’ indirect effects showed that pesticides are on average overused. 
Overutilization of pesticides is reported by Babcock et al. (1992) in their study on apple farms 
in North Carolina. The considerable amount of preventive pesticide applications that  apple 
production requires, might be one of the reasons for the reported overutilization. 
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3.5 Policy implications  
 
The important role of biodiversity in output realization shows a need for protecting farmland 
organisms. Overuse of pesticides can be associated with decreased numbers of beneficial 
organisms at a farm level and reduced efficiency of labour due to their health effects. The 
results of this study can assist policy makers in designing pesticide policies that are based on 
economic incentives.  
 
Different tax or levy schemes can lead to socially optimal pesticide use. A number of different 
taxes can be applied including a tax per kilogram of applied active substance, a flat tax on all 
pesticides, a flat tax on categories of pesticides that differ in terms of toxicity (i.e. LT and HT 
products), and taxes on PI. The flat tax on all pesticides and the tax per kilogram of active 
substance are easily implemented and involve low transaction costs. However, they do not 
differentiate between HT and LT products and ignore the impacts of pesticides on the 
environment and human health. 20 The flat tax on different categories of pesticides takes into 
account pesticides’ environmental spillovers as these categories have been constructed based 
on each product’s toxicity impact on biodiversity. A high tax on HT applications can reduce 
environmental spillovers as these products contribute more to PIs. On the other hand, a lower 
tax rate can be applied to LT pesticides as the results show that LT products cause less damage 
and have a slightly higher impact on production. Concerning taxes on PI, the tax can be a 
monetary value per PI. For this purpose, it is possible to maintain a threshold level and tax only 
the PIs above the threshold levels. From the PIs exceeding the threshold levels, PIb and PIw can 
be taxed at a higher rate than PIs as its increased level impacts significantly (i.e. decrease) 
agricultural output; i.e., the higher tax for the first two categories is due to the preservation of 
biological controllers and water organisms is associated with increased farm productivity.  
 
Levy systems can also be used where the revenues collected under a tax is redistributed back to 
farmers in the form of subsidies or to other involved stakeholders. Subsidies can be direct 
                                                 
20 A tax per kilogram of applied active substance cannot capture the true environmental/health impact of the 
applied pesticide as applying less active ingredients does not necessarily mean that the environmental/health  
impact is automatically smaller. 
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through the application of a farm subsidy for the use of LT pesticides and/or indirect through 
resources directed to extension services that will promote information on the existence of LT 
alternatives, more precise pesticide applications and safe handling of empty pesticide packages. 
Tax revenues can also be directed to R&D on the development of LT alternatives. 
 
Differentiated tax or levy schemes that  reflect the potential environmental and health damage 
of pesticides are strongly encouraged (Hoevenagel et al., 1999; Oskam et al., 1997). However, 
concerns are raised over its exact rate and the differentiation procedure in the light of 
inadequate information on pesticides’ indirect effects and the lack of an accepted methodology 
for hazard ranking (Pretty et al., 2001). Moreover, the design and implementation of 
differentiated taxes or levies, based on some measure of the hazards related to each pesticide, 
involves high costs due to high information requirements (Sheriff, 2005). 
 
Despite the efficiency advantages that economic instruments may have compared to command 
and control approaches (Baumol and Oates, 1988), economic instruments’ share in current 
pesticide policies is relatively small. In Europe, where a few countries have embedded 
economic incentives in their pesticide policy frameworks, the primary objective of the existing 
tax schemes is to provide resources for research and extension, rather than influencing user 
behavior (Wossink and Feitshans, 2000). The collection of detailed data on pesticide use at the 
farm level and environmental impacts of different pesticides may enable policy makers to 
introduce optimal pesticide tax and levy schemes. These schemes may alter pesticide decisions 
at the farm level such that environmental spillovers of pesticides are reduced.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
This study presents a model of optimal pesticide use on specialized cash crop farms in the 
Netherlands. The inclusion of two pesticide categories that differ in terms of toxicity, and 
pesticides’ environmental spillovers in both the production and the damage abatement 
specification is an improvement compared to earlier specifications in terms of richness of the 
results. Shadow prices of pesticides and other inputs are estimated and compared with market 
prices to assess the degree of over- or under-utilization.  
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The empirical results indicate that the indirect impacts of pesticides on biodiversity are 
affecting the farmer’s production environment. These results suggest that future pesticide 
policies should conserve organisms beneficial for the farm, as they protect farm yields from 
loses through the control of pest populations. The results also show that pesticides are overused 
on average. Organisms beneficial for the farm can be impacted negatively from the overuse of 
pesticides. The use of economic incentives like taxes may lead to optimal use of pesticides. 
When LT alternatives exist for some of the HT products, then taxes can also help switching to 
the LT category that has a lower impact on biodiversity. 
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Abstract 
Chemical pesticides constitute an important input in crop production. But their indiscriminate 
use can impact negatively agricultural productivity, human health and the environment. 
Recently, attention is focused on the use of economic incentives to reduce pesticide use and its 
related indirect effects. The aim of this work is to assess the effectiveness of different economic 
instruments such as taxes and levies in encouraging farmers to decrease pesticide use and their 
environmental spillovers. A policy simulation model is employed using data from Dutch cash 
crop producers including two pesticide categories that differ in terms of toxicity and pesticides’ 
environmental spillovers. Four different instruments were selected for evaluation: pesticide 
taxes, price penalties on pesticides’ environmental spillovers, subsidies, and quotas. The results 
of the study indicate that even high taxes and penalties would result in a small decrease in 
pesticide use and environmental spillovers. Taxes that differentiate according to toxicity do not 
lead to substitution of high with low toxicity pesticides. Subsidies on low toxicity products are 
not able to affect the use of high toxicity products. Pesticide quotas are more effective in 
reducing pesticide use and environmental spillovers.  
 
Keywords: pesticides, economic instruments, The Netherlands 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Pesticides are integral components of modern crop production systems. However, excessive 
pesticide use has a negative impact on a large number of dimensions such as contamination of 
surface and ground water, soil, food, biodiversity and human health (Pimentel et. al., 1992; 
Pimentel and Greiner, 1997; Wilson & Tisdell 2001). Reducing the applied pesticide quantities 
or using less toxic products are among the most challenging environmental policy objectives. 
The challenge in achieving these objectives is to maintain a balance between the continued 
contribution of agriculture to production and greater human health and environmental 
protection. 
 
Recently, particular attention is given to the role of market mechanisms in achieving 
environmental policy aims, especially through the introduction of economic incentives. The 
European Union’s (EU) pesticide policy envisages the use of pesticide tax and levy schemes 
(EC, 2007). Economic instruments such as taxes and subsidies may guide farmers toward pest 
management strategies which are more in line with society’s concerns for sustainable 
agriculture. Although the environmental economics literature suggests that economic 
instruments may have efficiency advantages compared to command and control approaches 
(Baumol and Oates, 1988), the economic instruments’ share in current pesticide policies is 
relatively small. In Europe, only a few countries have embedded economic incentives into their 
pesticide policy frameworks. However, in many cases the primary objective of the existing tax 
schemes is to provide resources for research and extension, rather than influencing user 
behavior (Wossink and Feitshans, 2000). The design and implementation of an efficient system 
of pesticide taxes and levies requires information on pesticide use, demand, and the risk and 
toxicity characteristics of the used products to account pesticides’ indirect effects (Hoevenagel 
et al, 1999; Oskam et al, 1997). 
 
Knowledge of the relationship between input applications and environmental damage is a key 
element in designing environmental taxes (Falconer, 1998). However, the design and 
implementation of differentiated taxes or levies based on some measure of the hazards related 
to each pesticide involves significant costs due to demanding information requirements 
(Sheriff, 2005). Another difficulty facing policy makers in designing pesticide tax and levy 
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schemes is whether to tax pesticide use or price. For example, a tax per kilogram of applied 
active substance cannot capture the true environmental or health impact of the pesticide 
applied, since applying less active ingredients does not necessarily mean that the environmental 
or health  impact is smaller automatically. A low application of a highly toxic product may still 
cause more environmental or health damage than a high dose of a less toxic product. On the 
other hand, a pesticide price tax may not yield the desired effects when pesticides’ demand 
elasticity is low or when the older and more hazardous pesticides are a cheaper alternative.  
 
Concerning the environmental effectiveness of pesticide tax schemes, an important issue is 
how to tailor the burden of the tax to the potential damage of a pesticide. Falconer (1998) 
points that market mechanisms can have a share in pesticide policy but their environmental 
effectiveness depends on their careful design. Differentiated taxes that can somehow reflect the 
potential environmental and health damage of pesticides are strongly encouraged (Pretty et al., 
2001; Hoevenagel et al., 1999; Oskam et al., 1997). However, concerns are raised over their 
exact rate and the differentiation procedure in the light of inadequate information on pesticides’  
indirect effects and the lack of an accepted methodology for hazard ranking.  
 
Empirical evidence from the introduction of an ad valorem tax in arable farming in South 
Central Texas and Alabama using aggregate state level data, reveals considerable decreases in 
pesticide usage but output supply is affected in different ways (Shumway and Chesser, 1994; 
Chen et al., 1994).1 Wossink et al. (2001) examine the effects of a pesticide tax for the total 
Dutch arable farming sector and report that reductions differ considerably among different 
types of pesticides. Despite the importance of a farm-level approach on primary policy 
analysis, little empirical research has been done on investigating the impact of different 
economic instruments on farm income, pesticide use, and environmental spillovers. Falconer 
and Hodge (2001) examine the linkages between the multidimensionality of ecological 
problems and the complexities associated with policy design by using farm-level data for a 
typical arable farm in the UK. Their modeling framework considers four economic incentive-
driven policy instruments in an effort to identify the possible trade-offs between reductions in 
                                                 
1 In South Central Texas, a 25% tax on pesticides yields considerable decreases in output supply while an 1% tax 
in Alabama yields mild impacts. 
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environmental damages and the income of farmers.2 Their results find that different pesticide 
tax schemes have different impacts in terms of both magnitude and direction, which suggests 
that compromises need to be made in environmental policy or additional policy instruments 
should be introduced. 
  
The aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of different fiscal measures in reducing 
pesticide use and environmental spillovers by using detailed farm level data from Dutch arable 
crop production. An important feature of this work is the examination of subsidies, price 
penalties on pesticides’ environmental spillovers, and quotas as additional or an alternative 
pesticide use policy tool. Another important aspect of this study is that it employs a dynamic 
perspective addressing the current production impact (through reducing crop damage in the 
current period) and the future impact through pesticides’ environmental spillovers (e.g., 
impacting the farm biodiversity which alters the future production environment). Hall and 
Norgaard (1973) and Talpaz and Borosh (1974) were the first to introduce the concept of 
damage-abatement input, which suggests that pesticides have an indirect effect on output in 
future years arising from pesticide resistance in addition to a direct yield-increasing effect in 
the current period. Feder and Regev (1975) developed a theoretical dynamic pest management 
model incorporating entomological knowledge in their model specification. Their results show 
that the absence of information on pest and predator populations’ growth and the absence of a 
market price for the environmental effects of pesticides may drive farmers to ignore them in 
their production process. Using a more comprehensive bio-economic model of optimal 
pesticide use that employed detailed entomological information, Regev et al. (1983) show that 
pesticide use does not only decrease pest populations but also increases pesticide resistance. 
Drawing inspiration from these bio-economic models as well as on early analysis of self-
insurance through expenditure in loss-reducing agents initiated by Ehrlich and Becker (1972), 
Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) developed an output damage-abatement specification for 
estimating pesticide productivity that treats damage abatement inputs in a different manner than 
regular inputs and serves as the foundation for an extensive range of empirical applications 
(Babcock et al., 1992; Carrasco-Tauber and Moffit, 1992; Lin et al., 1993; Chambers and 
Lichtenberg, 1994; Oude Lansink and Carpentier, 2001; Oude Lansink and Silva, 2004, and 
Guan et al., 2005). With none of these studies explicitly accounted for the impact of pesticides’ 
                                                 
2  Falconer and Hodge (2001) focus on  an ad valorem tax, a fixed levy per spray unit, a levy per kilogram of 
active ingredient, and a levy-based on pesticide hazard. 
Chapter 4 
 
76 
 
environmental spillovers on output realization,  this paper  uses a model that explicitly 
incorporates the asymmetric effect of pesticides’ environmental spillovers on crop production 
and tests whether economic incentives can alter pesticide decisions at the farm level such that 
environmental spillovers of pesticides are reduced. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model of optimal 
pesticide use. Section 3 addresses specification issues and presents the empirical model 
followed by a description of the applied pesticide quotas and tax and levy schemes. Data 
description takes place in section 4. Results are presented in Section 5 and discussion and 
conclusions in Section 6 and 7, respectively.  
 
4.2 Theoretical model 
 
The production technology is expressed by the following separable specification motivated by 
Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986): 
 
),(*),( ttkp PIZmqxfy tt?     (1) 
which indicates output, y, is the product of the production technology, f(·), and the abatement 
technology, m(·). 
 
The specification reflects that a single output is produced, y, using multiple variable inputs (xp), 
fixed inputs (qk) and damage-abatement inputs (Z, pesticides). Pesticides are separated into two 
categories, Z=(Zl, Zh), where subscripts "l" and "h" indicate low toxicity and high toxicity 
pesticides, respectively. The Pesticide Impact (PI) variable reflects impacts of pesticide use on 
water organisms and is related to pesticide use as:  
 
),(
11 ??? tt lht ZZgPI       (2) 
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where the beginning of the year PIt is a result of pesticides used in the preceding year. With last 
year’s pesticide use impacting production of the current year, the importance of PI on the farm 
decision environment follows from the potential for biodiversity to control pest populations 
and increase production through crop pollination.3 The producer maximizes profits over two 
time periods subject to the production technology reflecting the damage abatement and the 
equation of motion linking last year’s pesticide use to this year’s pesticide impact on water 
organisms. 
     
4.3 Application 
4.3.1 Specification issues 
 
The production technology in (1) is specified as:  
321210
32121),(
?????
ttttttt
qqqxxeqxf ckp ?       (3) 
Different specifications for the damage abatement function are available in the literature. 
Among the specifications that can accommodate the output-reducing nature of damage 
abatement ( i.e., by constraining the value of the abatement function to the [0, 1] interval) are 
the exponential, Weibull, Pareto, and logistic.4 Guan et al. (2005) provide an extensive 
discussion of the properties and problems associated with different damage abatement 
specifications. In this study we employ the exponential damage abatement specification:  
 
))(exp(1)exp(1),( 4321 thlhltt PIZZZZAPIZm tttt ???? ?????????   (4) 
 
                                                 
3Among the aquatic insects can be Coleoptera (e.g., beetles), Diptera (e.g., flies), Lepidoptera (e.g., moths), 
Hymenoptera (e.g., wasps) and other orders (Williams and Feltmate, 1992). Coleoptera and Diptera are considered 
to be primitive pollinators while most Lepidoptera and many Hymenoptera feed extensively on floral nectar 
(Kevan and Baker, 1983). 
4 Carrasco-Tauber and Moffitt (1992) use the exponential, Weibull and logistic damage abatement specifications 
to obtain pesticide productivity estimates and find that an exponential damage abatement specification led to 
substantially different estimates of pesticide productivity than the alternative specifications. However, a statistical 
test for identifying the most appropriate distribution could not discriminate the exponential as superior to 
alternative specifications. 
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This specification is used often in the literature (Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1986; Carrasco-
Tauber and Moffit, 1992; Oude Lansink and Carpentier, 2001) and allows for the regular 
interpretation of the percentage reduction of damage. The pesticides’ interaction term is used to 
address the issue that pesticide categories may be perfect substitutes. 
 
After defining the production and damage-abatement function, we conceptualize the problem 
of profit maximization as: 
 (
5) 
s.t.  (1) and (2) and ρ is the discount factor. 
Each production period starts off with a specific biodiversity status which has been shaped 
from previous period’s pesticide decisions. Then producers decide on the optimal use of 
pesticides taking into account the effect in the current period and the future periods. The 
solution to this optimization problem leads to the optimal x1 and x2: 
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and the optimal pesticide use is:  
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The subscript i indexes each farm  and N is the number of farms. Expression (8) implies that 
the current cost of applying another unit of pesticide, equals the discounted flow of marginal 
profit arising from current period pesticide use. 
 
4.3.2 Empirical model 
 
With no closed form solution for Zl and Zh, the econometric estimation focus on the optimality 
conditions in (6) and (7) for the variable inputs, the production technology in (1) [using (3) and 
(4)] and the instruments for modelling the pesticide decisions.  This system is estimated using 
3SLS recognizing the endogenous variables are y, x1, x2, Zl, and Zh, and the instruments are the 
fixed inputs (q1, q2, q3), output and input price indices, and quadratic terms of these variables.  
We also allow for fixed farm effects.  Lastly, the pesticide impact function, in (2) is specified 
by the quadratic expression: 
 
ܲܫ௧ = ܿ + ߜଵ߄௛೟షభ + ߜଶ߄௟೟షభ + ߜଷ߄௛೟షభ߄௟೟షభ + ߜସܼ௛ଶ௧ିଵ + ߜହܼ௟ଶ௧ିଵ  (9) 
 
The computation of the output elasticities of pesticides’ use reflects the impact of pesticide 
applications on the current period output and next period’s output through the pesticide impact 
component of the damage abatement function. Therefore, the overall elasticity for example of 
low toxicity pesticides is composed of the direct elasticity: 
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and the future elasticity: 
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Expression (11) indicates that the effect of present pesticide use is transmitted to future 
production through next year’s pesticide impact on water organisms. Following the 
econometric estimation, a dynamic optimization of the model in (5) is performed.  
 
4.3.3 Pesticide taxes, levies and quotas 
 
After dynamic optimization takes place, three pesticide taxing options are explored: a) the same 
tax rate on both types of pesticides; b) a tax rate that differentiates according to pesticides’ 
toxicity; and, c) a price penalty on pesticide impact on water organisms. The first type of tax is 
achieved by increasing proportionally the price of both types of pesticides and involves price 
increases of 20, 80, and 120%. A differentiated tax rate places a greater price penalty on high 
toxicity chemicals. The scenario explored under this tax scheme places a 100% tax on high 
toxicity products and no tax on low toxicity products. Introducing a greater tax rate on high 
toxicity products is expected to encourage farmers to reduce their use and increase the use of 
low toxicity chemicals. A price penalty on pesticide impact on water organisms penalizes 
farms with higher hazard score for water organisms. Penalizing pesticide impacts on water 
organims is not as straightforward as the previous taxing options due to the absence of prices 
for the pesticides’ environmental spillovers. However a suitable price for pesticide impact on 
water organisms can be retrieved through comparison of the tax revenues from different 
scenarios.5 
 
Under a levy scheme, tax revenues can be redistributed back to farmers in the form of 
subsidies. The idea is to affect farmers’ production decisions concerning pesticide use (i.e., to 
reduce pesticide use and their negative impacts) without decreasing farm income. Three 
                                                 
5 A suitable price is the one that when penalizing pesticide impacts on water organisms yields comparable 
penalty/tax revenues with the previous tax schemes. 
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different subsidies are examined in this study: a) subsidy on the use of low toxicity pesticides 
(Zl), b) subsidies on research and development (R&D) of low toxicity alternatives, and c) 
subsidies on R&D of more environmental friendly pesticides. Subsidies on the use of low 
toxicity pesticides is proxied by reducing their price in the simulation process. This price 
reduction can be financed by tax revenues and is expected to trigger producers to increase the 
use of low toxicity products. A 20% price decrease is tested in this case. The second type of 
subsidy concerns R&D of low toxicity products and is proxied by improving low toxicity 
pesticides’ productivity. As the simulation model of this study spans the short run and R&D 
impacts productivity in the long run (Alston et al., 2009), a 2% productivity increase will be 
tested.6 Thirtle et al. (2008) in a study that examines the relationship between total factor 
productivity (TFP) and public and private research,  report that public and private R&D in 
conjunction with farm size explain 2% of the TFP variance. Improving low toxicity pesticides’ 
productivity is expected to lead to lower use of low toxicity products and even trigger farmers 
to substitute some high toxicity with low toxicity products. Tax revenues can be also directed 
to the development of more environmental friendly products. This type of subsidy is expected 
to yield significant reductions in pesticides’ environmental burden. Finally, scenarios for 
pesticide quotas are also employed in this study with producers facing 10 and 20% reductions 
in pesticide use.  
 
4.4 Data 
 
Panel data for 2003-2004 from 55 farms, provided by the Dutch Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute (LEI), are used in the simulation model. Variable definitions and summary 
statistics are provided in Table 1, with one output and 8 inputs being specified. The output 
consists of wheat, potatoes, sugar-beet, onions, and carrots and  is measured as total revenue 
deflated to 2005 prices using an index of prices from Eurostat. The inputs are classified as 
productive inputs and damage-abating inputs. The productive inputs are separated into variable 
inputs which consist of fertilizer and other crop-specific inputs, as well as fixed inputs which 
include land, capital and labour. Land is measured in hectares, capital includes the replacement 
value of machinery, buildings and installations deflated to 2005 using a Tornqvist index, and 
labour is measured in annual work units (AWU7). Fertilizers were measured as expenditures 
deflated to 2005 prices using a fertilizer price index while "other inputs" variable includes 
                                                 
6 This is achieved by decreasing the initial level of  low toxicity pesticides by 2%. 
7 One AWU is equivalent to one person working full-time on the holding (EC, 2001).  
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expenditures on energy, seeds and other crop-specific costs deflated to 2005 using a Torngvist 
index. The damage-abating inputs include pesticides, measured as expenditures deflated to 
2005 using a pesticide price index. Pesticides are separated into low toxicity and high toxicity 
products based on their impact on water organisms.8  The pesticide impact variable provided by 
the Dutch Centre for Agriculture and Environment (CLM), reflects pesticide impacts on water 
organisms (mainly aquatic insects). It is expressed in impact points and takes into account the 
toxicity of pesticide used and the spray drift 9 to watercourses which depends on the application 
technique (CLM, 2010). Originally, the impact points are expressed for an application of 1 
kg/ha (i.e., standard application). To calculate the application specific impact on water 
organisms the environmental impact points under a standard application are multiplied by the 
actual applied quantity per hectare (CLM, 2010). The final farm-specific impact on water 
organisms is computed by summing up the impact points of the individual pesticide 
applications. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics (in EUR 1,000, deflated to 2005 prices) 
 
 Variable    Symbol  Number of Mean  S.D. 
       observations           
   
   Output    y  231           301.91             191.91        
   Fertilizers    x1  231  16.77          9.75        
   Other inputs    x2  231  91.61        51.59        
   Labour    q1  231    1.89           0.92        
   Capital    q2  231           419.03              260.76        
   Land     q3  231  94.91        57.07        
   Low toxicity pesticides  Ζl  231  21.81        11.99        
   High toxicity pesticides  Zh  231  11.65         7.32          
   Impact of pesticides on   PI  231    0.88           0.82 
   water organisms             
 
                                                 
8 Pesticides that exceed the acceptable level (under a standard application) for water organisms set by CTB (Dutch 
board for the authorization of pesticides) were characterized as highly toxic pesticides. 
9 In arable farming the percentage spray drift is 1% (CLM, 2010). 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Pesticide contribution to output and water organisms 
 
Parameter estimates from estimating the production and pesticide impact functions are reported 
in Tables 2 and 3. 10 11 The coefficient estimates α1-β3 are interpreted directly as elasticities 
while the Zl, Zh, and PI output elasticities are computed at their respective sample means.  
Table 2. Estimated coefficients of 3SLS system of equations 
Parameter       Estimate            p-value 
α1  0.042*** 0.000 
α2             0.252*** 0.000 
β1           0.062** 0.014 
β2  0.112  0.102 
β3              0.480** 0.001 
γ1  0.494** 0.031   
γ2  0.025** 0.001 
γ3 0.0036** 0.004 
γ4  1.617**  0.036 
α1 denotes fertilizers and α2 other inputs; β1 to β3 denote labour, capital, and land, respectively; γ1 to γ4 denote high 
toxicity pesticides, low toxicity pesticides, their interaction term, and pesticide impact on water organisms 
respectively; (**) and (***) indicate that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 5 and 1 per cent 
significance level, respectively.  
 
The coefficients in the damage abatement function (γ1 through γ4) of Table 2 individually are 
not directly interpretable but elasticity responses are reported in Table 4 which provide further 
insight on the output response to each input. Pesticide output elasticities are 0.002 and 0.0004 
for high toxicity and low toxicity products, respectively. The contribution of pesticides to 
output realization through the reduction of crop damage appears minimal.  However, their 
preventative role in the damage abatement process and their capacity to reduce output 
variability can explain why farmers keep using them.  
                                                 
10 Parameter estimates come from a longer panel (2003-2007) that includes the data used in the simulation model. 
11 The Translog is more flexible than the Cobb Douglas, but is not used in this study as a statistical test has shown 
that that the parameter estimates of the Translog function are jointly not significantly different from zero. 
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Table 3. Estimated coefficients of pesticide impact function (PI) 
Parameter       Estimate            p-value 
δ1  0.012*  0.087 
δ2  0.011*  0.092 
δ3  -0.0007 0.326 
δ4  0.0005  0.4767 
δ5  -0.00004 0.863 
Note: δ1 denotes high toxicity pesticides (Zh), δ2 low toxicity pesticides (Zl), δ3 the interaction term of the two 
pesticide categories, and δ4 and δ5 the squared terms of Zh and Zl respectively; (*) indicate that the estimate is 
significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent significance level. 
 
Upon evaluating the pesticide impact on biodiversity variable, we find that an increased 
pressure on water organisms (i.e., through increased use of pesticides that impact these 
organisms negatively) increases output as these organisms may cause some crop damage. This 
is contrary to our assumption that water organisms may contribute positively to crop 
production through control of pest populations or increased pollination. However, the impact of 
water organisms on output 12 is quite small and both types of pesticides have a negative but 
small impact on water organisms. High toxicity pesticides have a slightly higher contribution to 
water organisms compared to low toxicity pesticides (Table 3). This is in line with the 
conventional view that high toxicity pesticides may cause more damage to biodiversity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 A model that takes into account both the symmetric and asymmetric effect of pesticides’ environmental 
spillovers on output has been tested, but the effect of the pesticide impact on water organisms variable on both 
variable inputs was found to be insignificant. 
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Table 4. Production elasticities of inputs 
 
Elasticities   p-value 
   Direct  Future  Overall     
 
Fertilizer  0.042  -  0.042  0.000 
Other inputs  0.252  -  0.252  0.000 
Labour   0.062  -  0.062  0.014 
Capital   0.112  -  0.112  0.102 
Land   0.480  -  0.480  0.001 
HT pesticides  0.002  2*10-6  0.002  0.039 
LT pesticides  0.0004  2*10-7  0.0004  0.005 
PI   0.0003  -  0.0003  0.045 
Note: HT and LT denote high and low toxicity pesticides, respectively. PI denotes pesticide impacts on water 
organisms. 
 
4.5.2 Pesticide tax scenarios 
 
Table 5 presents the base scenario (“policy-off” scenario), which demonstrates the crop 
production decisions of profit-maximizing decision makers, and six different tax scenarios 
where tax rates are applied both to different pesticide categories and impacts. A general 
conclusion upon comparing the different tax scenarios with the optimal solution is that 
pesticide demand is highly inelastic.13 This is in line with findings of price demand elasticity 
for the Netherlands reported in the literature (Oskam et al., 1992; Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 
1996).  
                                                 
13 The demand elasticity for low toxicity and high toxicity pesticides is -0.03 and -0.0003 respectively. These 
elasticities are much smaller than former estimates for The Netherlands. Oude Lansink and Peerlings (1996) and 
Oskam et al. (1992) report pesticide demand elasticities of -0.48 and -0.12, respectively. The large differences 
among the estimates obtained under this study and the pre-mentioned studies can be attributed to the use of 
different modelling framework (dynamic vs static, farm level data vs aggregate data) and the increasing 
importance of pesticides in Dutch agriculture in comparison to a decade ago. 
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More explicitly, a 20% flat tax on both types of pesticides reduces overall pesticide use less 
than 1%. Increasing the tax rate (for both high toxicity and low toxicity products) to 80 and 
120%, total pesticide use is decreased by almost 3 and 4%, respectively. These scenarios show 
that even high taxes are not able to achieve significant reductions in pesticide use. Moreover, 
high taxes decrease farm revenues as the 4% pesticide decrease is accompanied by a 22% 
decrease in farm revenue. Producers’ rigidity in reducing pesticide use, thus avoiding the tax 
burden, may be attributed to the damage preventing role of pesticides and their capacity to 
reduce output variability. A differentiated tax rate for high toxicity and low toxicity products  
did not reveal any substitution between the two types of pesticides, which  is contrary to the 
hypothesis formed in section 4. The absence of low toxicity alternatives may explain farmers’ 
rigidity in switching to these products.  
 
Price penalties on pesticide impact on water organisms seem to yield small decreases in overall 
pesticide use. This is because in practice pesticide impact on water organisms may be reduced 
not only from decreased pesticide applications but also from a series of measures that a farmer 
can adopt such as more precise application techniques or being adjacent to water aquifers 
buffer zones. A price penalty on pesticide impact on water organisms of €10 and €20  reduces 
revenues by  6% and 12%, respectively. 
 
In all tax scenarios, fertilizers and other inputs are also decreased with the pesticide tax 
application. Concerning fertilizers, the 80 and 120% flat taxes yield considerable decreases in 
fertilizer use (approximately 7 and 9%, respectively), while other inputs’ reductions range from 
0.2 to 9%. Interestingly, these results suggest that there are potential trade-offs between 
pesticide use and the use of productive inputs. A pesticide tax may incentivize farmers in 
finding ways to reduce pesticide use, such as switching to crops that are less input intensive for 
both pesticides and productive inputs. Also, farmers may reduce the use of fertilizers to make 
pesticides more effective; for example, a reduction of N-fertilizer makes herbicides more 
effective (Oude Lansink and Silva, 2004). Reduced or more precise fertilizer applications may 
be viewed as a pesticide reduction factor as excessive fertilizer use may result in increased 
presence and growth of non-target species (e.g., weeds). Moreover, reduced use of pesticides or 
fertilizers leads to less use of spraying equipment and as a result less use of energy. Another 
common characteristic of the presented scenarios is the small reductions in pesticide impact on 
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water organisms, which can be explained by the small decreases in the use of both high toxicity 
and low toxicity products’ observed in all tax and levy scenarios. Finally, the direction of 
changes in pesticide use is the same for both pesticide categories. A potential explanation is 
that  different pesticides need to be applied in combinations for better control of crop damage. 
Therefore, reducing the use of low toxicity pesticides may also involve reductions in the use of 
high toxicity products. 
 
4.5.3 Levy schemes  
 
Table 6 presents different subsidy schemes which can be financed by tax revenues. When 
subsidizing low toxicity products by decreasing their price by 20%, then the use of these 
products increases by 0.6% while high toxicity use does not change significantly. Total 
pesticide use is increased less than 1 per cent and pesticide impact on water organisms 
increases marginally. In practice, low toxicity and high toxicity pesticide use are linked as 
farmers use combinations of different toxicity pesticides to reducing crop loss.  
 
Table 6. Subsidies 
Scenarios Profit ZHT ZLT Fertilizer 
Other 
inputs ܲܫ
 
Policy-off scenarioa 160.56 10.56 18.84 8.12 45.65 0.71 
 
 
  Δ (%)    
Profit ZHT ZLT Fertilizer 
Other 
inputs ܲܫ  
Total 
Z  
Decrease of ZLT’s 
price by 20% 1.63 0.09 0.64 1.72 1.69 0.13 0.73 
Increase of ZLT’s 
productivity by 2% -0.24 -0.01 -2.02 -0.12 -0.13 -0.35 -2.03 
ZHT & ZLT contribute 
10% less to ܲܫ -0.41 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.34 -11.05 -0.06 
ZHT & ZLT  contribute 
20% less to ܲܫ -0.49 -0.03 -0.09 -0.21 -0.48 -24.15 -0.12 
 Note: ZHT and ZLT stand for high and low toxicity pesticides respectively; PI is the pesticide impact on water 
organisms measured in impact points; The changes in profit and all inputs are mean values of the average farm per 
year.a Mean values in €1000. 
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An R&D-led increase of low toxicity pesticide’s productivity of 2% leads to a 2% decrease in 
the use of low toxicity products while the use of high toxicity products does not change 
significantly. The increased productivity of low toxicity pesticides enables farmers to use less 
of these products in their effort to tackle crop damage. With the use of high toxicity products 
being hardly affected suggests that farmers are not willing to substitute them with low toxicity 
pesticides which may be still considered as more effective in reducing crop damage. Small 
changes are also observed for farm profit, productive inputs and pesticide impact on water 
organisms. Finally, a 10 and 20% R&D-led decrease in the impact of high toxicity and low 
toxicity products on water organisms, causes insignificant changes in the use of pesticides, 
variable inputs and profit. However, pesticide burden on water organisms is decreased by 11 
and 24%. 
 
4.5.4 Quotas 
 
The effects of a 10 and 20% cut in pesticides use on farm profit, variable inputs and pesticide 
impact on water organisms are presented in Table 7. Both quotas yield marginal decreases in 
farm profit (0.8% for the 10% quota and 1.1% for the 20% quota). Concerning the use of 
variable inputs, a 10% quota contributes to the reduction of fertilizer and other inputs by 1.8 
and 2%, respectively. When reducing pesticide use to 20%, the use of fertilizers is reduced by 
2.3% while other inputs’ use decreases by 2.5%. As farmers are faced with reductions in 
pesticide use, they can be encouraged to apply less fertilizers to prevent the growth of non-
target species that then require increased pesticide applications. The decreased use of other 
inputs under a pesticide quota can be attributed to less use of spraying equipment and therefore 
decreased use of energy. Both quotas yield considerable reductions in pesticides’ contribution 
to water organisms (2.2 and 4.4% under a 10 and 20% cut in pesticides use, respectively). The 
fact that pesticide impact decreases are higher under the introduction of quotas in comparison 
to most of the pre-tested tax and levy schemes is attributed to the high reductions in pesticide 
use (10 and 20% for both high toxicity and low toxicity pesticides). The use of especially high 
toxicity pesticides is hardly affected in most of the tax and levy schemes. Therefore, quotas can 
be viewed as a suitable instrument for reductions in pesticide impacts on water organisms. 
Oude Lansink (1994) examines the effects of a 10% pesticide quota on input quantities and 
profit using data from specialized Dutch arable farms, and reports minor decreases in profit 
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which is in line with our findings. A decrease of 5% is reported for fertilizer use which is 
higher than our finding, while the use of other inputs is increased by around 1% which is 
contrary to our results. A cut in pesticide use may encourage some farmers to increase the use 
of other inputs by investing in pest resistant seeds. Such a substitution effect is absent from this 
study. 
 
Table 7. Pesticide quotas 
 
  Δ (%) 
  
 
Profit ZHT ZLT fertilizers Other inputs ܲܫ 
Pesticide quota (-10%) -0.84 -10.00 -10.00 -1.86 -2.06 -2.28 
Pesticide quota (-20%) -1.12 -20.00 -20.00 -2.28 -2.49 -4.41 
Note: ZHT and ZLT stand for high and low toxicity pesticides respectively; PI is the pesticide impact on water 
organisms, measured in impact points; The changes in profit and all inputs are mean values of the average farm 
per year. 
 
4.6 Discussion  
 
Economic incentives are absent from many European countries’ pesticide policies, including 
the Netherlands. This study provides empirical evidence from the application of pesticide tax 
and levy schemes in Dutch arable farming and proposes potential policy considerations. 
Several studies on the effects of agricultural input taxes in the EU demonstrate that high tax 
rates should be applied to attain a desirable reduction of pesticide use (Oskam et al., 1997; 
Nam et al., 2007). The dilemma inherent in pesticide taxation is that the use of pesticides may 
be so essential for some crops or regions that tax rates would have to be very high to impact 
pesticide use. This could result in a major reduction in farm income as depicted through the 
pesticide tax scenarios presented in this work. This study provides new information on the 
impacts of different tax and levy systems to Dutch and EU policy makers in the absence of 
empirical research in the Netherlands on the effectiveness of different economic instruments on 
pesticide use at the farm level. Results show that even high (and politically challenging) tax 
rates would result in a small reduction in the use of pesticides due to the rigidity of Dutch 
farmers in reducing pesticide use. As pesticides are non-homogeneous goods, the ideal taxation 
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requires classification according to toxic contents. The differentiated tax scheme simulated in 
this study finds that a higher tax rate on high toxicity products does not yield any substitution 
between low toxicity and high toxicity products. Detailed data on pesticides’ environmental 
spillovers at the farm level are recently available and the findings coming from their use in 
empirical work require further evaluation before they applied to pesticide policy. The small 
decrease in pesticide use resulting from the different tax schemes and the absence of 
substitution effects between high toxicity and low toxicity products yield minor decreases in 
pesticide impact on water organisms. Therefore, a pesticide tax as a stand-alone measure is 
ineffective, when taking into account the small decreases in environmental pressure and the 
fact that high and possibly politically problematic tax rates are needed to achieve considerable 
pesticide reductions. An example in the literature coming to similar conclusions is Falconer 
and Hodge (2001) who find that an ad valorem tax in UK arable farming is ineffective in 
achieving pesticide use or hazard reduction goals. Other instruments such as bans on some high 
toxicity pesticides or improved farmers’ training on more precise applications can play an 
important role in reducing pesticides’ environmental spillovers. While pesticide taxes are not 
effective in reducing pesticide use and indirect effects, they have secondary environmental 
advantages arising from decreased fertilizer use that can lead to fertilizer contamination 
reductions. Moving to the penalties on the environmental impacts of pesticides, this study 
shows that high penalties on pesticide impacts on water organisms should be applied to achieve 
considerable pesticide reductions. However,  penalties on pesticide impact on water organisms 
may encourage farmers to increase the precision of pesticide applications or to avoid spraying 
the adjacent to aquifers strips. 
 
The use of tax revenues is often subject to considerable public discussion. Different subsidies 
can have different impacts in pesticide use and environmental spillovers. When the primary 
policy objective is to reduce pesticide‘s indirect effects, R&D on more environmental friendly 
products can decrease pesticides’ environmental burden significantly. A decrease of low 
toxicity pesticides’ price and an R&D-led increase in these pesticides’ productivity yield 
insignificant changes in the use of high toxicity products. Farmers’ rigidity in reducing the use 
of high toxicity products or substituting them with low toxicity alternatives is a common 
feature in all the tax and subsidy scenarios examined in this study. Farmers’ reluctance to 
reduce the use of high toxicity products may be explained by a) their beliefs about the 
effectiveness of high toxicity products in preventing crop damage and reducing output 
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variability, b) the lack of low toxicity alternatives, and c) the fact that potatoes in the case study 
employed here is one of the most profitable and pesticide-intensive crops.14 15  
 
An important question is whether any pesticide policy tool out-performs the others. In terms of 
total reductions in pesticide use and environmental spillovers, pesticide quotas perform better 
than taxes or subsidies.16 But pesticide taxes and subsidies can also play an important role in 
pesticide policy frameworks. Taxes can have positive environmental side effects (decrease 
fertilizer use) while tax revenues are important for funding research and extension. Subsidies 
on the development of more environmental friendly products can reduce pesticides’ 
environmental damage considerably. In general, it is unlikely that a single instrument will 
solely address any set of pesticide policy goals. The effectiveness of single economic 
instruments may be improved by education and extension. For instance, extension can render 
taxes that differentiate according to toxicity more effective by informing farmers on the use of 
low toxicity substitutes; also the availability of substitutes for pesticides and the application of 
new crop varieties that are less susceptible to diseases can make economic instruments more 
effective. Falconer and Hodge (2000) argue that education and training should coexist with 
economic incentives in an effective pesticide policy. Archer and Shogren (2001) assess the 
effectiveness of different policy tools in reducing pesticide runoff and point that risk-indexed 
taxes can be an effective tool in reducing groundwater exposure. As in our case, this study 
finds that no single policy tool dominated the other options and proposes a set of policy tools 
including different tax schemes and bans that can lead to the desired policy goals. A package of 
measures can enable policy makers to tackle and adjust individual measures’ infeasibilities. 
 
One of the shortcomings of this work is that this modelling framework does not account for the 
effect of pesticide impact on water organisms variable on other farms’ production environment. 
Pesticide decisions in individual farms may impact biodiversity populations on farms that 
                                                 
14 Potatoes account for 56 and 67 per cent of total pesticide applications and HT applications, respectively.  
15 An important question is whether the character of the empirical results vary when investigations employ greater 
variation in farms according to their size or other criteria. Results are not expected to vary significantly, as the 
farms employed in this study are relatively homogenous in that these are all arable farms and their main crop is 
potatoes which is one of the most profitable and pesticide intensive crops. 
16 Except in the case where R&D subsidies on environmental friendly products result in the highest decrease of 
pesticides’ burden for water organisms. 
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operate in the same region. This is not possible to be captured in our model as the pesticide 
impact on water organisms values are farm specific and have no measurable impact on other 
farms. Another shortcoming of this work is that we do not account explicitly for the effect of 
pest resistance in our model due to the absence of detailed information on pest populations. In 
our case, we draw on the presence of the environmental variable (PI) which reflects impacts on 
biodiversity, and we expect the impact of pest resistance to be reflected in the evolution of this 
variable. 
   
4.7 Conclusions 
 
This study presents a simulation model of Dutch cash crop producers that explicitly accounts 
for the effect of pesticides’ environmental spillovers on crop production and examines the 
impact of different economic instruments in pesticide use and environmental spillovers. The 
empirical results indicate that pesticide taxes as a single instrument can be characterized as 
ineffective since they yield small decreases in pesticide use and environmental spillovers. 
Differentiated pesticide taxes do not yield substitution of high toxicity with low toxicity 
products, pointing either to the importance of high toxicity products in agricultural production 
or the lack of effective low toxicity alternatives. However, the importance of taxes in a 
pesticide policy relies on their capacity to raise tax revenues that can finance subsidy schemes. 
Subsidies on low toxicity pesticides hardly affected the use of high toxicity products while 
R&D of more environmental friendly products contributed to considerable hazard reductions. 
These findings provide new information to EU policy makers by showing that no single tax or 
levy instrument can lead to a substantial reduction of pesticide use. A pesticide policy 
combining different economic incentives may better address the desired policy goals. 
Command-and-control measures can also have a share in a pesticide policy framework as this 
study has shown that pesticide quotas are more appropriate in reducing pesticide use and 
environmental spillovers in comparison to most of the employed pesticide tax and levy 
schemes. As EU pesticide policy looks to move toward the use of economic incentives, policy 
makers can benefit from research on the effectiveness of different economic instruments in 
different EU countries or regions where agronomic and environmental characteristics vary 
significantly.  
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Abstract 
Pesticides’ dynamic effects and production uncertainty play an important role in farmers’ 
production decisions. Pesticides have a current production impact through reducing crop 
damage in the current period and a future impact through impacting the farm biodiversity which 
alters the future production environment. This study presents the difference in inefficiency 
arising from models that ignore the dynamic effects of pesticides in production decisions and 
the impact of production uncertainty. A dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis model is applied 
to outputs, inputs, and undesirables of Dutch arable farms over the period 2003-2007. A 
bootstrap approach is used to explain farmers’ performance, providing empirical 
representations of the impact of stochastic elements and the state of nature on production. These 
empirical representations are used to adjust outputs, inputs and undesirables to account for the 
effect of production uncertainty. Finally, the dynamic DEA model is applied to adjusted 
outputs, inputs and undesirables. We find that efficiency increased dramatically when a 
production technology representation that considers both pesticides’ dynamic impacts, and 
production uncertainty is adopted.  
 
Keywords: Data envelopment analysis; pesticides; biodiversity; systems dynamics; production 
uncertainty. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Agricultural production is a dynamic process that takes place under a stochastic decision 
environment. The dynamics of agricultural production technologies are impacted by pesticide 
use, as pesticides may impact production in the current period by reducing pest damage and in 
next period through their negative impact on beneficial for the farm organisms. Among the 
current period on-farm benefits of pesticide use are the improved shelf life of the produce, 
reduced drudgery of weeding by freeing labor for other tasks, and reduced fuel use for weeding 
and invasive species control (Cooper and Dobson, 2007). But these benefits can be off-set to 
some degree by the off-farm costs imposed by pesticides on the environment and human health, 
such as contamination of surface and ground water, soil, food, biodiversity and human 
poisonings (Pimentel et. al., 1992; Pimentel and Greiner, 1997; Wilson & Tisdell 2001). 
Pesticides influence biodiversity by negatively impacting water organisms (Fairchild & Eidt, 
1993), birds (Boatman et al. 2004), non-target beetles (Lee et al., 2001) and bees (Brittain et al., 
2009), thus depriving the farm from beneficial organisms’ productive and damage-abating 
functions. More specifically, beetles and birds can control pest populations while pollinators 
like wild bees can increase plant seed set and output quality (Roldan Serrano and Guerra-Sanz, 
2006; Morandin and Winston, 2006).  
 
Unpredictable or extreme climatic conditions can lead decision makers to make different 
production choices. O’ Donnell et al. (2010) find efficiency evaluation may lead to biased 
efficiency estimates when production uncertainty is not taken into account whether based on 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier (SFA) models. Chambers et al. (2011) 
employ a DEA model incorporating climatic variables to account for the stochastic nature of 
agricultural production, showing that efficiency results change dramatically when 
acknowledging stochastic elements. As unpredictable weather conditions and pesticides’ 
environmental spillovers can cause crop losses and/or reduce the quality of output, farmers 
often use risk management tools to secure farm profit, including production-oriented risk 
management techniques (e.g., crop diversification, fencing, windbreaks and protective nets) and 
market-oriented tools (e.g., crop premiums covering farm risks such as flood, fire, third-party 
liability and crop loss). 
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In an era of increasing awareness on pesticides’ environmental spillovers and ways of 
minimizing them, information on the environmental efficiency of polluting inputs is useful in 
the context of maintaining output levels while improving environmental quality. Several 
attempts have been made in the literature to measure efficiency in the presence of undesirable 
outputs.  Among the employed methods are parametric output and input distance functions 
(Färe et al. 1993; Coggins and Swinton, 1996; Hailu and Veeman, 2000) and DEA methods 
(Färe et al. 1989; Ball et al., 1994; Färe et al., 1996; Tyteca, 1997; Boyd and McClelland, 1999; 
Reinhard et al., 2000; Hailu and Veeman, 2001; Oude Lansink and Silva, 2003; Färe et al., 
2004). Färe et al. (1989) proposed an approach  allowing for an asymmetric treatment of 
desirable and undesirable outputs. Undesirable outputs are treated as weakly disposable while 
desirable outputs are strongly disposable (Färe et al., 1989). Weak disposability means that 
reducing (increasing) undesirable outputs (inputs) is not a costless procedure. On this basis, a 
number of studies have proposed the use of directional distance functions as a tool for 
modelling production in the presence of undesirables (Chung et al.,1997; Ball et al, 2001). A 
directional distance function efficiency measure allows for a simultaneous expansion of 
desirable outputs and reduction of inputs and/or undesirable outputs based on a given direction 
vector (Chung et al., 1997).  
 
There are a several studies in the literature  focusing primarily on assessing environmental 
and/or technical efficiency of pesticides using DEA (Oude Lansink and Silva, 2004; Wossink 
and Denaux, 2006).1 However, none of these studies address the dynamic effects of pesticides 
and the stochastic nature of production.  
 
This study aims to investigate the performance of Dutch arable farms by using a Russell type of 
measure to identify technical inefficiency and pesticides’ environmental inefficiency  
specifying the environmental impacts of pesticides simultaneously as undesirable inputs and 
outputs. A dynamic perspective is employed addressing pesticides’ current production impact 
                                                 
1 Oude Lansink and Silva (2004) present a non-parametric production analysis of pesticides use on specialized cash 
crop farms in the Netherlands and show that pesticides are in general under-utilised. Wossink and Denaux (2006) 
assess technical, environmental and cost efficiency of pesticides for transgenic and conventional cotton growers in 
North Carolina by means of DEA and investigate the determinants (farm characteristics and environmental 
variables) that explain efficiency using a Tobit regression. However their study to explore the factors that might 
explain efficiency is an invalid approach as DEA efficiency estimates are serially correlated as shown by Simar 
and Wilson (2007). 
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and future impact through pesticides’ environmental spillovers. We implement the Simar and 
Wilson (2007) double-bootstrap procedure to explain technical inefficiency using 
socioeconomic and environmental variables, thus providing empirical evidence for the design 
of pesticide policy measures and use the results of the double-bootstrap procedure to adjust 
firms’ outputs and inputs to incorporate production uncertainty in efficiency evaluation.   
 
The rest of the paper continues with Section 2 containing the methodology, while Section 3 
contains the definition and sources of the data used. In Section 4, the empirical results from the 
analysis are presented and discussed, and finally Section 5 concludes. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 Measuring inefficiency 
 
Let M, V, and F be the maximum number of outputs, variable 2  inputs, and fixed inputs 
respectively, used in each year t of the production process. Considering a set of firms I, the 
production process at time t, Pt uses variable inputs ݔ௜௩௧  and fixed inputs ݍ௜௙௧  to produce outputs 
ݕ௜௠௧ . To produce ݕ௜௠௧  an indirect effect related to pesticide use ܧܫ௜௝௧ 3 is also produced with j 
denoting the index set for environmental impacts. The indirect effect ܧܫ௜௝௧  reflects the impact of 
pesticides on different biodiversity categories and is assumed to impact the production process 
P in the next year (t+1) as beneficial for the farm organisms can decrease pest damage through 
the control of pest populations and increase crop pollination. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic 
production technology corresponding to the basic dynamic technology proposed by Färe et al., 
(2007), where variable and fixed inputs in year t are used to produce output in year t and 
environmental impacts that will be taken into account in the production technology of year t+1. 
We can assume that the dynamic effects influence the target periods only (i.e., no compound 
effect exists). 4 
 
 
                                                 
2 Includes other inputs, fertilizers, and pesticides. 
3 The acronym EI denotes environmental impacts of pesticides. 
4 The full depreciation assumption is actually imposed just by the construction of EI variables where a state of 
nature impact is absent. 
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 ݕ௜௠௧ ܧܫ௜௝௧              ݕ௜௠௧ାଵܧܫ௜௝௧ାଵ 
 
    Pt   Pt+1 
 
   
ݔ௜௩௧  ݍ௜௙௧    ݔ௜௩௧ାଵݍ௜௙௧ାଵ 
 
Figure 1. Dynamic production network 
 
The directional technology distance function in the presence of undesirable outputs seeks to 
increase the desirable outputs while simultaneously reducing the undesirable outputs and 
variable inputs: 
 
ܦሬ ௢⃗(ݔ, ݍ, ݕ, ܧܫ௧, ܧܫ௧ିଵ; ݃) = ݏݑ݌ {ߚ: (ݕ, ܧܫ௧, ܧܫ௧ିଵ, ݔ) + ߚ݃ ∈ ߖ}  (1) 
 
where g is the vector of directions in which desirable and undesirable outputs and variable 
inputs can be scaled. Expression (1) seeks for the maximum attainable expansion of desirable 
outputs in the gy direction and the largest feasible contraction of undesirables and variable 
inputs in -gEIt , -gEIt-1 and -gx  direction, respectively (Chung et al., 1997). The latter are negative 
to reflect that undesirables and inputs are being reduced. In this study undesirable outputs and 
inputs are modelled as weakly disposable outputs and inputs, implying that reducing pesticides’ 
environmental spillovers is not costless.  Assuming weak disposability of undesirables (outputs 
and inputs) and fixed inputs, a model that decomposes technical inefficiency of the different 
inputs and outputs for each firm i, i = 1, … ,N, is as follows: 
 
ܦሬ ௢⃗௧൫ݔ, ݍ, ݕ, ܧܫ; ݃௬, −݃ாூ೟, −݃ாூ೟షభ, −݃௫൯ = ܯܽݔఉ೟ఒ೟,{ߚଵ௧ + ߚଶ௧ + ߚଷ௧ + ߚସ௧}    
?????  ?????ାଵ ?????ିଵ 
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s.t. 
∑ ߣ௜௧ݕ௜௠௧ூ೟௜ୀଵ ≥ ݕ௠௧ + ߚଵ௧݃௬௧    (i) 
∑ ߣ௜௧ܧܫ௜௝௧ =ூ೟௜ୀଵ ߪ(ܧܫ௝௧ − ߚଶ௧݃ாூ೔ೕ೟
௧ )  (ii) 
                    ∑ ߣ௜௧ݔ௜௩௧ ≤ ݔ௩௧ூ೟௜ୀଵ − ߚଷ௧݃௫௧                                   (iii)        (2) 
∑ ߣ௜௧ܧܫ௜௝௧ିଵ = ߪ(ܧܫ௝௧ିଵ − ߚସ௧݃ாூ೔ೕ೟షభ
௧ )ூ೟௜ୀଵ              (iv) 
∑ ߣ௜௧ݍ௜௙௧ = ߪݍ௙௧ூ೟௜ୀଵ     (v) 
ߋ1ᇱߣ = 1 , 
ߣ௜௧ ≥ 0 , 
0 < ߪ ≤ 1 
 
Each computed value of β provides the maximum expansion of desirable outputs and 
contraction of undesirable outputs if a firm has to operate efficiently given the directional 
vector g. The interaction between time periods comes through the EIs. A separate intensity 
vector is calculated for each year, indicating the role that each observation i plays in 
determining the set frontier. Free disposability of crop outputs and variable inputs throughout 
the production process is imposed through constraints (i) and (iii). Constraints (ii), (iv), and (v) 
reflect weak disposability of environmental impacts and fixed inputs. λ is a N*1 vector of 
intensity variables (firm weights), while the constraint ߋ1ᇱߣ = 1 allows for a variable returns to 
scale technology (VRS). The scaling parameter σ is selected such that there is a feasible 
solution of the DEA problem with weakly disposable fixed inputs and undesirables under 
variable returns to scale. 
 
The Russell type of model presented above, aggregates both output and input inefficiencies in 
the framework of a radial measure, thus accounting simultaneously for the inefficiency in both 
inputs and outputs. In Figure 2, four farms are observed represented by points A, B, C, and D. 
The DEA technology is the set of all inputs and outputs bounded by the line AB and the 
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horizontal extensions from A and B. The Pareto-Koopmans' efficient subset is represented by 
the line AB. The farms C and D produce inside the frontier and are technically inefficient. In 
the case of farm D its projection lies within the Pareto-Koopmans' efficient subset while farm C 
projects at point E which is outside the efficient subset AB. Therefore, on optimality a radial 
measure would produce a slack (EA) that is different from zero.  
 X1 
 
  
  
  
  
    
 
         
 X2 
Figure 2. Russell graph measure of technical efficiency. 
 
In an effort to identify the importance of including the EIs in the DEA model and the dynamic 
nature they introduce to the arable production framework, a model which ignores EIs is 
estimated and compared with the initial model in (2). The model specification is as follows: 
 
ܦሬ ௢⃗௧൫ݔ, ݍ, ݕ, ܧܫ; ݃௬, −݃௫൯ = ܯܽݔఉ೟ఒ೟,{ߚଵ௧ + ߚଶ௧}    
s.t. 
∑ ߣ௜௧ݕ௜௠௧ூ೟௜ୀଵ ≥ ݕ௠௧ + ߚଵ௧݃௬௧    (i) 
                    ∑ ߣ௜௧ݔ௜௩௧ ≤ ݔ௩௧ூ೟௜ୀଵ − ߚଶ௧݃௫௧                                   (ii)        (3) 
∑ ߣ௜௧ݍ௜௙௧ = ߪݍ௙௧ூ೟௜ୀଵ     (iii) 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
slack 
● 
● 
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ߋ1ᇱߣ = 1 , 
ߣ௜௧ ≥ 0 , 
0 < ߪ ≤ 1 
 
Traditional DEA models that ignore the dynamics of a production process can provide a biased 
indication of resource efficiency. The comparison of the results of the initial model in (2) with 
those of the model in (3), can provide further insight into the magnitude of the bias of the 
inefficiency results. 
 
5.2.2 Factors that influence arable farmers’ performance 
 
We make use of the Algorithm 2 procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007), based on 
truncated regression and bootstrapping techniques, to explain output, undesirables and variable 
inputs inefficiency. Using γi to denote the inefficiency score of farm i, and zi to denote the 
vector of producer-specific and environmental variables, a regression can be specified as: 
 
ߛ௜ = ߜݖ௜ + ߝఐ  ι=1…,Ι,    (4) 
 
 
where δ is the vector of parameters to be estimated and ε is an error term. The unobserved γi in 
(3) is replaced by its bootstrap-based, bias corrected estimate, denoted ߛො௜ obtained in stage one. 
Given the directional distance function approach in (2) and the fact that both sides of (4) are 
bounded by zero, the distribution of ε is restricted by the condition ߝఐ ≥ 0 − ߜݖ௜. The 
distribution of εi is assumed to be truncated normal, with zero mean, unknown variance, and left 
truncated at point 0 − ߜݖ௜ (Simar and Wilson, 2007). Next step requires the use of the following 
truncated regression model for the stage two analysis:  
 
ߛො௜ = ߜݖ௜ + ߝఐ     (5) 
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where ߝ௜~ܰ(0, ߪఌଶ). The parameter estimates from (5) and the original estimates are used to 
construct estimated confidence intervals of δ and ߪఌଶ. The selection of variables that explain 
farms’ performance includes farm-specific variables such as age, crop subsidies and rotation, 
and environmental variables such as soil type, precipitation, temperature, sunshine duration and 
biodiversity populations.   
 
5.2.3 Adjusted DEA 
 
In this third stage of the analysis, producer’s outputs and inputs are adjusted to account for the 
impact of the different stochastic variables that comprise farms’ operating environments and the 
state of nature (i.e., random statistical noise). We expand on Fried’s et al. (2002) approach by 
taking the results of the double-bootstrap approach used in the previous stage of the analysis to 
avoid problems of bias in the estimations.5 This method allows the incorporation in the analysis 
of the production effects of stochastic elements such as climatic variables and the state of nature 
(statistical noise), thus accounting for a wide representation of production uncertainty.6 
Adjustment of outputs and inputs takes into account the fact that some producers may operate 
in relatively unfavorable production conditions, contributing to higher inefficiency scores in the 
initial DEA evaluation. The extent to which each producer has been disadvantaged by 
unfavorable production conditions is revealed by the parameter estimates obtained in each 
truncated regression. The desirable outputs of producers that have been advantaged by each 
source are adjusted downwards while the undesirables (outputs and inputs) and variable inputs 
are adjusted upwards.  Let weather related variables used in the truncated regression of the 
double-bootstrap process and their parameter estimates be denoted as ż୧ and δ̇, respectively.  
Equations (6), (7), and (8) show how producers’ adjusted desirable outputs, variable inputs and 
undesirables are constructed: 
 
ݕ௜஺ = ݕ௜ − ൣ݉ܽݔ௜൛̇ߜ̇ݖ௜ൟ − ̇ߜ̇ݖ௜൧ − [݉ܽݔ௜{ߝ௜} − ߝ௜]  (6) 
                                                 
5 Simar and Wilson (2007) have noted that Frieds’ et al. (2002) approach of regressing radial and non-radial slacks 
on environmental variables is inappropriate as the dependent variables are functions of estimated efficiencies that 
are serially correlated. 
6 Cordero et al. (2008) provide a broader picture of the advantages and disadvantages of approaches that 
incorporate exogenous factors in efficiency evaluation. 
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ݔ௜஺ = ݔ௜ + ൣ݉ܽݔ௜൛̇ߜ̇ݖ௜ൟ − ̇ߜ̇ݖ௜൧ + [݉ܽݔ௜{ߝ௜} − ߝ௜]  (7) 
ܧܫ௜஺ = ܧܫ௜ + ൣ݉ܽݔ௜൛̇ߜ̇ݖ௜ൟ − ̇ߜ̇ݖ௜൧ + [݉ܽݔ௜{ߝ௜} − ߝ௜]  (8) 
 
where ݕ௜஺ , ݔ௜஺, ܧܫ௜஺ are adjusted desirable outputs, variable inputs and undesirables7 
respectively, while ݕ, ݔ and ܧܫ, are observed desirable output, variable input and undesirable 
quantities, respectively. The first adjustment on the left side of the equations puts all producers 
on a common operating environment, the least favorable weather conditions observed in the 
sample, while the second adjustment on the right side of the equations puts all producers into a 
common state of nature, the worst case situation encountered in the sample. Therefore, 
producers farming under relatively good production conditions have their desirable outputs 
(undesirable outputs and inputs, and variable inputs) adjusted downward (upward) by a 
relatively large amount, while producers experiencing relatively bad production conditions have 
their desirable outputs (undesirable outputs and inputs, and variable inputs) adjusted downward 
(upward) by a relatively small amount. The initial DEA model in (2) is re-estimated after 
replacing the observed output and input data with the adjusted ones. Comparing the  results of 
the adjusted with the initial DEA model can shed light on farmers’ performance when 
unobserved heterogeneity arising from production uncertainty is taken into account in the 
modelling framework. 
 
5.3 Data 
 
Data on specialized arable farms covering the period 2002-2007, were obtained from a stratified 
sample of Dutch farms which kept accounts on behalf of the farm accounting system of the 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI). The panel is unbalanced and on average 
farms stay in the sample for four to five years. The data set used for estimation contains 703 
observations from 188 farms. Table 1 reports the mean values of the data. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Equation 8 reflects the adjustment of undesirable ouputs. Adjustments in undesirable inputs can be obtained by replacing EI 
with EIt-1 in both the left and right side of equation (8). 
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Table 1. Variables and descriptive statistics. 
Variable Dimension Mean S.D. 
Output 1000 Euros 191.33 191.35 
Fertilizer 1000 Euros 10.52 8.45 
Other 1000 Euros 59.11 58.53 
Labor Annual working units 1.74 1.01 
Capital 1000 Euros 366.92 384.78 
Land Hectares (ha) 85.72 55.74 
Pesticides  1000 Euros 19.15 18.05 
EIw a Impact points 365.42 461.66 
EIb Kg  43.85 198.86 
Rotation  Percent (%)  ha 45 21 
Age Years 54.65 9.88 
Crop subsidies 1000 Euros 13.71 22.59 
Economic size  European Size Units (ESU) b 164.99 4.558 
Temperature Mean temperature (°C) of first half year 8.77 1.06 
Precipitation Mean precipitation (mm) of first half year 346.85 75.63 
Biodiversity Number of species 458.04 406.48 
Category Percent (%) 
Soil type c 0 40.43 
 
 
1 59.57 
 
a EIw and EIb denote pesticide impacts on water organisms and biological controllers, respectively. 
b One ESU corresponds to a standard gross margin of €1200. 
c 0 indicates low quality soil type (sand, peat) and 1 high quality soil type (loess, fluvial or marine clay). 
 
One output, five inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, other variable inputs, labour, capital, and land), 
and two environmental impacts of pesticides (impacts on water organisms and biological 
controllers) are distinguished. Output mainly consists of root crops (potatoes, sugar beets, 
carrots and onions), cereals (wheat, barley, triticale, corn, oats and rye) and other crops (green 
beans and peas and grasseed) and is measured as total revenue from all products, deflated to 
2005 values using a Tornqvist index based on output prices from Eurostat. The inputs are 
separated into fixed ones which include land, capital and labour, and variable ones which 
consist of fertilizers, pesticides, and other variable (or specific crop) inputs. Land represents the 
total area under crops and is measured in hectares, capital includes the replacement value of 
machinery, buildings and installations, deflated to 2005 using a Tornqvist index based on the 
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respective price indices, and labour is measured in annual work units (AWU).8 Fertilizers were 
measured as expenditures deflated to 2005 using the fertilizer price index and pesticides were 
measured as expenditures deflated to 2005 using pesticide price index. The "other inputs" 
variable includes expenditures on energy, seeds and other specific crop costs, deflated to 2005 
using a Torngvist index for the disaggregated "other inputs" components.  
 
The environmental impact data were obtained from the Dutch Centre for Agriculture and 
Environment (CLM, 2010). For each pesticide that Dutch arable farmers use, there is an 
environmental indicator which shows the impact on aquatic, surface water organisms (EIw), and 
biological controllers (EIb). The effects of pesticides on water organisms is known as 
environmental impact points. 9 The EIw depends on pesticide toxicity and the amount of spray 
drift to watercourses. The amount that reaches a watercourse depends on the application 
technique. The percentage spray drift is 1% for arable farming. Originally the environmental 
impact points for EIw are computed for a standard application (i.e., 1 kg/ha). To calculate the 
application specific EIw the environmental impact points under a standard application are 
multiplied by the actual applied quantity per hectare (CLM, 2010). The total farm specific EIw 
for one year is computed by summing up the impact points of the individual pesticide 
applications. EIw increases when pesticides have a greater impact on the environment. For water 
organisms, a score of 10 impact points is in line with the acceptable level (AL) set by the Dutch 
board for the authorization of pesticides (CTB) which reflects the concentration which 
implicates minor risk for the environment.  
 
The risk for biological controllers (EIb) (e.g., ladybugs, predatory mites, hymenopteran 
parasitoids) is indicated in the data ordinally with a symbol. This symbol shows the usability for 
integrated cropping systems and is a combination of all pesticide effects  for individual 
beneficial organisms. 10 There are four symbols for bio-controllers: symbol ‘A’ indicates that 
the pesticide is useful in the effort to save beneficial organisms; symbol ‘B’ slightly useful; 
symbol ‘C’ not useful; and symbol ‘?’ not well known impact. The EIb variable is a continuous 
variable that represents the sum of the kilograms of the most hazardous for beneficial organisms 
                                                 
8 One AWU is equivalent to one person working full-time on the holding (EC, 2001).  
9 This category includes mainly aquatic insects (CLM, 2010). 
10 Direct effects, such as mortality or non-hatching of eggs and pupae, have been taken into account as well as 
indirect effects, such as reduced fertility, repellency, persistence etc. 
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applications (“C”). In this way the EIb variable reflects the magnitude of pressure farmers exert 
on biological controllers. 
 
Rotation is measured as the share of root crops in the total crops’ acreage; crop subsidies are 
measured in euros. The average age of the sampled farmers was 55 years (Table 1). Farms 
distinction according to soil type took place after using a simplified soil map of The 
Netherlands (Hiemstra et al., 2009) which distinguishes soils in six classes (sand, peat, loess, 
marine clay, fluvial clay, and built-up). The soil type variable is measured as a dummy variable 
with 0 indicating farms operating under low quality soil (sand and peat) and 1 under high 
quality soil (loess, fluvial and marine clay). Farms that operate under low quality soil account 
for around 40% of the total number of farms in the sample while around 60% operate under 
high quality soil. The mean economic size of the sampled farms is 165 European Size Units 
(ESU) and is determined on the basis of the overall standard gross margin of the holding. 
 
Meteorological data from 36 weather stations within the Netherlands were obtained from the 
Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI, 2011). The high number of weather 
stations in conjunction with detailed location data of the sampled farms enabled us to obtain a 
highly spatially disaggregated dataset on meteorological variables.11  
 
Figure 3. Annual average temperature of first half year in The Netherlands, 2003-2007. 
Source: KNMI (2011) 
 
                                                 
11 The sampled farms are separated in 33 regions according to a location map provided by the LEI (LEI, 2011). 
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Averaging the temperatures and precipitation of the first six months of each year, results in the 
mean temperature and precipitation for the main growing period from 2003-2007 (Reidsma et 
al., 2009). The mean temperature of the main growing period between 2003-2007 was 10.6 
degrees Celsius with the warmest year being 2007 with around 11 degrees Celsius (Figure 
3).The average precipitation amount during the same period is 785 mm, with 2007 being the 
most wet year with 942 mm (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Annual average precipitation of first half year in The Netherlands, 2003-2007. 
Source: KNMI (2011) 
 
Finally, biodiversity data were obtained from the Netherlands Biodiversity Information Facility 
(NLBIF, 2011) including species of both flora and fauna (e.g. arthropods, birds etc.). The 
biodiversity variable reflects the number of species found in one of the 33 regions that each 
sampled farm belongs to. 
 
5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Inefficiency measures 
 
Technical inefficiency scores for output, variable inputs and undesirables are obtained using the 
GAMS programming software. Annual averages of technical inefficiency scores under VRS 
and WD of undesirables and fixed inputs in the years 2003-2007 are found in Table 2. Dutch 
arable farmers have considerable output technical inefficiency, with annual averages ranging 
between 15% and 30%. The average technical inefficiency for EI inputs (24%) and EI outputs 
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(25%) is slightly higher than the average output technical inefficiency score (21%), whereas the 
annual average of variable inputs technical inefficiency is much lower, ranging between 2% and 
4%. EI output inefficiency can be interpreted as the level of farm pressure on the state of the 
environment, while EI input inefficiency indicates the extent that farmers consider the impact of 
their current pesticide decisions on next period’s production realization. The high EI 
inefficiency shows that there is a considerable scope for decreasing the environmental impacts 
of pesticides.  
 
When ignoring the EI (reduced form model) most of the inefficiency is picked up by the output 
variable (output inefficiency scores are overestimated by 56% on average) while variable 
inputs’ inefficiency scores are hardly affected (Table 2). 12 Therefore, ignoring the dynamics 
may lead to increased output inefficiency thus misleading policy makers.  
 
Table 2. Inefficiency measures of the directional distance function (VRS and WD of EI) 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Output 
0.23 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.30 
EI (output) 
0.21 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.30 
Variable inputs 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 
EI (input) 
0.21 0.27 0.26 0.20 0.27 
Inefficiency measures when EI are ignored 
     
Output 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.44 0.53 
Variable inputs 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Note: EI denotes environmental impacts of pesticides. 
  
                                                 
12 This result is somehow expected as the number of efficient decision making units (DMUs) increases (decreases) 
as more variables are added  to (excluded from) the model (Nunamaker, 1985). 
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5.4.2 Explaining farms inefficiency 
 
 
Next, we turn to investigating how producer-specific and environmental variables are 
influencing the inefficiency scores of Dutch arable farmers. Table 3 presents the parameter 
estimates and their bootstrap-estimated 95% and 90% confidence interval. 13 Concerning 
output, the closer farmers are to retirement, the less efficient and more risk averse they may be. 
The effect of age on efficiency is highly debatable across the literature: older farmers are likely 
to have more experience and hence be less inefficient (Coeli and Battese, 1996). On the other 
hand, younger farmers may be more efficient as they tend to acquire more easily knowledge on 
technical advances (Weersink, et al., 1990) and are more motivated in adopting efficiency 
improving changes in their farms. Crops subsidies have a positive effect on output technical 
inefficiency as farmers may substitute subsidy income with farm income. The marginal effect 
of €1000 subsidies on technical inefficiency is 0.0057, implying that the average farm will have 
an increase of 0.57% in technical inefficiency. 
 
Subsidies can reduce farmers’ motivation to produce efficiently as they may decide to trade off 
market income for subsidy income. The negative impact of subsidies on farms’ technical 
efficiency seems to be a fairly common finding in the literature (e.g. Lambarraa et al., 2009; 
Bezlepkina et al., 2005; Guyomard et al., 2006; Kleinhanß et al., 2007 and Emvalomatis et al., 
2008; Karagiannis and Sarris, 2005; Dinar et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2008; Zhu and Oude Lansink, 
2010; Giannakas et al., 2001). Farming in more fertile soils increases output inefficiency as 
farmers may rely on a few highly profitable crops (e.g. potatoes) or varieties and hence do not 
diversify and spread risk spatially (Di Falco and Chavas, 2009). Biodiversity increases 
inefficiency in output production possibly through increased presence of non-target plants and 
other pests that cause crop damage. Higher temperatures decrease output inefficiency as they 
promote crop growth. An increase in precipitation rates increases output inefficiency as land 
may become increasingly waterlogged in some cases with negative consequences on farm 
productivity (Chambers et al., 2011). Finally, larger farms are more output inefficient compared 
to small farms. Larger farms (due to their size) may have difficulties in conducting their 
operations at the optimal time and thus being less efficient (Amara et al., 1999). Another 
                                                 
13 When utilising the Simar and Wilson (2007) bootstrap procedure to compute the estimated bias-corrected 
inefficiency scores in the stage one bootstrap, a choice must be made about the number of replications. The 
number of replications in the bootstrap procedure has been set equal to 1000. 
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explanation may be that the share of family labour, that may be more motivated, flexible and 
committed to the business, is higher in smaller farms while large farms are more dependent on 
hired labour that needs to be supervised and may be less motivated (Wiggins et al, 2010). 14 
 
Table 3. Truncated regression. Estimated parameters and bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
95% confidence 90% confidence 
Output 
Estimated 
parameter 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Rotation a -0.02307 -0.02834 0.01006 -0.02395 0.00573 
Age 0.19710 0.03849 0.86501 0.13086 0.76937 
Crop subsidies 0.00577 -0.00058 0.01016 0.00042 0.00911 
Soil type b 0.11684 0.05773 0.14751 0.06861 0.13997 
Biodiversity c 0.03761 0.00670 0.04916 0.01187 0.04397 
Temperature d -0.33302 -0.62819 -0.08982 -0.57142 -0.15321 
Precipitation e 0.45266 0.28565 0.57088 0.31685 0.54369 
Economic size f 0.05178 0.01583 0.06455 0.02044 0.05853 
_cons -2.09984 -2.75489 -1.37462 -2.63836 -1.4875 
EI (output) 
Rotation -0.04211 -0.03773 -0.01494 -0.03483 -0.01735 
Age 0.92253 0.60950 1.08654 0.66369 1.03413 
Crop subsidies 0.00035 -0.00298 0.00367 -0.00220 0.00292 
Soil type 0.02196 -0.00662 0.04658 -0.00123 0.04028 
Biodiversity -0.00417 -0.01282 0.01488 -0.00929 0.01177 
Temperature 0.28680 0.15698 0.49306 0.20063 0.45947 
Precipitation 0.06577 -0.04231 0.13186 -0.02389 0.11297 
Economic size 0.02897 0.01614 0.04570 0.01974 0.04191 
_cons -1.36143 -1.60634 -0.80770 -1.53021 -0.89432 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The mean share of hired labour on total labour (hired+own) for the bottom one-third of farms ranked by size for 
the study period was around 4% while the respective figure for the top quarter of farms was around 16%.  
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Table 3. (continued) 
95% confidence 90% confidence 
Variable inputs 
Estimated 
parameter 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Rotation -0.04987 -0.07820 -0.02880 -0.07267 -0.03405 
Age -0.13650 -0.26088 0.55135 -0.17901 0.45411 
Crop subsidies 0.00434 -0.00432 0.00727 -0.00313 0.00603 
Soil type 0.07910 0.01746 0.11063 0.02701 0.10040 
Biodiversity -0.05982 -0.09207 -0.04488 -0.08450 -0.04997 
Temperature -0.16273 -0.35024 0.21528 -0.29340 0.14450 
Precipitation 0.52981 0.26641 0.59915 0.30018 0.56130 
Economic size -0.03474 -0.06084 -0.01054 -0.05430 -0.01530 
_cons -2.05267 -2.74010 -1.16666 -2.52481 -1.29143 
EI (input) 
Rotation -0.03239 -0.04137 -0.01825 -0.03821 -0.02068 
Age -0.18075 -0.17872 0.30301 -0.11902 0.24432 
Crop subsidies 0.00329 -0.00067 0.00593 0.00013 0.00524 
Soil type 0.04361 0.02784 0.07718 0.03211 0.07172 
Biodiversity -0.01392 -0.02363 0.00290 -0.02040 -0.00059 
Temperature 0.08021 -0.19049 0.13993 -0.15997 0.10078 
Precipitation -0.00531 -0.00718 0.16163 0.01122 0.14339 
Economic size 0.04677 0.02602 0.05420 0.02984 0.05116 
_cons 0.62833 -0.25242 0.57114 -0.16409 0.48650 
 
Notes: i) The regressand is the bootstrap-based bias-corrected DEA estimate of the unobserved inefficiency score 
of output, EI (output), variable inputs, and EI (input). ii) Statistically significant confidence intervals are in bold. 
a Measured as the percentage of root crops in the total crops’ acreage. 
b Measured as a dummy with 0 indicating low quality soil type (sand, peat) and 1 high quality soil type (loess, 
fluvial or marine clay). 
c Total number of species in farms’ area.  
d Mean temperature (°C) of first half year. 
e Mean precipitation (mm) of first half year. 
f Measured in European Size Units (ESU). 
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The results of the regression of EI output inefficiency suggest that a higher share of root crops 
(rotation) decreases environmental inefficiency. Older farmers are less efficient in terms of 
environmental impacts as they may be less informed on the external effects of pesticides or less 
motivated in adopting environmental friendly innovations. In addition to  being beneficial for 
the growth of target plants, higher temperatures may also favour the growth of non-target 
species and hence attract more farmland organisms (e.g., arthropods). This may require the 
intensification of pesticide applications to maintain crop yields, leading to higher environmental 
inefficiency. Larger farms are less environmental efficient as they use more pesticides leading 
to higher environmental spillovers.15 
 
Concerning variable inputs, a higher share of root crops decreases inefficiency in the use of 
variable inputs suggesting inputs are used more efficiently in root crops than in other outputs. 
Farming in more productive soils leads to less efficient use of variable inputs  showing that 
variable inputs are used more efficiently by farmers operating in less productive soils.  
Operating in regions with higher biodiversity populations leads to more efficient use of variable 
inputs, possibly through increased pollination and decreased crop damage as pests may 
encounter difficulties in spreading in a highly non-uniform environment. An increase in 
precipitation rates increases variable inputs’ inefficiency as they promote the growth of non-
target species leading to increased yield variability and higher crop specific costs (e.g., 
mechanical weeding, fuel use). Larger farms are less inefficient in the use of variable inputs by 
exploiting scale economies (Hallam and Machado, 1996). Coelli and Battese (1996) argue that 
smaller farms may have alternative income sources and thus put less effort in farming compared 
with the larger farms. 
 
The results of the EI input inefficiency regression show that farmers that adopt a higher share of 
root crops are more aware of the production impacts of pesticides’ environmental spillovers on 
future production. Farming in more productive land increases EI inputs’ inefficiency as farming 
intensity is higher. Potatoes are one of the most profitable arable crops and are widely 
cultivated in clay soils. Their production requires intensive use of fungicides that may lead to 
                                                 
15 A comparison of the bottom (small) and top one-third (large) of farms ranked by economic size reveals that large 
farms’ have spent on average €22.5 thousand more pesticides than the small farms .The average EIw and EIb of 
large farms are 487.9 and 88.45, respectively, while the respective figures for small farms are 239.6 and 18.7, 
respectively. 
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higher EI. In such a case, the economic benefits from operating in more fertile land may 
outweigh potential crop losses from pesticides’ negative effects. An increase in precipitation 
during the growing season may render farmers more precise and careful in applying pesticides, 
considering their potential negative future impacts through increased leaching. Finally, large 
farmers are less effective in taking into account the impact of pesticide’s environmental 
spillovers in future output, as production in larger economic size farms may be more profit-
driven and thus the short-term economic benefits of increased pesticide applications may 
outweigh their negative long-run production impact. Therefore, large farmers tend to be more 
myopic decision makers by ignoring the dynamics or future effects of their current production 
decisions. 
 
5.4.3 Accounting for the impact of variation in the production conditions 
 
The Stage 3 DEA inefficiency scores are presented in Table 4. After adjusting for variation in 
the production conditions, inefficiency scores decrease. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that producers operating under unfavourable production conditions may be disadvantaged in the 
initial DEA evaluation that does not take this factor into account. More specifically, adjusting 
performance evaluations for variation in the production conditions results in a decrease in 
average output, EI-output, variable inputs, and EI-input inefficiency of around 24%, 50%, 40%, 
and 46%, respectively.  
 
The highest output inefficiency decrease is observed in 2007 and may be partly related to the 
fact that this year accounts for the highest precipitation amount in the study period (Figure 4). 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that increased precipitation can impact negatively farm 
productivity as in some cases land may become waterlogged. Concerning EI-output 
inefficiency, the highest decrease is observed in 2007 and 2004 as some farms that received 
relatively low initial performance (i.e. higher inefficiency scores) did so in part due to their 
relatively unfavourable production conditions such as high precipitation rates that can be 
responsible for increased pesticide leaching.16 Variable inputs’ inefficiency scores did not 
change significantly while EI-input inefficiency scores follow almost the same trend as the EI-
                                                 
16 High precipitation rates in conjunction with high temperatures (especially in 2007, Figure 3) can boost not only 
target crops’ but also non-target species’ growth, leading to higher use of pesticides and thus greater environmental 
pressure. 
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output scores (i.e., high inefficiency changes during the years of relatively extreme weather 
events). 
 
Accounting for production uncertainty in the evaluation of farmers’ performance has resulted in 
a notable improvement of efficiency scores. The recent empirical literature on this point reports 
similar findings. Chambers et al. (2011) developed an event specific DEA model that shows 
how event-specific representation of the production technology can be implemented within a 
DEA framework and compared its findings with the standard DEA model. Their results show 
that when stochastic elements that alter the nature of the production technology are ignored, 
efficiency scores are underestimated up to 50%. Emvalomatis (2011) in a study that applies a 
dynamic stochastic frontier model to a panel of US electric utilities shows that ignoring 
unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., firm-specific factors that affect productivity and are not under 
the control of the firm) leads to higher persistence of inefficiency, as part of the unobserved 
heterogeneity is interpreted as inefficiency. Greene (2005a, b) argues that the stochastic 
component of frontier models can be viewed as containing both inefficiency and heterogeneity 
and shows that accounting for heterogeneity in stochastic frontier models brings significant 
changes in estimated results. 
 
The initial DEA evaluation has revealed that Dutch arable farmers are for output and 
undesirables on average around 21% and 24%, respectively,  below the production frontier, 
while with the adjusted DEA model the distance from the frontier is reduced to around 16% and 
13%, respectively. Therefore, it can be argued that managerial inefficiency accounts for only 
around 13-16% while another 5-11% is attributed to production uncertainty. In monetary terms, 
farmers’ profit loss from production uncertainty is on average € 9.57 thousand. The notable 
amount of profit loss of the sampled farms reveals a need to mitigate the economic damage 
through risk management tools. Market-oriented risk management tools are widely available 
but to what extent are economically feasible for farmers that want to cover such a considerable 
amount of profit loss needs further investigation.  
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5.5 Conclusions 
 
Employing non-parametric methods to compute farmers technical and environmental 
inefficiency may provide a wrong estimation of where we stand when ignoring the dynamics of 
the operating environment and the impact of the variability in production conditions. This study 
uses DEA to compute output, input and undesirables inefficiency in Dutch arable production 
over the period 2003-2007. Initially, a dynamic DEA model is employed and farms’ 
performance is compared with the results of a standard DEA model that ignores the dynamics 
of pesticide use. Then a bootstrap procedure is applied to explore the factors that might explain 
inefficiency in the dynamic model. After the bootstrap procedure has been completed, the 
original outputs and inputs are adjusted to account for the impact of the variability in 
production conditions. Then the dynamic DEA model is re-employed after replacing observed 
output and input data with those adjusted for the impact of variability in production conditions 
and compared to the initial dynamic DEA model. 
 
Results of the initial DEA evaluation show that Dutch farmers have noticable output 
inefficiency scores and high EI (both input and output) inefficiencies that reveal a considerable 
scope for decreasing pesticides’ environmental spillovers. The analysis reveals among others 
that large farms are more output and environmental inefficient both in terms of protecting the 
status of the environment and taking into account pesticides’ future negative effects in their 
current production decisions. Biodiversity and weather related variables do have a statistically 
significant effect on farmers’ performance. After adjusting outputs and inputs to account for the 
impact of variability in production conditions, estimates of inefficiency decreased dramatically. 
The results highlight the degree to which our understanding of efficiency levels can be distorted 
when using models that ignore the dynamics of production and the effects of variability in 
production conditions. 
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Nonparametric Risk-Adjusted Efficiency Approach Applied to Dutch 
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Abstract 
Pesticides are widely used by crop producers in developed countries to combat risk associated 
with pest and diseases. However, their indiscriminate use can lead to various environmental 
spillovers that may alter the production environment thus contributing to production risk. This 
study utilises a nonparametric efficiency approach to measure performance of arable farms, 
incorporating pesticides’ environmental spillovers and output variance as risky outputs in the 
efficiency analysis and taking explicitly into account the effect of pesticides and other inputs on 
production risk. This approach is applied to outputs, risk-mitigating inputs, and risky outputs of 
Dutch arable farms over the period 2003-2007. A moment approach is used to compute output 
variance, providing empirical representations of the risk-increasing or -decreasing nature of the 
used inputs. Finally, shadow values of risk-mitigating inputs are computed. We find that 
pesticides are overused in Dutch arable farming and there is a considerable scope for decreasing 
pesticides’ environmental spillovers. 
Keywords: environmental spillovers, Netherlands, pesticides, production risk. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
Risk constitutes an integral part of the agricultural production environment, playing an 
important role in farm-level production decision making. Production risk alongside with price 
risk, technological risk and, policy risk are the main sources of risk and uncertainty that are 
relevant from the point of view of the agricultural decision maker (Moschini and Hennessy 
2001). Production risk refers to the stochastic nature of agricultural production where there is 
uncertainty on the amount and quality of output resulting from different input choices. This 
uncertainty may arise from unpredictable weather events and/or sudden increase in 
destructiveness or population numbers of a pest species in a given area (i.e., pest infestation). 
Several risk management tools are available to producers in developed countries to manage 
risk, notably market or financial insurance, price contracts, pesticides, fertilizers, crop rotation, 
anti-hail protection equipment, and genetically modified crops.  
 
Concerning pesticide use, as pest arrival is an uncertain event and pesticide productivity varies 
across time and space, there is an uncertainty at the time of application. This uncertainty can 
lead to overuse of pesticides relative to the private or social optimum. In an effort to avoid crop 
losses, risk averse farmers apply pesticides at an early stage when the pest population may not 
be at its peak. This action can induce extra costs as additional pesticide doses are applied. On 
the other hand, waiting and monitoring the pest population and applying pesticide when full 
information is available may increase the crop loss at the monitoring stages. Norgaard (1976) 
states that the major motivation for pesticide application is the provision of some “insurance” 
against damage. Therefore, uncertainty in the pest-pesticide system leads to a higher and more 
frequent use of pesticides. 
 
Farmers often lack full knowledge of the relation between pesticides and pest mortality (Feder 
1979). Pesticide effectiveness can be influenced by fluctuations in weather conditions such as 
precipitation and temperature. Changes in weather conditions can impact both pest populations 
and the effectiveness of pesticides as each chemical product has different durability. Horowitz 
and Lichtenberg (1994) consider three scenarios of risk or uncertainty: risk or uncertainty about 
a) crop growth conditions only; b) pest damage only; and c) both growth conditions and pest 
damage. Their findings support the conventional view that when there is uncertainty due to pest 
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damage, pesticides are likely to be risk-reducing inputs. However, the literature reports mixed 
findings on the role of risk aversion with some studies finding that pesticides are risk-reducing 
(Griffiths and Anderson 1982; Saha et al. 1994; Smith and Goodwin 1996) and other risk-
increasing inputs (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993; Pannell 1995; Gotsch and Regev 1996; 
Saha et al. 1997). When both pest populations are high and growth conditions are favorable, 
pesticides will be risk-increasing as they increase the variability of harvests (increase output 
under good growth conditions). Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) have shown that pesticides 
may be risk-increasing inputs even if a federal government provides crop insurances that act as 
a substitute for additional pesticide applications.  
 
The relationship between pesticide use and production risk may also be shaped by pesticides’ 
environmental spillovers. Farmland biodiversity can benefit farm productivity (Di Falco and 
Chavas 2006; Omer et. al 2006; Tilman et al. 2005), reduce environmental risk and yield 
variability, improve pest control by impeding the evolution of pest populations and 
consequently reducing pest damages (Priestley and Bayles 1980; Heisey et al. 1997). Therefore, 
pesticide indirect effects on biodiversity may increase production risk through decrease in 
beneficial natural predators (Pimentel et al. 1992).  
 
The theory on modelling firms’ production risk  is well developed (Just and Pope, 1978; Antle, 
1987). The Just and Pope (1978) approach to modeling production processes in the face of 
production risk has been widely used in applied analysis, with the variation in production being 
influenced by the input levels; some inputs may be variation-increasing, while others are 
variation-decreasing, where risk is defined as the variance of output. Increasing attention has 
been given in recent years to risk in agricultural decisions and ways to mitigate it. Output 
variance and pesticides’ environmental spillovers may be considered among the outputs of 
agricultural production to be minimized (i.e., undesirable outputs). Several attempts  using data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) methods have been made in the literature to measure efficiency in 
the presence of undesirable outputs (Färe et al., 1989; Ball et al., 1994; Färe et al., 1996; 
Tyteca, 1997; Reinhard et al., 2000; Hailu and Veeman, 2001; Oude Lansink and Silva, 2003; 
Piot-Lepetit and Moing, 2007). An approach allowing for an asymmetric treatment of desirable 
and undesirable outputs was proposed by Färe et al. (1989), where undesirable outputs are 
treated as weakly disposable while desirable outputs are strongly disposable. Weak 
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disposability means that reducing (increasing) undesirable outputs (inputs) is not a costless 
procedure. On this basis, a number of studies have proposed the use of directional distance 
functions as a tool for modelling production in the presence of undesirables (Chung et al.,1997; 
Ball et al., 2001). A directional distance function allows for a simultaneous expansion of 
desirable outputs and contraction of inputs and/or undesirable outputs (Chung et al. 1997). The 
employment of directional distance functions to measure both technical and environmental 
efficiency of firms that produce both desirable and undesirable outputs has become widespread 
(Färe et al., 2005; Piot-Lepetit and Moing, 2007; Murty et al., 2007; Kjærsgaard et al., 2009). 
Undesirables are not always treated as inputs or outputs in a directional distance function 
approach. Hoang and Alauddin (2011), in a study that measures economic, environmental and 
ecological performance of agricultural production systems in 30 OECD countries, use a 
directional distance function approach seeking the optimal input and output combination that 
minimizes the total amount of nutrient and cumulative exergy balance sent into the 
environment. 
 
Various attempts have been made to incorporate risk in non-parametric efficiency analysis with 
the vast majority being in the banking sector. Some studies focus on cost efficiency measures 
with incomplete price information (Schaffnit et al., 1997; Camanho and Dyson, 2005) and risk-
adjusted profit efficiency using a mean variance criterion (Settlage et al., 2009) 1, and others are 
treating risk as an external factor and employ the methods described in Fried et al. (2002) to 
adjust efficiency measures for risk (Chang 1999; Chen et al. 2007).  
 
In the context of agricultural production, Chambers et al. (2011) employ a DEA model 
incorporating climatic variables to account for production uncertainty in the evaluation of 
farmers’ performance, finding that efficiency results change dramatically when acknowledging 
stochastic elements. Skevas et al. (Chapter 5) have expanded Fried’s et al (2002) approach to 
account for a wide representation of production uncertainty in computing the efficiency of 
Dutch cash crop farms. Both studies adjust efficiency modelling to reflect risk as an exogenous 
factor. However, none of these studies explicitly accounted for the risk-increasing or decreasing 
nature of agricultural inputs and the employment of risky outputs. The objective of this study is 
to investigate the performance of Dutch arable farms by using a risk-adjusted efficiency 
                                                 
1 Others include risk as an input in the production process of a bank (Berg et al. 1992) or as an undesirable output 
(Chang 1999; Park and Weber 2006). 
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measure to a) identify technical inefficiency and risk-mitigating inputs and risky outputs 
inefficiency, b) incorporate risky outputs in the efficiency analysis and c) take explicitly into 
account the extent to which agricultural inputs increase or decrease production risk. 
 
The rest of the paper continues with Section 2 with the presentation of  the methodology, while 
Section 3 describes the definition and sources of the data used. In Section 4, the empirical 
results from the analysis are presented and discussed, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
6.2 Methodology 
 
6.2.1 A risk-adjusted inefficiency model 
 
The inefficiency model is based on a set of observations of farms in a sample that use a vector 
of variable inputs, fixed inputs, and risk-mitigating inputs to produce a desirable output (y) and 
risky or undesirable outputs (r). The directional technology distance function in presence of 
risky outputs, seeks to increase the desirable output while simultaneously reducing the risky 
outputs. Assuming weak disposability of risky outputs, and fixed inputs, a model that 
decomposes technical inefficiency of the different inputs and outputs for each firm i, i = 1, … 
,N, is as follows: 
 
ܦሬ ௢⃗௧൫ݍ, ݕ, ܧܫ; ݃௬, −݃௭, −݃௥, −݃௖൯ = ܯܽݔ
ఉ೟ఒ೟,
{ߚଵ௧ + ߚଶ௧ + ߚଷ௧ + ߚସ௧} 
s.t. 
∑ ߣ௜௧ݕ௜௠௧ூ೟௜ୀଵ ≥ ݕ௠௧ + ߚଵ௧݃௬௧            (i) 
∑ ߣ௜௧ݖ௜௩௧ ≤ூ೟௜ୀଵ ݖ௩௧ − ߚଶ௧݃௭௧                        (ii) 
∑ ߣ௜௧ݍ௜ௗ௧ = ߮ݍௗ௧ூ೟௜ୀଵ                          (iii) 
∑ ߣ௜௧ݎ௤௧ = ߮(ݎ௤௧ − ߚଷ௧݃௥௧)ூ೟௜ୀଵ     (iv)     (1) 
∑ ߣ௜௧ݔ௜௙௧ ≤ ݔ௙௧ூ೟௜ୀଵ −ߚସ௧݃௫௧     (v) 
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ߋ1ᇱߣ = 1      (vi) 
ߣ௜௧ ≥ 0      (vii) 
0 < ߮ ≤ 1     (viii) 
 
where β1, β2, β3 and β4 are the technical inefficiency scores for the i-th farm of desirable output, 
risk-mitigating inputs, risky outputs, and variable inputs, respectively. Desirable output is 
represented by y, z are the risk-mitigating inputs (i.e., fertilizer, fungicides, herbicides, 
insecticides and, other pesticides), q are the fixed inputs (i.e., capital, labour, land), r represents 
risky outputs (i.e., output variance, and pesticide effects on biodiversity), x are the variable 
inputs (i.e., other inputs), and λ are the firm weights (intensity variables). Pesticide effects on 
biodiversity are considered risky outputs as higher pressure on farmland organisms can deprive 
farms from services such as soil nutrient enhancement and increase production risk through 
decrease in beneficial natural predators (Pimentel et al. 1992). The vector of directions in which 
outputs and inputs can be scaled is represented by g. Model (1) seeks for the maximum 
attainable expansion of desirable outputs in the gy direction and the largest feasible contraction 
of risk-mitigating inputs, risky outputs, and variable inputs in –gz , -gr and -gx direction, 
respectively (Chung et al. 1997). The latter are negative to pick up the fact that risky outputs 
and inputs are being reduced. Constraint (vi) allows for a variable returns to scale (VRS) 
technology. The scaling parameter φ is selected to ensure a feasible solution of the DEA model 
with weakly disposable fixed inputs and risky outputs under VRS. Weak disposability of fixed 
inputs and risky outputs throughout the production process is imposed through constraints (iii) 
and (iv), respectively. Fixed inputs are specified as weakly disposable (in the short run) as 
changes in land or capital are processes that involve high costs. The indirect effects of 
pesticides on biodiversity characterized as risky outputs and also considered weakly disposable 
as considerable reductions in environmental spillovers may require significant changes in the 
type and cost of pesticide products used (e.g., purchasing more environmental friendly products 
may be more expensive than high toxicity products). Moreover, the indirect effects of pesticides 
may reduce the production possibility set for other farms, resulting in governmental regulations. 
Therefore, the disposing of this risky output is not a costless activity. Yield variance is also not 
freely disposable as it is related to weather conditions and changes in pest populations, i.e., 
variables beyond the control of farmers. On the other hand, risk-mitigating inputs are 
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considered strongly or freely disposable; i.e., changing the levels of these inputs does not 
involve costs for farms. 
 
After solving model (1), a set of dual variables for each observation is obtained, accounting for 
the effect on inefficiency of a change of each technological constraint. Utilizing the procedure 
suggested by Ball et al. (1994, 2004), these dual variables can be used to generate the shadow 
values of each risk-mitigating input. The shadow value of each risk-mitigating input is: 
ܵ ௩ܸ௜ = ݌ ∗
⎣⎢
⎢⎢
⎡
−
߲ߚଶ ߲ݖ௩௜ൗ
߲ߚଵ ߲ݕ௜ൗ ⎦⎥
⎥⎥
⎤
                        (2) 
 
Where  ܵ ௩ܸ௜ is the shadow value of risk-mitigating input v, v=1,...,V for each firm i, i=1,...,N, 
and p is the output price. The terms ∂β2/∂zvi and ∂β1/∂yi are the shadow costs associated with 
constraints (i), and (ii) (i.e., on output y, and risk-mitigating inputs v, respectively) from model 
(1). The extent to which risk-adjusted inputs are over- or under-used is inferred from a 
comparison of the shadow values with the market prices. Market prices are greater (lower) than 
shadow values for inputs that are over-used (under-used). 
 
6.2.2 Output variance 
 
The estimation procedure of output variance follows two steps. First, we estimate the first two 
moments of the output distribution following a sequential estimation procedure as described in 
Kim and Chavas (2003) which adapts the procedure in Antle (1987). In the first step output is 
regressed on the  input variables as shown in the following model: 
 
ݕ௜ = ݂(ݔ௜; ߚ௜) + ݑ௜    (2) 
 
where y denotes output, x is a vector of production inputs (fertilizers, other variable inputs, 
fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, other pesticides, labour, capital, and land), u is the 
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identically independently distributed error term, and i =1,...,N denotes individual farmers in the 
sample. 
The jth moment of output conditional on input use is: 
 
ߤ௝ = ܧ൛[ݕ(. )]௝ൟ    (3) 
 
Thus, the estimated errors from the regression in equation (2) are estimates of the first moment 
of output distribution. The estimated errors ݑො , are then squared and regressed on the same set of 
explanatory variables as in equation (2):  
 
ݑො௜ଶ = ݍ(ݔ௜; ߛ௜) + ݑො௜    (4) 
 
Consistent estimates of the parameter vector γ are obtained after applying OLS to equation (4). 
The predicted values ݑො௜ଶ are consistent estimates of the second central moment of output 
distribution (Antle 1983). The farm specific variance of output is computed as following:  
 
ݒ௜ = ݑො௜ଶ − ߤଵଶ     (5) 
 
In general, it is expected that all inputs increase output, but for the second moment, inputs can 
be either risk-increasing or risk-decreasing. 
 
6.3 Data 
 
The data are an unbalanced panel of Dutch arable farms covering the period 2003-2007, 
obtained from the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI). Farms remain in the panel 
for a maximum of five years. The data set used comprises 493 observations from 119 farms. 
Table 1 reports the mean values of the data. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics  
Variable Dimension Mean S.D. 
Output 1000 Euros 197.89 202.03 
Fertilizers 1000 Euros 10.07 8.67 
Other inputs 1000 Euros 51.59 54.38 
Labour Annual work units (AWU) 1.67 0.88 
Capital 1000 Euros 335.30 389.17 
Land Hectares (ha) 80.96 56.55 
Fungicides 1000 Euros 12.76 9.82 
Herbicides 1000 Euros 8.35 5.44 
Insecticides 1000 Euros 1.74 1.92 
Other pesticides 1000 Euros 2.55 3.26 
Pesticide impact on water organisms Impact points 490.01 508.05 
Pesticide impact on soil organisms Impact points 643.09 654.86 
 
One output, 7 inputs (fertilizers, fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, other pesticides, other 
variable inputs, labour, capital, and land), and two pesticide externalities (impacts on water and 
soil organisms) are distinguished. Output mainly consists of potatoes, sugar beets, and cereals 
(wheat, barley, corn) and is measured as total revenue from all products, deflated to 2005 values 
using a Tornqvist index for the disaggregated output components. The inputs are separated into 
fixed inputs including land, capital and labour, variable inputs consisting of other variable (or 
specific crop) inputs, and risk-mitigating inputs including fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides, 
and other pesticides 2. Land represents the total area under crops and is measured in hectares, 
capital includes the replacement value of machinery, buildings and installations, deflated to 
2005 using a Tornqvist index based on the respective price indices, and labour is measured in 
annual work units (AWU3). Fertilizers were measured as expenditures deflated to 2005 using a 
fertilizer price index. All pesticide categories are measured as expenditures deflated to 2005 
using pesticide price indexes for each pesticide category from Eurostat. The "other inputs" 
variable includes expenditures on energy, seeds and other specific crop costs, deflated to 2005 
using a Torngvist index for the disaggregated "other inputs" components.  
                                                 
2 Other pesticides include growth regulators, rodenticides, additives (i.e., mineral oil), ground disinfectants, 
detergents, sulfur, and, unclassified products. 
3 One AWU is equivalent to one person working full-time on the holding (EC 2001).  
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The pesticide impact data are obtained from the Dutch Centre for Agriculture and Environment 
(CLM). There is an environmental indicator expressed in impact points for each pesticide 
farmers use, capturing its indirect effect on water and soil organisms.4 Pesticide toxicity and the 
amount of spray drift to watercourses (1% for arable farming) are taken into account in 
computing the impact points for water organisms. The impact points for soil organisms, are 
computed based on the organic matter content (3-6% for the case study farms), pesticide 
characteristics (degradation rate, and mobility in soil) and pesticide toxicity. The organic matter 
content in conjunction with pesticide characteristics determine the amount of pesticides that 
remain in the soil over time. Originally, the environmental impact points (for both water and 
soil organisms) are expressed for an application of 1 kg/ha (standard application). The impact 
points under a standard application are multiplied by the actual applied quantity per hectare 
(CLM, 2010). The final farm-specific impact for water and soil organisms is computed by 
summing up the impact points of the individual pesticide applications. 
 
The environmental impact points increase when pesticides have a greater impact on the 
environment. For soil organisms a score of 100 impact points is in line with the acceptable level 
(AL) set by the Dutch board for the authorization of pesticides (CTB) which reflects the 
concentration which implicates minor risk for the environment. Since 1995, the AL for aquatic 
organisms is 10 impact points per application (CLM, 2010). 
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Analysis of elasticities and variance 
 
The results of the moment function estimation are summarized in Table 2 in terms of the 
elasticities of the first two moments of output with respect to each production input using a 
quadratic functional form specification (which includes inputs in levels, squares and cross 
variables).5 Concerning the first moment, all farmer choice factors have a positive and 
                                                 
4 Water and soil organisms include mainly aquatic and soil insects, respectively (CLM 2010). 
5 Most of the inputs in squares and cross variables of equation (2) where insignificant even at the 10 per cent 
significance level and were excluded from the estimation. The only significant terms were the squared insecticide 
variable (parameter estimate: 0.01, p-value: 0.000) and the cross variable “fungicides*herbicides” (parameter 
estimate: -0.05, p-value: 0.000). 
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significant impact, except for labour that is also insignificant. This is quite close to our 
expectation that inputs in the first moment function estimation increase output. The significant 
elasticities of fertilizer and other inputs indicate that these inputs do play an important role in 
crop production. Land elasticity is higher in comparison to the rest of the productive inputs, 
implying that land is a scarce input that constrains the cash crop sector. All pesticide elasticities 
are significant, pointing to the importance of pesticides in reducing crop damage. Fungicide 
elasticity is higher in comparison to the rest of pesticide inputs. This is expected as one of the 
most important crops of the sampled farms is potatoes that requires rigorous fungicide 
applications to combat oomycete Phytophthora infestants, considered the crops’ main enemy 
(Haverkort et al. 2009).  
 
In the second stage estimation describing the second moment, production inputs can be 
separated into marginal risk-reducing and marginal risk-increasing inputs. The marginal risk-
reducing input category includes fertilizer, land, fungicides, insecticides, and herbicides, but 
only pesticide inputs play a significant role in decreasing output variance. Fungicides are 
important in preventing crop damage in potato production that has a high share in the examined 
farmers’ crop basket. Insecticides and herbicides can reduce output variability by reducing the 
presence of pests, thus optimizing the growth conditions of target plants. Griffiths and 
Anderson (1982), Saha et al., (1994) and Smith and Goodwin (1996) support the view that 
pesticides are risk-reducing inputs while Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), Pannell (1995), 
Gotsch and Regev (1996), and Saha et al., (1997) suggest othewise. When both pest populations 
are high and growth conditions are favorable, pesticides will be risk increasing as they increase 
the variability of harvests (i.e., increase output under good growth conditions). Among the 
marginal risk-increasing inputs are other inputs, labour, capital, and other pesticides. Labour 
and other pesticides are the only significant parameters at the 5% significance level. Assuming 
that pest damage is independent of other factors affecting output may lead to the conventional 
view that pesticides are risk-reducing inputs (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1994). 
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Table 2. Elasticity of moment with respect to each input 
             Moment  
 First Second 
Fertilizer  0.090  (0.001) -0.014  (0.270) 
Other inputs  0.194  (0.000)  0.021  (0.156) 
Labour -0.057  (0.154)  0.041  (0.036) 
Capital  0.091  (0.000)  0.018  (0.147) 
Land  0.363  (0.000) -0.022  (0.280)   
Fungicides  0.190  (0.029) -0.029  (0.014) 
Insecticides  0.016  (0.016) -0.014  (0.008) 
Herbicides  0.084  (0.040) -0.026  (0.019) 
Other pesticides a  0.014  (0.028)  0.009  (0.002) 
Note: P-values in parenthesis. P-values for fungicides, insecticides, and herbicides were computed using bootstrap 
techniques. 
a Include growth regulators, rodenticides, additives (i.e., mineral oil), ground disinfectants, detergents, sulfur, and, 
unclassified products. 
 
6.4.2 Technical inefficiency 
 
Technical inefficiency scores for output, risk-mitigating inputs, risky outputs, and variable 
inputs are obtained using the GAMS programming software. Annual averages of technical 
inefficiency scores under VRS and WD of risky outputs and fixed inputs in the years 2003-
2007 are found in Table 3. Annual averages of output technical inefficiency of Dutch arable 
farmers ranges between 6% and 13%. The average technical inefficiency for risk-mitigating 
inputs (6%) is slightly lower than the average output technical inefficiency score (9%), whereas 
the average technical inefficiency for risky outputs (9%) is at a similar level. The annual 
average of variable inputs technical inefficiency is quite low, ranging between 2% and 4%. 
Risky outputs’ inefficiency can be interpreted as the level of farm production pressure on 
farmland biodiversity, and farmers’ capacity in reducing output variability. Risk-mitigating 
inputs’ inefficiency indicates how efficient are farmers in using risk-mitigating inputs to 
manage production risk. The considerable level of risky outputs’ inefficiency presents a 
considerable range (9%) of potential improvement in decreasing the environmental impacts of 
pesticides. 
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Table 3. Inefficiency measures (SD a of risk-mitigating inputs, WD of risky outputs). 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Output 
0.06 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.10 
Risk-adjusted inputs 
0.05 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.06 
Risky outputs  
0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 
Variable inputs 
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 
a SD and WD denote strong and weak disposability, respectively. 
 
6.4.3 Analysis of shadow values 
 
Table 4 presents the shadow values of risk-mitigating inputs which are computed at the sample 
means, at average output price index 1.12. The average shadow price of fertilizer over the 
period 2003-2007 is 0.55. A comparison of this shadow price with its market price shows that 
fertilizers were overused.6 This finding is consistent with results from Oude Lansink and Silva 
(2004), and Guan et al. (2005) while Skevas et al. (Chapter 3) report that fertilizers were 
optimally used from Dutch cash crop producers.  A comparison of the average shadow values 
of fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, and other pesticides with pesticide prices shows that all 
pesticides were overused. This finding shows that farmers could increase their profitability by 
decreasing the use of pesticides.  
 
Oude Lansink and Silva (2004) report fungicides, other pesticides, and herbicides 7 were (on 
average) under-utilized in their study of Dutch arable farms over the period 1989-1992. 
Underutilization of fungicides, herbicides and other pesticides is also reported by Oude Lansink 
and Carpentier (2001) for Dutch specialized arable farms over the same period. Guan et al. 
(2005) report a pesticide shadow value of 1.25 and conclude that pesticides were optimally used 
at the farm level but they add that this might lead to an overuse if the indirect effects of 
pesticides are taken into account. Skevas et al. (Chapter 3) use a model with two types of 
                                                 
6 A statistical test has shown that the shadow value of fertilizers is significantly different from its market price. 
7 Herbicides were over-utilized only in the model that measured efficiency radially in the productive input 
subspace. 
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pesticides that differ in terms of toxicity and environmental spillovers of pesticides in their 
study of Dutch arable farms over the period 2003-2007. Their findings show that both types of 
pesticides were overused, a result that is in line with our finding.  
 
Table 4. Annual averages of the shadow values of fertilizer and pesticides (SD a of risky inputs, 
WD of risky outputs). 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003-2007 Input price b 
Fertilizer 0.49 0.57 0.35 0.43 0.70 0.51 0.98  
Fungicides 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.31 0.16 0.14 0.99 
Herbicides 0.28 0.27 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.18 1.01 
Insecticides 0.43 0.69 0.95 0.56 0.16 0.56 1.02 
Other pesticides 0.92 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.26 0.73 1.01 
a SD and WD denote strong and weak disposability, respectively. 
b Price index from Eurostat. 
 
 6.5 Conclusions 
 
This study uses a non-parametric risk-adjusted inefficiency model of Dutch cash crop producers 
that explicitly accounts for the effect of production means on output variability to compute 
output, risk-mitigating inputs and risky outputs inefficiency. Farmers use risk-mitigating inputs 
to manage risk, with agricultural practices leading to the production of risky outputs, defined as 
the variance of output and pesticide effects on biodiversity. The first two moments of output 
distribution are used to compute output variance which is then incorporated into the efficiency 
modelling framework, thus accounting for the risk increasing or decreasing nature of the 
employed production inputs. 
 
Results show that fungicides and herbicides are risk-reducing inputs while other pesticides and 
other inputs are risk-increasing inputs. Dutch cash crop farmers have considerable levels of 
risky outputs’ inefficiency (i.e., 9%) implying that policy makers could focus on reducing 
pesticides’ environmental spillovers. Fertilizer and all types of pesticides (i.e., fungicides, 
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herbicides, insecticides and other pesticides) are overused by Dutch cash crop farmers. The 
considerable level of risky outputs’ inefficiency in conjunction with pesticides’ overuse reveals 
a need to decrease pesticide use and their environmental spillovers. Therefore, pesticide policies 
aiming at optimal pesticide use may increase farmers’ profitability by reducing pesticide use 
and improve environmental quality through reductions in pesticides’ environmental spillovers.
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7.1 Introduction 
 
In modern agriculture, pesticides feature prominently in growers’ arsenal to reduce crop 
damage caused by various pests and diseases. But their indiscriminate use can harm human 
health and the environment (Pimentel et. al., 1992; Pimentel and Greiner, 1997; Wilson & 
Tisdell 2001) and, eventually, impact agricultural productivity negatively. In an era of an 
increasing public awareness on the external effects of pesticides, the EU intends to update its 
pesticide policy by establishing tax and levy schemes. Information coming from empirical 
research on pesticide use and environmental spillovers at the farm level may assist policy 
makers in introducing optimal pesticide policies. 
 
However, little is known about the impact of pesticides’ environmental spillovers on output 
realization. Moreover, there is little farm-level empirical research investigating the impact of 
different economic instruments on pesticide use and environmental spillovers. The major 
objective of this thesis is to assess empirically the effect of pesticide use and environmental 
spillovers on farmers’ production environment with a view toward contributing to the 
development and implementation of future pesticide policies. 
 
The issues addressed in this research were: a) the composition of an optimal pesticide policy 
and the information needs for applying such a policy; b) the impact of pesticide use and 
environmental spillovers on output realization; c) the potential or ability of economic incentives 
and command and control approaches to alter farm practices by reducing pesticide use and 
environmental spillovers; d) farmers’ technical and pesticides’ environmental efficiency under 
pesticide dynamics and production uncertainty; and e) farmers’ technical and allocative 
efficiency when considering undesirable outputs, pesticides as risk-mitigating inputs and taking 
explicitly into account the risk-increasing or decreasing nature of production inputs. Numerous 
implications for policy makers, scientists, and other stakeholders can be derived from these 
issues. These implications are going to be presented and discussed in this chapter. 
 
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents the approaches used 
in this thesis and information on their application. Section 7.3 reports the main results, while 
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policy implications and recommendations for future research are presented in section 7.4 and 
7.5, respectively. 
 
7.2 Approach and implementation 
 
The framework of the research comprises four approaches to address the five research 
questions. A review of the economics of pesticide use literature took place which enabled not 
only the identification of the contour of an optimal pesticide policy and the information needed 
for applying such a policy, but also provided the foundations for the development of a dynamic 
model of optimal pesticide use incorporating pesticides’ environmental spillovers and takes into 
account explicitly the symmetric and asymmetric effect of pesticides’ environmental spillovers 
on production. This model captures the impact of pesticide use and environmental spillovers on 
output realization, thus providing empirical evidence of the impact of farmland biodiversity on 
farmers’ production environment. A similar dynamic model is used in a simulation process to 
identify the impact of economic incentives and command and control approaches on pesticide 
use and environmental spillovers. Data envelopment analysis is employed to measure the 
performance of farmers after adjusting outputs and inputs to account for the effect of variability 
in farmers’ operating environment using a bootstrap-approach. Data envelopment analysis is 
also conducted to provide a risk-adjusted efficiency measurement of the performance of Dutch 
arable farmers, using undesirable outputs, risk-mitigating inputs, and taking explicitly into 
account the effect of production inputs on risk management. Secondary data are used for this 
study. These data included panel data of Dutch cash crop farms over the period 2002-2007 
obtained from the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), data on pesticides’ 
environmental spillovers from the Dutch Centre for Agriculture and Environment (CLM), and 
data on weather variables from the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI, 2011). 
 
7.3 Overview of findings 
 
To reach the overall goal of this study, five research questions were addressed. The highlights 
for each research question are presented in this section. 
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Research question one: 
What is the contour of an optimal pesticide policy scheme and what are the knowledge gaps to 
be addressed to support the design of optimal pesticide policies?  
 
The optimal pesticide policy should involve incentives to achieve environmental and health 
standards. Concerning the information needs for the introduction of optimal pesticide policy 
frameworks, overuse or underuse of pesticides depends on the model specification employed 
and the crops under consideration. A clearer view of pesticide use trends should be obtained 
through more research on different EU countries and crops. Pesticide demand is  inelastic, in 
general, implying that only high pesticide taxes may alter farmers’ practices. Considering that 
high pesticide taxes may impact farm profit negatively, using a mixture of instruments and 
regulations can compensate for the deficiencies of each other. Consumers are in general willing 
to pay to reduce the environmental risks from pesticide use, implying that pesticide policies 
should inform and encourage farmers on low pesticide production practices. Incentives can be 
also provided for farmers forming organic or IPM production groups and thus gain from their 
collective capacity to establish a reputation for their products. 
 
Data on pesticides’ environmental spillovers may help policy makers in classifying pesticides 
according to toxic content, thus supporting the introduction of differentiated pesticide taxes. 
One of the reasons behind the absence of economic incentive-based pesticide policies that are 
tied to environmental indicators in several EU countries’ pesticide policies may be the lack of 
data on pesticides environmental spillovers. As agronomic and climatic conditions differ among 
EU countries, country-specific research on the environmental effects of pesticides may help 
scientists  form robust pesticide environmental indicators.  This can enable policy makers to 
introduce pesticide policy schemes that will better reflect pesticides’ potential environmental 
damage. These schemes can alter pesticide decisions at the farm level such that negative 
environmental spillovers of pesticides are reduced.  
 
Research question two: 
Are pesticides’ impacts on biodiversity affecting agricultural output? 
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The impacts of pesticides on biodiversity are impacting the farmers’ production environment 
significantly. More specifically, when increasing the pressure on water and soil organisms and 
biological controllers some output losses are realized as these organisms can have a beneficial 
impact on output by reducing crop damage through the control of pest populations, enhancing 
soil nutritional characteristics and contributing to increased crop pollination. The results also 
show that pesticides are overused on average. Overuse of pesticides may impact beneficial  
farm organisms negatively, pointing the need to reduce pesticide use and conserve farmland 
organisms. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a contribution to the economics of pesticide use literature. It is the first time 
that a dynamic model of optimal pesticide use accounts for both the symmetric and asymmetric 
effect of the environmental spillovers of pesticides on output. Pesticides do not only protect 
crops from pests and diseases but also cause environmental damage. The integration of 
pesticides’ environmental spillovers in farmers’ production technology is an improvement 
compared to earlier specifications in terms of richness of the results, thus providing valuable 
information to policy makers aiming at introducing optimal pesticide policies.  
 
Research question three: 
Are pesticide tax and levy schemes effective in reducing pesticide use and environmental 
spillovers in Dutch arable farming? 
 
No single tax or levy instrument can lead to a substantial reduction of pesticide use. Pesticide 
taxes as a single instrument can be characterized as ineffective since they yield small decreases 
in pesticide use and environmental spillovers. Pesticide tax schemes that put higher penalties on 
high toxicity than low toxicity pesticides do not result in the substitution. Farmers’ beliefs on 
the effectiveness of high toxicity products in preventing crop damage and reducing output 
variability may explain farmers’ reluctance to reduce the use of high toxicity products. 
However, pesticide taxes can have positive environmental side effects (decrease fertilizer use), 
raise tax revenues and finance subsidy schemes. Subsidies on low toxicity pesticides did not 
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affect the use of high toxicity products while R&D of more environmental friendly products 
effectively reduced the environmental spillovers of pesticides. Pesticide quotas are more 
appropriate in reducing pesticide use and environmental spillovers in comparison to most of the 
pesticide tax and levy schemes employed in this study. 
 
In conclusion, taxes are not effective in reducing pesticide use. A set of policy tools including 
both economic incentives and command and control regulations may better address the desired 
policy goals. The contribution of chapter 4 to the literature on the economics of pesticide use 
and pesticide policy analysis is threefold. First, the asymmetric effect of pesticides’ 
environmental spillovers on crop production are explicitly incorporated into the analysis to test 
whether economic incentives can alter pesticide decisions at the farm level such that 
environmental spillovers of pesticides are reduced. Second, this chapter provides new insights 
to Dutch and EU policy makers on the impacts of different policy tools. In the absence of 
empirical research in the Netherlands on the farm-level impact of pesticide tax and levy 
schemes, the results from such empirical analysis may help policy makers in setting optimal 
pesticide policies. Third, this study provides a way to classify pesticides according to toxic 
contents, thus assisting policy makers in developing differentiated pesticide taxes. 
 
Research question four: 
What is Dutch farmers’ technical and pesticides’ environmental inefficiency when considering 
pesticide dynamic effects on biodiversity and production uncertainty? 
 
The initial DEA evaluation shows that Dutch farmers have noticeable output inefficiency scores 
(21%) and high pesticide environmental inefficiency (24-25%) that reveal a considerable scope 
for decreasing pesticides’ environmental spillovers. When ignoring pesticide dynamics (i.e., the 
environmental spillovers of pesticides) output inefficiency increases dramatically (48%). Large 
farms, operated by older decision makers, with high soil quality, increased presence of farmland 
biodiversity, and exposed to high precipitation rates tend to be more output inefficient. 
Concerning pesticides’ environmental inefficiency, large farms are more inefficient in 
protecting the status of the environment and taking into account pesticides’ future negative 
effects in their current production decisions. 
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After adjusting for the variation in production conditions, farmers’ output and pesticide 
environmental inefficiency scores decrease. More specifically, average output and pesticide 
environmental inefficiency scores decrease by 24% and 46-50%, respectively. This result 
provides evidence that producers operating under unfavorable production conditions may be 
disadvantaged in the initial DEA evaluation not accounting for production uncertainty (i.e., the 
variation in production arising from climatic events and other random forces). Comparing the 
initial and the adjusted DEA evaluation we see that farmers’ average output inefficiency is 
reduced from 21% to 16% while pesticide environmental inefficiency decreased from 24% to 
13%. This result shows that managerial inefficiency accounts for only 13-16% of the 
inefficiency while production uncertainty contributes 5-11%. Production uncertainty leads to 
considerable profit loss for farmers (€ 9.57 thousand) revealing a need to reduce the economic 
damage through market-oriented risk management tools. 
 
Based on the empirical findings in this section, the following conclusions can be derived. First, 
inefficiency scores that consider pesticide dynamics and variability in the operating 
environment reveal a considerable scope for improving the process of output realization and 
reducing the environmental spillovers of pesticides. Second, ignoring the dynamics of 
production and the effects of variability in production conditions when measuring farmers’ 
performance may lead to an overestimation of farmers’ inefficiency scores. Chapter 5 
contributes to the recent literature (Chambers et al., 2011; Emvalomatis, 2011) by providing 
further evidence that efficiency levels can be distorted when using models that ignore 
production uncertainty. 
 
Research question five: 
What is Dutch farmers’ technical and allocative inefficiency when accounting for undesirable 
outputs and the risk-increasing or decreasing nature of agricultural inputs? 
 
Dutch farmers have considerable average output technical inefficiency (9%) and undesirable 
outputs’ inefficiency score (9%). Results reveal a considerable scope for decreasing output 
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variability and pesticides’ environmental spillovers. The average technical inefficiency of risk-
mitigating and variable inputs is 6% and 3%, respectively. Fungicides, insecticides, and 
herbicides decrease output variance while labour and other pesticides are marginal-risk 
increasing inputs (i.e., increase the variability of harvests under good growth conditions). All 
types of pesticides (i.e., fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, and other pesticides) are overused 
on average, indicating that farmers can increase their profitability by decreasing the use of 
pesticides.  
 
In conclusion, the findings of this chapter suggest that considerable improvements may still be 
achieved in farmers’ profitability and environmental status through reductions in pesticide use 
and environmental spillovers. More specifically, policy makers can focus on reducing 
pesticides’ environmental spillovers by up to 9% reduction. The major contribution of chapter 6 
to literature is the employment of a DEA model that accounts for the risk-increasing or 
decreasing nature of agricultural inputs. Unlike most of the DEA studies at the agricultural 
firm-level that account for risk as an exogenous factor (i.e., weather variables or statistical 
noise) (Chambers et al., 2011; Skevas et al., Chapter 5), this work presents a way to incorporate 
risk focusing on the risk behavior on the part of the producer. This is realized by including in 
the modeling framework undesirable outputs and risk-mitigating inputs and taking explicitly 
into account the impact of those inputs on farmers’ risk behavior. 
 
7.4 Policy implications 
 
Pesticide taxes proved to be ineffective in reducing pesticide use and environmental spillovers 
while higher taxes on high toxicity products, and subsidies on the use of low toxicity products 
did not affect the use of high toxicity products. However, pesticide taxes should not be 
excluded from pesticide policy schemes due to their capacity to raise tax revenues that can 
finance subsidies (e.g. for R&D of more environmental friendly products) and extension and 
the fact that they have secondary environmental advantages arising from decreased fertilizer use 
that can lead to fertilizer contamination reductions. Subsidies on the development of more 
environmental friendly products can decrease pesticides’ environmental spillovers 
considerably. These findings indicate that an optimal pesticide policy should not designed with 
a single instrument but will involve a mixture of policy tools including economic incentives and 
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command and control approaches. The latter proved to be effective in reducing pesticide use 
and environmental spillovers, implying that command and control approaches can have a role in 
any pesticide policy. Education and extension can further enhance the effectiveness of 
individual policy tools. For instance, informing farmers on low toxicity substitutes may render 
differentiated according to pesticide toxicity tax schemes more effective. As this is the first 
Dutch study on the effectiveness of different economic instruments on pesticide use at the farm 
level and detailed data on pesticides’ environmental spillovers at the farm level are recently 
available, the findings coming from their use in empirical work require further evaluation 
before they applied to pesticide policy. 
 
The considerable pesticide environmental inefficiency of Dutch arable farmers imply that a 
reduction of pesticides’ environmental spillovers can be achieved with the current technology 
(e.g. more precise pesticide applications). Alternatively, pesticide policies may trigger farmers 
in switching to more environmental friendly practices. As many studies have shown that 
consumers are willing to pay for higher environmental quality, providing incentives to farmers 
to adopt more environmental friendly practices can enhance environmental quality and protect 
farmers profit through increasing the number of beneficial farm organisms and/or taking 
advantage of the price premium of more environmental friendly products. Overuse of pesticides 
is a common finding of chapters 3 and 6 providing further evidence for the need to decrease 
pesticide use, thus increasing farmers’ profitability and reducing environmental damage. Large 
farms tend to have a higher output and pesticide environmental inefficiency, suggesting that 
policies aiming at reducing pesticides’ environmental spillovers can initially target those farms.  
 
Another policy contribution of this work is that it provides a way to classify pesticides 
according to toxicity contents using the official classification from the Dutch Board for the 
authorization of pesticides( CTB) for pesticide toxicity in the Netherlands. Results coming from 
pesticide variables using this measure can help policy makers in designing more realistic 
pesticide policies. Classification of pesticides enables the introduction of differentiated 
according to toxicity taxes1, thus better reflecting the potential environmental damage caused 
                                                 
1 Sweden was one of the first countries to introduce a simple tax scheme based on an environmental levy of 30 
SEK (3.25 €) per kg active substance. Norway had also introduced a tax system where the taxation level is banded 
by health and environmental properties (differentiated tax rates per hectare and standard area doses) (Lesinsky and 
Veverka,, 2006 ; OECD, 2008). 
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by pesticides. Instead of taxing pesticides, taxes can be placed on their environmental 
spillovers. Despite the absence of prices for environmental spillovers the tax can be a monetary 
value per environmental spillover. Spillovers on biological controllers and water organisms can 
be taxed at a higher rate as they have a significant negative impact on output realization. 
 
Agricultural producers are operating in a stochastic environment where production dynamics 
and uncertainty are affecting production decisions. Models that ignore pesticide dynamics and 
variation in the operating environment can lead to biasing results, thereby possibly 
misinforming policy makers. As inefficiency due to production uncertainty counts for 5-11% 
leading to farmers’ profit loss of around € 9.57 thousand on average, market-oriented risk 
management tools can mitigate farmers’ economic damage. The considerable amount of profit 
loss raises concerns on the ability of farmers to cover it through market-oriented risk 
management tools. In any case, extension services should inform farmers on the economic 
damage caused by production uncertainty. 
 
Moving from a country specific pesticide policy to an EU wide pesticide policy a mixture of 
policy instruments including both economic incentives and command and control approaches 
and accompanied by education and extension can possibly better address any set of policy 
goals. Differences in agronomic characteristics and employed pesticide products across EU 
states or even regions within a state should not pose an obstacle to forming an EU-wide 
pesticide policy. Heterogeneity across states’ production characteristics shows that taxes and 
levies should be country- or region-specific with the overall pesticide policy being coordinated 
by the EU. Agronomic characteristics and more specifically pesticide use and impacts differ 
across states or regions. Uniformity of environmental indicators across states may help towards 
the harmonization of national pesticide policies. The environmental indicators developed in the 
Netherlands (CLM, 2010) can be an example of developing similar databases in other EU 
countries. Problems (such as unanimity in tax-related decisions) arising by harmonizing 
pesticide policies across all EU states may be surpassed by cooperation among groups of states. 
 
7.5 Recommendations for future research 
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Pesticides’ environmental spillovers do not only have farm level impacts but they may affect 
the production environment of other farms operating in the same region. Regional data on 
changes in biodiversity populations in conjunction with farm level data on pesticides’ 
environmental spillovers can be included in a modeling framework, thus providing a more 
comprehensive bio-economic representation of the impact of pesticide decisions on both farms’ 
and  neighboring producers’ production environment. Taking into account not only the farm-
level impact of pesticides but also their impact on other agents’ production choices can help 
researchers design models that better internalize pesticide externalities. Information on the 
production impacts of pesticides’ environmental spillovers and the effect of each farmers’ 
production decisions on biodiversity populations’ changes allow for studying incentive systems 
in which the generator of the impact compensates the affected party. Modeling frameworks 
using compensation/payment and, in general, ex-post liability rules may enable researchers to 
test whether farmers can further reduce the use of highly toxic products and/or move towards 
more precise pesticide applications. 
 
Detailed information on pest populations can also help to explicitly capture the effect of pest 
resistance on output realization. Although this effect can be reflected in the evolution of the 
environmental spillover variables (i.e., higher values of environmental spillovers are assumed to 
reflect higher pesticide applications due to resistance), data on pest populations can better 
reflect this issue. Incorporating both pesticides environmental spillovers and resistance 
development in modeling frameworks of optimal pesticide use can provide a better picture of 
the impact of pesticide practices on production. 
 
Given the dynamic nature of agricultural production, assessing the impact of dynamics in farm-
decision making and investigating whether farmers are rational when taking into account these 
dynamics can provide valuable information to researchers and policy makers. Stochastic as well 
as structural components can lead to dynamic linkages. Modeling frameworks that integrate 
dynamic linkages coming from both stochastic and structural components may provide a more 
overall and realistic representation of the drivers behind farmers’ production decisions.  
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Differences in agronomic characteristics across Europe or even within states reveal a need to 
apply pesticide use modeling approaches to each country or region separately. Tax or levies as 
stand-alone measures may not be effective in reducing pesticide use and environment spillovers 
in the Netherlands, where potatoes is one of the most profitable arable crop requiring high 
number of preventive fungicide applications.  But these measures may be effective in other 
countries were their agriculture is dominated by different crops. Incorporating environmental 
spillovers of pesticides at the farm level in modeling approaches is an addition to the literature 
of the economics of pesticide use. More empirical applications are needed to verify the 
robustness of the results of this dissertation. More specifically as this research shows that 
overuse of pesticides is a common finding in modeling frameworks that take into account 
pesticides’ environmental spillovers, further investigation is needed to verify this finding 
possibly at country level where pesticide use and climatic and agronomic characteristics vary 
considerably.  
 
Pesticides do not only pose environmental challenges but also affect human health through 
direct exposure of farm workers during pesticide applications or through the food chain. 
Research on the economics of pesticide use at the firm-level can be enriched further by 
simultaneously examining the effect of both environmental and health spillovers of pesticides 
on output realization. This might not be relevant for the Netherlands where farmers spray 
pesticides from a closed environment (i.e., tractors) and wear the appropriate protective 
equipment. However, it can be important in countries where farmers have considerably smaller 
acreages (i.e., where maybe it is not cost effective to use closed tractors for spraying) and do 
not use frequently the appropriate protective equipment. 
 
Production uncertainty plays a decisive role in farmers’ production choices. This dissertation 
demonstrated ways to modeling risk either as an exogenous (e.g., adjusting outputs and inputs 
for changes in weather conditions) or an endogenous impact (i.e., considering risk behaviour on 
the part of the producer reflected by choices on risk-mitigating inputs and management of 
undesirable outputs). An interesting research avenue might be to develop a modeling approach 
that takes into account risk both as an endogenous and exogenous impact. For instance, when 
detailed meteorological data at the farm-level are available, using the risk-adjusted efficiency 
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measurement developed in chapter 6 for separate groups of farms classified according to the 
intensity of climatic events may provide more insights of how farmers manage production risk. 
 
Technology diffusion in agriculture is closely related, among others, to pesticide use. For 
instance, new pesticide products that are more effective in combating pest damage and 
simultaneously more environmental friendly may appear in the market, and genetically 
modified crops are related with lower pesticide applications. New agricultural technologies can 
enhance farm productivity and contribute significantly to pesticide policies that aim to reduce 
pesticide use and environmental spillovers. But new technologies may imply extra costs due to 
compliance with policy regulations. The implications of the diffusion of new technologies in 
the agricultural sector for shifting patterns of production and resource use are providing new 
pathways in empirical research. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
The major conclusions of this thesis are: 
1. Incentives to achieve environmental and health standards should be part of pesticide 
policies. Economic incentive-based pesticide policies that are tied to environmental 
indicators can benefit from country specific research on the environmental effects of 
pesticides, as agronomic and climatic conditions differ among EU countries and regions.  
2. Pesticides are overused in Dutch arable farming. Overuse of pesticides implies that 
farmers could increase their profitability by decreasing pesticide use. Pesticide policy 
frameworks should aim at reducing pesticide use in order to increase farmers’ 
profitability and reduce environmental damage. 
3. Pesticides’ effects on biodiversity are affecting agricultural output significantly. 
Therefore, when increasing the pressure on these organisms some output changes are 
realized. 
4. Pesticide taxes are not effective in reducing pesticide use and environmental spillovers. 
However, pesticide taxes can be part of pesticide policies due to their capacity to raise 
tax revenues that can finance subsidies (e.g. for R&D of more environmental friendly 
products) and the fact that they have secondary environmental advantages (e.g. 
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decreased fertilizer use that can lead to fertilizer contamination reductions). Pesticide 
quotas are more effective in reducing pesticide use and environmental spillovers.  
5. Inefficiency measurement revealed a considerable scope for decreasing pesticides’ 
environmental spillovers. This implies that a reduction of pesticides’ environmental 
spillovers can be achieved with the current technology, through better management of 
agricultural practices such as more precise pesticide applications. 
6. Technical inefficiency decreased dramatically when accounting for production 
uncertainty. Agricultural producers are operating in a stochastic environment where 
production uncertainty affects their decisions. As production uncertainty is an integral 
part of farmers’ production environment, models that ignore it, can lead to erroneous 
results. 
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Summary 
 
During the second half of the last century agricultural firms faced great changes with  
agricultural intensification being one of the most important ones. Being part of this 
intensification, pesticides are highly used in agricultural production of developed countries to 
prevent and combat crop damage, thus securing crop yields. Pesticides have an indirect effect 
on output rather than a direct yield-increasing effect. Pesticides reduce pest damage and enable 
farmers to obtain high quality products that can have a positive impact on their revenues. 
Despite the positive outcomes from the use of pesticides, adverse impacts to human health and 
the environment are a related consequence. Continuous use of chemical inputs such as 
pesticides produces significant negative impacts that have been broadly documented in the 
scientific literature. Negative impacts on flora and fauna, reduced numbers of beneficial pest 
predators, development of pesticide resistant weeds and pests, aquifers’ polution, fishery loss, 
contaminated products and bee poisonings are some of the adverse effects of pesticides.  
 
As public awareness on the indirect effects of pesticides on the environment and human health 
is increasing, European Union (EU) seeks to update its pesticide policy by using economic 
incentives to reduce pesticide use and their spillovers. Currently, a few EU countries, such as 
Sweden and Norway, have embedded economic incentives in their pesticide policy but it is 
difficult to separate the impact of taxation on pesticide use from other factors influencing 
farmers’ use decisions (e.g., switch to low dose agents, conversion to organic farming, 
improved pesticide technologies and management). Although tax and levy systems in these 
countries may assist policy makers in developing tax and levy schemes, farm-level empirical 
research on pesticide use and environmental spillovers is needed. Implementation of economic 
incentive-based pesticide policies require detailed information on pesticide use and 
environmental spillovers thus pointing to the importance of farm-level approaches in primary 
policy analysis. 
 
However, little empirical research has been done on the impacts of both pesticide use and 
environmental spillovers on output realization. Also, little empirical evidence exists on the 
impacts of pesticide policy tools (such as economic incentives and command and control 
approaches) on farmers’ pesticide use decisions and environmental spillovers. The objective of 
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this thesis is to examine empirically the impact of pesticide use and environmental spillovers on 
output realization, thus providing evidence for the implementation of future pesticide policies. 
 
In Chapter 2, a literature review took place to identify the contour of an optimal pesticide policy 
and the information needs for applying such a policy. These information include knowledge on 
the production structure (i.e., production function, pesticide demand elasticities), attitudes 
toward risk and uncertainty related to pesticides application, the value of pesticides to 
consumers (e.g., the willingness to pay (WTP) for lower pesticide use), and the effects of 
pesticide use on biodiversity in relation to existing pesticide policies. The literature review 
produced a number of key findings: more research (at regional or state level) is needed on 
examining whether pesticides are over- or under-utilized as pesticide use trends depend on the 
employed model specification and the crops under consideration; pesticide demand is inelastic, 
implying that high and possibly politically problematic taxes are needed to reduce pesticide use; 
consumers are willing to pay to reduce pesticides’ environmental spillovers; country specific 
research on pesticides’ environmental spillovers can assist policy makers in introducing 
pesticide policies that will better reflect pesticides’ potential environmental damage and alter 
farmers’ pesticide use decisions. 
 
In Chapter 3, a dynamic model of optimal pesticide use is used to assess the impact of pesticide 
use and environmental spillovers (i.e., impacts on farmland biodiversity) on output realization. 
Two pesticide categories are used (i.e., high and low toxicity pesticides) and both the 
symmetric and asymmetric effect of pesticides’ environmental spillovers on output is taken into 
account. Including environmental spillovers of pesticides on farmers’ production technology is 
an improvement compared to earlier studies in terms of richness of the results. Results show 
that pesticide impacts on biodiversity have a significant effect on agricultural output and both 
types of pesticides are overused in Dutch arable farming. The importance of farmland 
biodiversity in output realization in conjunction with pesticide overuse show a need to reduce 
pesticide use and protect farmland organisms. This chapter contributes to the economics of 
pesticide use literature by internalizing effectively in a dynamic model of optimal pesticide use 
the environmental spillovers of pesticides.  
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In Chapter 4, a dynamic model of optimal pesticide use is developed and estimated 
econometrically. After the econometric estimation, a simulation model of optimal pesticide use 
is employed to investigate the impact of different economic incentives and command and 
control measures on pesticide use and environmental spillovers. The economic incentives 
employed in this study include uniform and differentiated taxes on high and low toxicity 
products, subsidies on the use of low toxicity products and R&D of more environmental 
friendly products while the command and control measures include pesticide quotas. The 
results of the simulation analysis indicate that taxes as stand-alone measures are not effective in 
reducing pesticide use and environmental spillovers. Differentiated taxes and subsidies on the 
use of low toxicity products did not affect the use of high toxicity products. Farmers’ rigidity in 
reducing the use of high toxicity products or substitute them with low toxicity ones may be 
explained by high toxicity products’ capacity to prevent crop damage and reduce output 
variability. R&D of more environmental friendly products can reduce pesticides’ environmental 
spillovers while pesticide quotas are more effective in reducing pesticide use and their 
environmental impacts in comparison to most of the employed instruments. A pesticide policy 
framework including both economic incentives and command and control approaches may be 
more effective in achieving pesticide policy targets. This chapter contributes to the pesticide 
policy literature by providing new evidence to Dutch and EU policy makers on the impact of 
pesticide policy tools on pesticide use and environmental spillovers. 
 
In chapter 5, a dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model is used to investigating the 
performance of Dutch arable farms when taking into account pesticide dynamics and 
production uncertainty (i.e., variability in production conditions due to weather events and  the 
state of nature). Technical inefficiency is explained using the Simar and Wilson (2007) double-
bootstrap procedure with socioeconomic and environmental variables, thus providing empirical 
representations of the impact of stochastic elements and the state of nature on production. 
Firms’ outputs and inputs are adjusted using the results of the double-bootstrap procedure to 
account for the impact of variability in production conditions. Finally, the dynamic DEA model 
is applied to adjusted outputs, inputs and undesirables (i.e., pesticides environmental 
spillovers). The results of the initial DEA evaluation show that Dutch arable farmers have 
noticeable output inefficiency scores (21%) and high pesticide environmental inefficiency (24-
25%). Large farms have higher pesticide environmental inefficiency; i.e., are more inefficient in 
protecting the status of the environment and taking into account pesticides’ future negative 
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effects in their current production decisions. When adjusting outputs and inputs for the variation 
in production conditions farmers’ output and pesticide environmental inefficiency scores 
decrease; average output and pesticide environmental inefficiency scores decrease by 24% and 
46-50%, respectively. The initial DEA evaluation shows that Dutch arable farmers are for 
output and undesirables on average around 21% and 24%, respectively, below the production 
frontier, while with the adjusted DEA model farmers’ inefficiency is reduced to around 16% 
and 13%, respectively. This results shows that managerial inefficiency accounts for only around 
13-16% while another 5-11% is attributed to production uncertainty. This amount of production 
uncertainty is translated to farmers’ profit loss of around € 9.57 thousand on average, revealing 
a need to mitigate it through market-oriented risk management tools. This chapter provides 
evidence that efficiency levels can be distorted when using models that ignore production 
uncertainty. 
 
In chapter 6, a risk-adjusted DEA model is used to measure technical and allocative 
inefficiency of Dutch arable farms. The DEA model uses undesirable outputs and risk-
mitigating inputs and takes explicitly into account the risk-increasing or –decreasing effect of 
production inputs on output realization. Results show that fungicides, insecticides, and 
herbicides are marginal-risk decreasing inputs while labour and other pesticides are marginal-
risk increasing inputs. Results further indicate that Dutch arable farmers have considerable 
output technical inefficiency (9%) and undesirables inefficiency score (9%). These findings 
show that pesticides’ environmental spillovers can be reduced by up to 9%. Fungicides, 
herbicides, insecticides, and other pesticides are overused on average, revealing a considerable 
scope for increasing farmers’ profitability through decreases in pesticide use. This chapter 
contributes to the literature by providing a risk-adjusted efficiency model that takes explicitly 
into account the impact of production inputs on output variability. 
 
Numerous conclusions and policy implications can be drawn from this dissertation. First, as 
farmland biodiversity plays an important role in farmers’ production environment and 
pesticides are overused in Dutch arable farming, pesticide policies should try to conserve 
farmland organisms and reduce pesticide use. Second, tax and levy schemes are not effective in 
reducing pesticide use and environmental spillovers but they can still have a share in pesticide 
policies as they can finance subsidies ( as subsidies on more environmental friendly products 
Summary 
 
168 
 
can reduce the environmental spillovers of pesticides) and decrease fertilizer use leading to 
fertilizer contamination reductions. Pesticide quotas are more effective in reducing pesticide use 
and their indirect impacts on biodiversity in comparison to most of the examined economic 
incentives. Therefore, pesticide policies need not entail a single policy tool but should involve a 
mixture of measures including both economic incentives and command and control approaches. 
Third, Dutch farmers considerable environmental inefficiency shows that a reduction of 
pesticides’ environmental spillovers can be achieved with the current technology. This may be 
realized by better management of pesticide use such as higher precision of pesticide 
applications. Fourth, modeling frameworks that ignore pesticide dynamics and variation in the 
operating environment can lead to erroneous results and conclusions. Fifth, the differences in 
agronomic and climatic characteristics of different countries and regions require the application 
of country or region specific pesticide modeling frameworks. Such frameworks can be 
benefited from collection of country or region specific pesticide impact data as biodiversity, 
employed crops and production practices may differ considerably among different countries or 
regions. 
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Samenvatting 
 
In de tweede helft van de vorige eeuw ondergingen landbouwbedrijven grote veranderingen in 
de intensiteit. De grotere intensiteit ging samen met een groter gebruik van pesticiden in de 
landbouw van ontwikkelde landen, ter preventie van schade en om oogsten zeker te stellen. 
Pesticiden hebben eerder een indirect effect op output in plaats van een direct opbrengst 
verhogend effect.  Pesticiden verminderen de schade als gevolg van ziekten en plagen en maken 
het mogelijk dat agrarische ondernemers een goede kwaliteit kunnen afleveren en hoge 
revenuen kunnen genereren. Naast positieve effecten van pesticiden, zijn er ook negatieve 
consequenties voor de humane gezondheid en het milieu. Een voortdurend gebruik van 
pesticiden heeft negatieve effecten die goed zijn gedocumenteerd in de literatuur. Voorbeelden 
van negatieve effecten zijn: effecten op flora en fauna, minder natuurlijke vijanden, 
ontwikkeling van pesticiden resistentie, vervuiling van grondwater, residuen in voedsel en 
vergiftiging van vissen en bijenpopulaties. 
 
De toename van het bewustzijn van burgers van de negatieve effecten heeft geleid tot meer 
beleid vanuit de EU om de effecten te beteugelen. Daarbij onderzoekt de EU ook de 
mogelijkheden van economische incentives. Op dit moment hebben Zweden en Noorwegen 
economische incentives opgenomen in hun pesticiden beleid. Het exacte effect van 
economische incentives vis-à-vis het gebruik van lage doseringen, verbeterde 
toedieningstechnieken en biologische landbouw, is echter moeilijk vast te stellen. Empirisch 
onderzoek is nodig om te onderzoeken of belastingen en heffingen kunnen bijdragen aan een 
terugdringing van het gebruik van pesticiden. Implementatie van pesticiden beleid gebaseerd op 
economische incentives vraagt gedetailleerde informatie over pesticiden gebruik en milieu 
effecten. Empirisch onderzoek op het niveau van landbouwbedrijven is daarbij essentieel. 
Desalniettemin is er tot nu toe weinig onderzoek geweest naar de effecten van pesticiden en 
milieu spillovers op de gerealiseerde output van landbouwbedrijven. Ook zijn er weinig 
empirisch onderzoeksresultaten over de effecten van pesticiden beleid op beslissingen op 
bedrijfsniveau over het pesticiden gebruik en milieu spillovers. Het doel van deze thesis is om 
empirisch het effect te bepalen van pesticidengebruik en milieu spillovers op de gerealiseerde 
output om daarmee inzicht te verschaffen in de mogelijkheden van economische incentives in 
het pesticidenbeleid. 
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In Hoofdstuk 2 is een literatuur review uitgevoerd om de contouren te schetsen van een 
optimaal pesticiden beleid en om vast te stellen wat de daarbij behorende informatiebehoefte is. 
De informatiebehoefte omvat kennis van de productiestructuur (productiefunctie, vraag naar 
pesticiden), houding ten opzichte van risico en onzekerheid over pesticidengebruik, de 
willingness to pay (WTP) van consumenten voor een lager pesticiden gebruik en de effecten 
van pesticidengebruik op biodiversiteit. De belangrijkste resultaten van de literatuur review 
zijn:  meer onderzoek (op regionaal of nationaal niveau) is nodig om vast te stellen of er sprake 
is van overmatig dan wel een te laag gebruik van pesticiden; trends in het gebruik van 
pesticiden hangen af van de gebruikte model specificatie en de gewassen die worden 
meegenomen in de analyse; de vraag naar pesticiden is inelastisch, wat impliceert dat hoge 
belastingen of heffingen nodig zijn om het gebruik te verminderen; consumenten zijn bereid om 
te betalen voor een lager pesticiden gebruik en vermindering van milieu spillovers. Onderzoek 
dat specifiek voor individuele landen wordt uitgevoerd kan behulpzaam zijn bij het ontwerpen 
van pesticiden beleid waarin milieu schade beter wordt meegenomen en dat leidt tot 
daadwerkelijke veranderingen in de beslissingen van boeren over pesticiden gebruik.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt een dynamisch model van optimaal pesticiden gebruik ingezet om de 
impact te bepalen van pesticidengebruik en milieu spillovers op de gerealiseerde output. Het 
model omvat twee categorieën van pesticiden (hoge en lage toxiciteit) en zowel de 
symmetrische en asymmetrische effecten van milieu spillovers op output worden meegenomen. 
Het meenemen van milieu spillovers van pesticiden op de productie technologie van bedrijven 
is een verbetering van modellen die gebruikt worden in de huidige literatuur. De resultaten laten 
zien dat de impact van pesticiden op biodiversiteit  een significant effect heeft op de output. 
Ook laten de resultaten zien dat beide categorieën van pesticiden overmatig worden gebruik op 
Nederlandse akkerbouwbedrijven.  Het belang van biodiversiteit op de gerealiseerde output in 
samenhang met het overmatig gebruik van pesticiden laten zien dat een reductie van pesticiden 
nodig is, ter bescherming van biodiversiteit. Dit hoofdstuk draagt bij aan de literatuur over de 
economie van pesticiden gebruik door de milieu spillovers op te nemen in een dynamisch 
model.   
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In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt een dynamisch model van optimaal pesticiden gebruik ontwikkeld en 
econometrisch geschat. Met behulp van de geschatte parameters wordt een simulatie model 
geconstrueerd waarmee de effecten van verschillende economische incentive mechanismen op 
pesticden gebruik en milieu spillovers worden onderzocht. De economische incentives in dit 
onderzoek zijn uniforme en gedifferentieerde belastingen op pesticiden met een hoge en lage 
toxiciteit, subsidies op het gebruik van pesticiden met een lage toxiciteit en R&D investeringen 
in meer milieu vriendelijke producten. Daarnaast worden pesticiden quota onderzocht. De 
simulaties geven aan dat belastingen nauwelijks effect hebben op het pesticiden gebruik en de 
milieu spillovers. Gedifferentieerde belastingen op hoge toxiciteit pesticiden en subsidies op het 
gebruik van pesticiden met een lage toxiciteit hadden geen effect op het gebruik van de hoge 
toxiciteit pesticiden. Deze resultaten suggereren dat hoge toxiciteit pesticiden zeer effectief zijn 
in het voorkomen van gewasschade. R&D in meer milieuvriendelijke producten kan leiden tot 
lagere milieu spillovers. Pesticiden quota zijn het effectiefst van alle onderzochte instrumenten 
in het reduceren van het pesticiden gebruik en spillovers. Pesticiden beleid dat economische 
incentives combineert met quota kan daarom effectiever zijn in het behalen van de 
beleidsdoelstellingen. Dit hoofdstuk draagt bij aan de literatuur over pesticiden beleid door 
nieuwe inzichten te verschaffen aan Nederlandse en EU beleidsmakers over het terugdringen 
van het pesticiden gebruik en milieu spillovers. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt een dynamisch Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model gebruikt om de 
prestaties van Nederlandse akkerbouwbedrijven te meten. Het model houdt rekening met de 
dynamische effecten van pesticiden en onzekerheid over de productie omstandigheden (b.v. als 
gevolg van het weer).  Technische inefficiëntie wordt verklaard door een regressie op sociaal-
economische en omgevingsvariabelen met behulp van een dubbele bootstrap procedure.  De 
inputs en outputs van bedrijven worden aangepast met behulp van de resultaten van de dubbele 
double-bootstrap procedure om te corrigeren voor onzekerheid over de productie 
omstandigheden. Het dynamische DEA model  wordt tenslotte toegepast op de aangepaste 
inputs, outputs en milieu spillovers. De resultaten van de DEA laten een grote inefficiëntie zien 
(21%) en een hoge milieu inefficiëntie (24-25%). Grote bedrijven hebben een hogere milieu 
inefficiëntie; ze zijn dus minder goed in staat om het milieu te beschermen en nemen de 
negatieve effecten van pesticiden op de toekomstige gerealiseerde output ook minder mee in 
hun huidige beslissingen. Na aanpassing van inputs en output voor onzekerheid worden de 
output milieu inefficiëntie scores lager; de gemiddelde output en milieu inefficiëntie scores 
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verminderen met respectievelijk 24% en 46-50%. Na aanpassing voor onzekerheid liggen de 
output en milieu inefficiëntie scores rond de 16 en 13%  onder de productie frontier. Deze 
resultaten laten zien dat inefficiëntie die kan worden toegerekend aan management slechts 13-
16% is, terwijl 5-11% inefficiëntie kan worden toegerekend aan productie onzekerheid. Deze 
productie onzekerheid leidt tot verliezen van gemiddeld 9.57 duizend euro; dit geeft aan dat er 
behoefte is aan risico management tools om de consequenties van onzekerheid te verminderen. 
Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat inefficiëntie schattingen kunnen worden verstoord door 
onzekerheid over de productie omstandigheden.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt een risico aangepast DEA model gebruikt om de technische en 
allocatieve inefficiëntie van Nederlandse akkerbouwbedrijven te meten. Het DEA model 
onderscheidt ongewenste outputs and risk-verminderende inputs en neemt expliciet het risico-
vergrotende of verminderende effect van inputs op de gerealiseerde output in acht. De 
resultaten laten zien dat fungiciden, insecticiden, en herbiciden marginaal risico verminderende 
inputs zijn, terwijl arbeid en overige pesticiden marginaal risico-verhogende inputs zijn. De 
resultaten laten verder zien dat Nederlandse akkerbouw bedrijven een technische output 
inefficiëntie hebben van 9% en dat de ongewenste output inefficiëntie eveneens 9% is. Deze 
resultaten laten zien dat milieu spillovers kunnen worden gereduceerd met 9%. Fungiciden, 
herbiciden, insecticide en overige pesticiden worden overmatig gebruikt, wat impliceert dat 
bedrijven hun winstgevendheid kunnen verbeteren via een afname van het pesticiden gebruik. 
Dit hoofdstuk draagt bij aan de DEA literatuur door een risico-aangepast DEA model te 
ontwikkelen en expliciet het effect van inputs op de variabiliteit van output mee te nemen. 
 
Verschillende conclusies en beleidsimplicaties kunnen worden ontleend aan deze thesis.  Ten 
eerste, beleid moet zich richten op het terugdringen van pesticiden gebruik en het behoud van 
biodversiteit, aangezien biodiversiteit een belangrijk aspect is van de productie omgeving van, 
en pesticiden overmatig worden gebruikt, op Nederlandse akkerbouwbedrijven. Ten tweede, 
belastingen en heffingen zijn niet geschikt als middel voor het terugdringen van het pesticiden 
gebruik en milieu spillovers. Echter, heffingen kunnen wel gebruikt worden voor de 
financiering van subsidies op milieuvriendelijke middelen en kunnen leiden tot een lager 
gebruik van kunstmest. Pesticiden quota zijn effectiever dan andere economische incentives 
(heffingen, belastingen, subsidies) in terugdringen van het pesticiden gebruik en de indirect 
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gevolgen op biodiversiteit. Pesticiden beleid moet daarom niet bestaan uit één enkele tool, maar 
moet een mix zijn van economische en command en control mechanismen. Ten derde, de 
aanzienlijke milieu inefficiëntie van Nederlandse boeren suggereert dat een reductie van het 
pesticiden gebruik en de milieu spillovers kan worden bereikt met de huidige technologie. Dit 
kan worden gerealiseerd door een beter management van het pesticidengebruik, b.v. door betere 
applicatie technieken. Ten vierde, model raamwerken die de dynamische effecten van 
pesticiden en onzekerheid over de productieomstandigheden niet meenemen kunnen tot 
foutieve resultaten en conclusies leiden. Ten vijfde, de verschillen in agronomische en 
klimatologische omstandigheden in vragen om een land- en regio specifieke modellering van 
het pesticiden gebruik en spillovers. Om deze modellen op een zinvolle manier te kunnen 
toepassen moeten in de toekomst gegevens worden verzameld in verschillende regio’s of landen 
over de impact van pesticiden, zoals biodiversiteit, gewassen en productieomstandigheden. 
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Training and Supervision Plan 
 
*1 ECTS on average is equivalent to 28 hours of course work. 
 
Name of the activity Department/Institute Year ECTS* 
Project related competences    
Irreversibilities Uncertainties and Real 
Option Values 
MG3S 2008 4 
Dynamic Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis 
MG3S 2008 4 
Advanced Production Economics 
AEREC 534 
Penn State University, 
USA 
2009 6 
Advanced Agricultural Business 
Economics BEC30306 
BEC 2009 6 
 
General research related competences 
Advanced Econometrics AEP50806 AEP 2008 6 
Econometrics I Penn State University, 
USA 
2009 6 
Mansholt Introduction course 
‘Do farmers internalize external impacts 
of pesticides in production?’ 
‘Using economic instruments in pesticide 
policy - A case study of Dutch cash-crop 
farmers’ 
MG3S 
EAAE Seminar, Chania, 
Greece 
EAAE Congress, Zurich, 
Switzerland 
2008 
2010 
 
  2011 
1,5 
1 
 
1 
 
Career related competences/personal development 
PhD Competence Assessment WGS 2009 0.3 
Teaching methodology and skills for PhD 
students 
DO 2009 1.8 
Total   37.6 
Colophon 
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